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INTRODUCTION
Retributivism1 is all the rage. Whether it is a "revival,"2 a "resur-
gence," 3 or a "renaissance, ' 4 retributivism's rapid "rise' 5 since the early
I Retributivism is a theory, or justification, of punishment. Though a precise definition of retribu-
tivism has proven elusive, stated most simply, the theory holds that punishment is justified solely be-
cause the person being punished deserves it. As one commentator observed:
What we may call the retributive view is that punishment is justified on the grounds that wrongdo-
ing merits punishment. It is morally fitting that a person who does wrong should suffer in propor-
tion to his wrongdoing. That a criminal should be punished follows from his guilt, and the
severity of the appropriate punishment depends on the depravity of his act. The state of affairs
where a wrongdoer suffers punishment is morally better than the state of affairs where he does not;
and it is better irrespective of any of the consequences of punishing him.
John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REv. 3, 5 (1955).
Other commentators locate the common denominator of all retributivist accounts in retributivism's
relation to a past wrong or offense. See, e.g., R.A. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNIsHMENTS 4 (1986) ("[AII
[retributivist theories] find the sense and justification of punishment in its relation to a past offence");
GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHIKING CRBNAL LAw 416-417 (1978) ("Retribution simply means that pun-
ishment is justified by virtue of its relationship to the offense that has been committed.").
Igor Primoratz notes that "in its most complete form," retributivism contains five tenets:
(1) The moral right to punish is based solely on the offense committed.
(2) The moral duty to punish is also grounded exclusively on the offense committed.
(3) Punishment ought to be proportionate to the offense (the lex talionis).
(4) Punishment is the "annulment' of the offense.
(5) Punishment is a right of the offender.
IGORPRIMORATZ, JUSTIFYING LEGAL PUNISHMENT 12 (1989).
2 See, e.g., David Dolinko, Three Mistakes of Retributivism, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1623, 1623 (1992)
("It is widely acknowledged that retributivism, once treated as an irrational vestige of benighted times,
has enjoyed in recent years so vigorous a revival ...." (footnote omitted)); RLA. Duff, In Defence of
One Type ofRetributivism: A Reply to Bagaric and Amarasekara, 24 MELB. U. L. REV. 411,411 (2000)
('A striking feature of penal philosophising during the last thirty years has been the revival ofretributiv-
ism.").
3 Kyron Huigens, The Dead End of Deterrence, and Beyond, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 943, 980
n.152 (2000) (noting "retributivism's resurgence in the 1970s"); Sanford Kadish, Fifty Years of Criminal
Law: An Opinionated Review, 87 CAL. L. REV. 943, 978 (1999) (chronicling the "[r]esurgence" of re-
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1970s6 has been remarkable. The U.S. Supreme Court,7 state courts, 8 state
legislatures,9 philosophers, and legal scholars10 alike are increasingly ac-
tributivism in the early 1970s); Herbert Wechsler, Revision and Codification of Penal Law in the United
States, 7 DALHOUSIE L.J. 219, 232 (1983) (raising concern about "the resurgence of retributive emotions
clothed in philosophical pretensions").
4 Martin IL Gardner, The Renaissance of Retribution: An Examination of Doing Justice, 1976 WIS.
L. RE V. 781, 784 (footnote omitted) (noting that "retribution is suddenly being seen by thinkers of all
political persuasions as perhaps the strongest ground, after all, upon which to base a system of punish-
ment").
5 Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39 UCLA L.
REV. 1659, 1659 (1992) ("There has been a steady rise in the popularity of retributivism over the last
decade, which is surprising given its near death in the 1950s and 1960s."). For the contrary view-that
retributivism is not the currently favored theory of punishment--see Huigens, supra note 3, who com-
ments: "The deterrence theory of punishment is probably dominant over retributivism in criminal law
scholarship, though not as much as it used to be, because consequentialism, and economics in particular,
has greater credibility in our society than any comprehensive morality that might undergird a retributive
theory." Id. at 955 (footnote omitted).
6 There is some disagreement as to when the revitalization of retributivism began. Perhaps the ear-
liest starting point might be attributed to the publication, in 1968, of Herbert Morris's hugely influential
article Persons and Punishment, 52 MONIST 475 (1968), reprinted in HERBERT MORRIS, ON GUILT AND
INNOCENCE: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY AND MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 31-89 (1976). For discussions
of the revival of retributivism in the early 1970s, see generally FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF
THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL (1981); Gardner, supra note 4. Other accounts locate the advent of the re-
tributivism revival in the mid-1970s. Developments in the Law-Alternative Punishments: Resistance
and Inroads, Il HARV. L. REv. 1967, 1970 (1998) (noting that since the mid-1970s, "a 'just deserts'
philosophy associated with retributivism has claimed the mantle of penological predominance"). Still
others designate retributivism's ascent as starting simply in the 1970s. R.A. Duff, Penal Communica-
tions: Recent Work in the Philosophy of Punishment, 20 CRIME & JUSTICE 1, 1-2 (1996) ("Penal theory
in the 1970s was marked by a retributivist revival, in reaction against the consequentialist orthodoxies
that had dominated penal thought in the postwar period.").
For notable scholarship which sparked this revival, see generally MORRIS, supra; ANDREW VON
HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS (1976); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Marxism and Retri-
bution, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 217 (1973), reprinted in PUNISHMENT: A PHILOSOPHY & PUBLIC AFFAIRS
READER 3 (A. John Simmons et al. eds., 1995).
7 See, e.g., Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 461-62 (1984) (declaring that retributivism "is an
element of all punishments society imposes" and enthroning it as the "primary justification of the death
penalty"); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183-84 (1976) (Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ., announc-
ing the judgement of the Court) (acknowledging that deterrence was a permissible partial purpose of
punishment, but explaining, in effect, that retributivism was an important purpose of capital punish-
ment).
8 State courts, since the 1970s, have increasingly interpreted state statutes and constitutional provi-
sions endorsing a nonretributive purpose of punishment by reading into the provisions a retributive pur-
pose. Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution as an Articulated Purpose
of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1313, 1326-27 (2000) (citing State v. Morrow, 492
N.W.2d 539, 546 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992); Adams v. State, 577 S.W.2d 717, 729 (rex. Crim. App. 1979)
(en banc), rev'd on other grounds, 448 U.S. 38 (1980)). As Professor Cotton puts it, "State courts ig-
nored and evaded relevant state statutes and constitutional provisions specifying nonretributive pur-
poses, or engaged in unorthodox methods of statutory interpretation, in order to find retribution as a state
purpose for punishment, in violation of the separation of powers." Cotton, supra, at 1357.
9 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(a)(1) (West 1985) ("The legislature finds and declares that the
purpose of imprisonment for crime is punishment.'); 204 PA. CODE § 303.11 (2001) ("The sentencing
guidelines provide sanctions proportionate to the severity of the crime [which] ... establishes a sentenc-
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knowledging retributivism as the dominant theory of punishment. 1 Even
its critics acknowledge that retributivism "can fairly be regarded as the
leading philosophical justification for the institution of criminal punish-
ment."
12
Putting the rhetorical excesses of retributivism's ascendancy aside,
what is truly striking is that a theory of punishment borne out of the harsh
and rigid justice13 of the Old Testament14 has been transformed into a theory
that stakes out the higher moral ground.15  Simply put, retributivism justi-
fies punishment, or the suffering by the punished, not on any actual good
ing system with a primary focus on retribution...."); see also Cotton, supra note 8, at 1357 ("State leg-
islatures ignored constitutional supremacy by enacting retributive statutes that either ignored or trod
upon contrary constitutional provisions"1.
10 See sources cited supra notes 2-6.
I1 One of the most influential definitions of punishment is H.L.A. Hart's. Hart defined punishment
in terms of the following five elements:
(i) It must involve pain or other consequences normally considered unpleasant.
(ii) It must be for an offence against legal rules.
(iii) It must be for an actual or supposed offender for his offence.
(iv) It must be intentionally administered by human beings other than the of-
fender.
(v) It must be imposed and administered by an authority constituted by a legal
system against which the offense is committed.
H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSmILrrY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 4-5 (Oxford
Univ. Press 1992) (1968). For other attempts to define punishment, see Antony Flew, The Justification
of Punishment, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT: A COLLECRION OF PAPERS 83, 85-87 (H.B. Acton
ed., 1969); Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 1336, 1341 (San-
ford Kadish ed., 1983).
12 Dolinko, supra note 2, at 1623 (footnote omitted). For other acknowledgments, by retributiv-
ism's critics, of retributivism's generally favored status, see Mirko Bagoric & Kumar Amarasekara, The
Errors of Retributivism, 24 MELB. U. L. REV. 124, 124 (2000) ("Retributivism has been the dominant
theory ofpunishment in the Western world for the past few decades."); id. at 126 ("Retributivism, under
the banner ofjust deserts, has replaced utilitarianism as the prime philosophical underpinning of pun-
ishment on the Western world."); David Dolinko, Retributivism, Consequentialism, and the Intrinsic
Goodness of Punishment, 16 LAW & PHIL. 507, 507 (1997) ("The retributive theory is arguably the most
influential philosophical justification for the institution of criminal punishment in present-day Amer-
ica.) (footnote omitted); Nigel Walker, Modern Retributivism, in JUISPRUDENCE: CAMBRIDGE ESSAYS
73, 83 (Hyman Gross & Ross Harrison eds., 1992) (criticizing the ascent of modem retributivism and
noting that the "retreat from the utilitarian justification of punishment has been too hasty").
13 But see sources cited infra note 17.
14 For acknowledgment of the Bible as an influential source of authority for retributivism see
PRIMORATZ, supra note 1, at 13 ("The history of the retributive view of punishment begins with the bib-
lical and talmudic ethical and legal ideas"); George P. Fletcher, Punishment and Responsibility, in A
COMPANION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 514,516 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996).
15 David Dolinko contends that
a fair amount of retributivist writing ... is marred by the presence of a certain moral smugness, a
self-satisfied belief that we can have our cake and eat it too-we can impose afflictive sanctions
on criminal offenders while feeling (unlike utilitarian deterrence theorists) that what we are doing
is no regrettable though necessary evil but instead a positive good: respecting persons, doing jus-
tice, and generally living up to the most high-minded and Kantian ethical demands.
Dolinko, supra note 2, at 1625.
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consequences that might be attained, but solely because the punished de-
serve it.16 From its roots in vengeance, bloodlust, revenge, retaliation, and
an eye for an eye,17 retributivism is pitched as the only theory which, in jus-
tifying punishment, does justice by (i) not justifying punishment of the in-
nocent, (ii) not using persons as mere means to attain other goals, (iii)
giving a principled account of the requisite degree of desert and punish-
ment, and (iv) justifying punishment of only those who are morally culpa-
ble. 8
The principal alternative conception of punishment--consequential-
ism-is claimed by retributivists to be morally inferior to retributivism on
these four counts. Consequentialist theories justify punishment not on the
desert due the offender but on the actual, good consequences that are at-
tained, for example, deterrence of crime, incapacitation of the offender, and
rehabilitation of the offender. Until the retributivist revival, consequential-
ist theories of punishment had enjoyed the mantle of being humane, merci-
ful, rational, enlightened, and morally sensitive from Plato onward.
Retributivism was dismissed as irrational, "taking blind vengeance like a
beast."'19 Punishment under retributivism was conceived as "tak[ing] pleas-
ure in another's evil [which] belongs to hatred, which is contrary to the
charity whereby we are bound to love all men."20 Retributivism was reviled
16 See supra note 1.
17 The biblical injunction of taking an eye for an eye, which appears to be harsh and severe justice
from our modem perspective, was comparatively quite mild in its time. The lex talionis "did not en-
courage, but rather restrained the vengefulness of the wrong." PRIMORATz, supra note 1, at 87; see also
Andrew Oldenquist, Retributive Rationale, in 2 THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 749, 749
(Christopher Berry Gray ed., 1999) ("There is reason to think this was the voice of the soft-hearted in
biblical times: one can take only one eye for an eye, only one life for a life (and not the criminal's fam-
ily)." (emphasis added)).
18 See Duff, supra note 6, at 25 (retributivists' "central claim is that only a retributivist conception
of punishment can do justice to the guilty, as well as to the innocent"); see also infra note 23.
19 PLATO, Protagoras, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 309, 321 (Edith Hamilton &
Huntington Cairns eds., 1973). The quote appears in the following passage:
In punishing wrongdoers, no one concentrates on the fact that a man has done wrong in the past, or
punishes him on that account, unless taking blind vengeance like a beast. No, punishment is not
inflicted by a rational man for the sake of the crime that has been committed-after all one cannot
undo what is past ....
Id.
20 For St. Thomas Aquinas, punishment, or as he termed it vengeance, without any intention that
good consequences would result, which is in essence retributivism, is unlawful and immoral:
Vengeance consists in the infliction of a penal evil on one who has sinned. Accordingly, in the
matter of vengeance, we must consider the mind of the avenger. For if his intention is directed
chiefly to the evil of the person on whom he takes vengeance, and rests there, then his vengeance
is entirely unlawful: because to take pleasure in another's evil belongs to hatred, which is contrary
to the charity whereby we are bound to love all men. Nor is it an excuse that he intends the evil of
one who has unjustly inflicted evil upon him, as neither is a man excused for hating one who hates
him: for a man may not sin against another just because the latter has already sinned against him,
since this is to be overcome by evil, which was forbidden by the Apostle, who says (Rom. Xii. 21):
Be not overcome by evil, but overcome evil by good.
2 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA 1656 (Fathers of the English Dominican Prince trans.,
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as nothing more than "a triumph, or glorying in the hurt of another...
[which is] contrary to reason[,] ... against the Law of Nature and is com-
monly stiled by the name of Cruelty. '21 But the tables have now turned; it
is retributivism which now claims to reflect our aspiration to higher moral
principles and it is consequentialism that is widely considered morally un-
palatable.
My project is not to defend a consequentialist theory of punishment,
but to displace retributivism's place on the high moral ground. Just as re-
tributivism is said to turn back the crime on the criminal,22 I will seek to
turn back retributivism's principal criticisms of the consequentialist theory
onto itself. As a result, I conclude that retributivism is no better than con-
sequentialism as a theory of punishment.
And it is perhaps worse. By presenting new arguments demonstrating
that retributivism fails to satisfy its own criteria of just punishment, the in-
justice of the "theory of just punishment" is revealed. By showing that re-
tributivism falls victim to its own withering critique of other theories of
punishment, retributivism succumbs to its own "Ishmael effect. '23 That is,
1947) (located in part 2-2, question 108, 1st article). But punishment may be lawful if it is imposed with
the intention that good consequences would result:
If, however, the avenger's intention be directed chiefly to some good, to be obtained by means of
the punishment of the person who has sinned (for instance that the sinner may amend, or at least
that he may be restrained and others be not disturbed, that justice may be upheld, and God hon-
ored), then vengeance may be lawful, provided other due circumstances be observed.
Id.
21 THOMAS HOBBES, LEviATHAN 79 (Oh. 15) (J.M. Dent & Sons 1976) (1651). The quoted lan-
guage is drawn from the following passage in which Hobbes sets forth the Seventh Law of Nature af-
firming that the purpose of punishment is its good consequences and rejecting retributivism as revenge:
Whereby we are forbidden to inflict punishment with any other designe, than for correction of the
offender, or direction of others .... Besides, Revenge without respect to the Example, and profit
to come, is a triumph, or glorying in the hurt of another, tending to no end; (for the End is alwayes
somewhat to Come;) and glorying to no end, is vain-glory, and contrary to reason; and to hurt
without reason, tendeth to the introduction of Warre; which is against the Law of Nature; and is
commonly stiled by the name of Cruelty.
Id.
2 Fletcher, supra note 14, at 517; see G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT
129 (Allen W. Wood ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., 1991) (1821) (punishment is "the crime turned round
against itself); id. at 127 (through punishment "what the criminal has done should also happen to
him'); IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 169 (Mary Gregor trans., 1991) (1797) ("For
the only time a criminal cannot complain that a wrong is done to him [by punishment] is when he brings
his evil deed back upon himself, and what is done to him in accordance with penal law is what he has
perpetrated on others .... ").
23 The "Ishmael effect" is a philosophical term meaning "[tihe claimed ability of some philosophi-
cal theory to escape from the fate to which it condemns all other discourse." SIMON BLACKBURN,
OxFow DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 200 (1996). The term is named after Ishmael, the character and
narrator of Herman Melville's Moby Dick. In an epilogue Ishmael informs the reader, after telling the
tale, "'and I only am escaped alone to tell thee."' Id.
Retributivists typically condemn all theories of punishment for failing to do justice in punishing
wrongdoers; all, that is, except for retributivism. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 6, at 7 ("I believe that
retributivism can be formulated in such a way that it is the only morally defensible theory of punish-
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retributivism is incoherent. In contrast, consequentialism, while undeniably
flawed, may be true to itself.
This age-old debate over the justification of punishment is not merely
of theoretical interest.24 The resolution of a wide-ranging spectrum of prac-
tical issues may crucially hinge on, or be substantially influenced by, the
particular justification of punishment perceived to be defensible. What is
perceived to be the leading theory of punishment influences legislatures' ar-
ticulation of the purpose of punishment and courts' construction of such
statutory articulations, which in turn, affect a host of other practical doc-
trines, policies, and procedures.25 Prominent among these are the viability
of the victims' rights movement,26 the weakening of probation and parole,
27
the "three strikes and you're out" legislation aimed at recidivists, 28 and per-
haps most significantly, the morality of the death penalty.29 Capital pun-
ishment has traditionally been supported by, and associated with,
retributivism. 30 That support was further strengthened with the Supreme
ment."); see also supra note 18. But this Article will attempt to establish that retributivism also fails to
satisfy its own criteria ofjust punishment. Therefore, it will be argued, retributivism is a casualty of its
own, self-created Ishmael effect. That is, retributivism cannot escape itself.
24 See Introduction, in PUNISHMENT: A PHILOSOPHY & PUBLIC AFFAIRS READER, supra note 6, at
vii ("The problem ofjustifying legal punishment has remained at the heart of legal and social philosophy
from the very earliest recorded philosophical texts to the most recent.").
25 Consider the following examples:
(J]udges sentence according to the purposes authorized by law. Where jurors determine [a] sen-
tence, they may be instructed by the court and exhorted in closing arguments by attorneys to con-
sider particular purposes in making their decision. In voir dire, attorneys may employ the state's
articulated purposes for punishment as a means of screening and influencing jurors. A defendant
might challenge a particular punishment for failing to comport with the purposes articulated in a
state constitutional provision. The articulated purposes thus affect jury selection, instructions, and
arguments; sentencing and parole; and even assessment of the legitimacy of particular punish-
ments.
Cotton, supra note 8, at 1317 (footnotes omitted).
26 Michael Moore, Victims and Retribution: A Reply to Professor Fletcher, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV.
65, 67 (1999) ("[V]ictims should and must be ignored if you are claiming to be doing retributive the-
ory.").
27 Guyora Binder & Nicholas J. Smith, Framed: Utilitarianism and Punishment of the Innocent, 32
RUTGERS L.J. 115, 117 (2000) (noting the retributivist attack on systems of probation and parole).
28 Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 1303-04
(2001) (footnote omitted) (suggesting that "three strikes and you're out" policies "seem to be fueled by
concerns about retribution, which are particularly sharp, many believe, because multiple recidivists have
so clearly rejected society's norms and institutions").
29 C.L. Ten, Crime and Punishment, in A COMPANION TO ETHICS 366, 370 (Peter Singer ed., 1991).
30 See, e.g., Robert J. Cottrol, Hard Choices and Shifted Burdens: American Crime and American
Justice at the End of the Century, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 506 (1997) (book review). Professor Cottrol
notes:
[S]ince the mid-seventies retribution has come back with a vengeance, enjoying today a greater
prominence in public discourse over crime and punishment than at any other time in post-war
America.
Nowhere is this mood better demonstrated than in the debate over the death penalty. Where
once capital punishment was reluctantly defended as a necessary deterrent to the most heinous of
murders, it has, in recent years, been eagerly embraced by politicians eager to adopt a "tough on
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Court's enthroning retributivism as the "primary justification for the death
penalty."31
After some introductory remarks on the fundamentals of punishment
theory in Part I, Part II argues that two versions of retributivism justify the
intentional punishment of particular, identifiable individuals who are either
legally or morally innocent. In advocating the punishment of morally cul-
pable wrongdoers, moralistic retributivism justifies the intentional punish-
ment of legal innocents who have extrinsic defenses unrelated to, and which
fail to negate, moral culpability. In supporting punishment of offenders
found legally guilty, legalistic retributivism justifies the intentional punish-
ment of moral innocents.
Part III considers the retributivist criticism that consequentialist theo-
ries fail to supply a principled rationale for determining the degree of an of-
fender's desert and punishment in light of yet another version of
retributivism-combined legalistic and moralistic retributivism. Though
this version avoids justifying the intentional punishment of particular, iden-
tifiable innocents, it does so at the cost of being unable to supply a princi-
pled account of the degree of an offender's desert and punishment. In some
instances, the combined version furnishes contradictory assessments of of-
fenders' degree of desert and punishment.
Part IV demonstrates retributivism's justification of the indirect pun-
ishment of the innocent. Retributivism will be shown to justify the adop-
tion of, and punishment under, standards and practices in which virtually
every innocent defendant would be convicted and punished. These stan-
dards include strict liability for serious criminal offenses and a presumption
of guilt standard of proof.
Part V inverts the standard retributivist criticism that consequentialist
theories violate the Kantian maxim of using offenders as mere means by
contending that retributivism perversely uses crime victims as mere means
in order to respect offenders as ends in themselves. Stated simply, the ar-
gument is that since the use of crime victims is necessary as a means to at-
taining retributive justice, and that the interests of crime victims as ends in
themselves are irrelevant, retributivism violates the Kantian duty to treat
crime victims not as mere means but rather as autonomous ends.
Part VI addresses a large class of retributive theories that justify pun-
ishment by resorting to consequences. To avoid the circularity stemming
from the simple retributivist formula of "it's right to punish criminals be-
cause doing so is right,"32 some versions of retributivism seek to justify
punishment in terms of the good consequences that might be promoted. In
crime" posture.
Id. at 507-08 (footnotes omitted); see also C.L. Ten, supra note 29, at 370.
31 Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 461 (1984). For similar pronouncements by the Supreme
Court, see supra note 7.
32 Dolinko, supra note 12, at 507.
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turn, to avoid their theory collapsing into consequentialism, retributivists
argue that the consequences are only conceptual, rather than the actual con-
sequences found in consequentialist theories. Even if the use of merely
conceptual consequences suffices to prevent the collapse into
consequentialism, the reliance on consequences renders this class of
retributivism subject to the same problems as consequentialist theories-
intentional punishment of the innocent and the use of offenders as mere
meaIsconclude that retributivism does not deserve its self-anointed place on
the high moral ground. Rather, like what retributivism claims criminals de-
serve, retributivism deserves to suffer (in our esteem). Because retributiv-
ism is subject to the same criticisms it levels against consequentialist
theories, retributivism is no better a justification of punishment than conse-
quentialist theories. And it is perhaps worse. By failing to satisfy its own
principles, retributivism is incoherent.
I. FUNDAMENTALS OF PUNISHMENT THEORY
Why do we need to justify punishment? After all, crime and punish-
ment seem to go together, as the old Frank Sinatra song goes, like "love and
marriage" and a "horse and carriage. '33 To doubt the legitimacy of pun-
ishment would seem to cast doubt on the enterprise of criminal law itself.
Why would we bother to promulgate the prohibitions of the criminal law if
they could be violated with impunity? For violations of the norms of crimi-
nal law, punishment seems to be an obviously fitting response. But pun-
ishment does require justification, 4 for the same reason we consider
conduct violating the core prohibitions of our criminal law to be wrong.
Punishment involves the deliberate infliction of pain, suffering, and depri-
vation, which is prima facie wrong.35 So too, committing homicide or caus-
ing grievous bodily damage, under ordinary circumstances, is prima facie
wrong. But just as the prima facie wrong of homicide may be justified or
negated when committed under circumstances of self-defense as a response
to a criminal attack, so also the state's infliction of the suffering and depri-
33 See "Love and Marriage" (lyrics by Sammy Cahn; music by Jimmy Van Heusen), in S. CAHN, I
SHOULD CARE: THE SAMMY CAHN STORY 298 (1974) ("Love and marriage ... go together like a horse
and carriage.... Try, try, try to separate them, it's an illusion .... Love and marriage ... you can't
have one without the other!').
34 DUFF, supra note 1, at 1 ("It is agreed that a system of criminal punishment stands in need of
some strenuous and persuasive justification .... .); Richard Wasserstrom, Why Punish the Guilty?, 20
PRINCETON U. MAG. 14 (1964), reprinted in PHmLOSOPmCAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT 328, 337
(Gertrude Ezorsky ed., 1972) ("Punishment is an evil, an unpleasantness; it requires that someone suffer.
Its infliction demands justification.").
35 See, e.g., PRIMORATZ, supra note 1, at 7 ("To punish is to inflict an evil. But to inflict evil on
someone is something that, at least prima facie ought not to be done."); C.L. TEN, CRIME, GUILT, AND
PUNISHMENT: A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION 3 (1987) ("We are not normally justified in depriving
people of the things which they value, such as their liberty or their property."); Murphy, supra note 6, at
9, 11 (punishment is a form of coercion by the state, which is prima facie wrong).
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vation constituting punishment may be susceptible to justification as a re-
sponse to the commission of a crime. Punishment might be conceived in
this way as an institutionalized form of self-defense by the state against
crime.
Among perhaps many, there is one obvious disanalogy between self-
defense and punishment.36 Self-defense is used to prevent criminal aggres-
sion; it is employed before the fact. Punishment is employed after the fact
(after the crime has already occurred) and thus cannot prevent the crime.
37
But though punishment of a crime cannot prevent that crime from occur-
ring, as self-defense might, it still might be preventive in nature. Punish-
ment, by deterrence or incapacitation or reformation, may serve to prevent
future crime. 38 Or, from a retributive perspective, punishment may serve to
prevent what a crime might otherwise signify-if a crime is a negation of
the crime victim's autonomy, punishment negates the negation.
39
Punishment's justification, however, should be kept distinct from its
definition. There have been some attempts to solve the justification issue
by definition.40 For example, the retributivist thesis that an offender must
36 For discussion of the use of self-defense as a rationale for the justification of punishment, see
R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION AND COMMUNITY 16-19 (2001); ROBERT NOZICK,
ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 62-63 (1974). See generally Laurence Alexander, The Doomsday Ma-
chine: Proportionality, Punishment and Prevention, 63 MONIST 199 (1980); George Fletcher, Self-
Defense as a Justification for Punishment, 12 CARDOzO L. REV. 859 (1991); George Fletcher, Punish-
ment and Self-Defense, 8 LAW & PHIL. 201 (1989); Warren Quinn, The Right to Threaten and the Right
to Punish, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AE. 327 (1985).
37 Forging a middle position between self-defense preventing a present or imminent crime and pun-
ishment preventing future crime, self-defense (in the state of nature) might serve the purpose of future
deterrence even though it would not qualify as punishment:
[1]t seems right to think that if we are in a state of nature, and you are about to cut my throat, then I
have a privilege of causing you more harm than is necessary to defend my throat against your cur-
rent assault on it: I have a privilege of causing you as much harm as is necessary to defend my
throat against not merely your current but your otherwise likely future assaults on it. But punish-
ment strikes me as different.
JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS 364 (1990).
38 Viewing punishment in this way, by analogizing to self-defense, would seem to suggest that pun-
ishment be understood in consequentialist terms. But there are a number of aspects of self-defense that
cannot necessarily be justified on consequentialist terms. Though the purpose of self-defense may be
the prevention of criminal aggression, self-defense is sometimes conceived as a right that is good in it-
self without regard to beneficial consequences. The right to use self-defense is not limited to those
situations where more harm will be avoided than caused. For example, lethal force in self-defense may
be used to prevent non-lethal aggression such as rape or grievous bodily harm. Additionally, to save the
life of one person from criminal aggression, a self-defender may kill 10, 100 or 1,000 aggressors.
39 See HEGEL, supra note 22, at 123 ("punishment is merely the negation of the negation"); id. at
127 ("The cancellation... of crime is retribution in so far as the latter, by its concept, is an infringement
of an infringement....").
40 See, e.g., HOBBES, supra note 21, at 164, Ch. 28 (emphasis omitted) ("A Punishment is an Evill
inflicted by publique Authority, on him that hath done, or omitted that which is Judged by the same Au-
thority to be a Transgression of the Law; to the end that the will of men may thereby the better be dis-
posed to obedience.").
Built into Hobbes's definition of punishment is that it has the purpose of general deterrence:
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be guilty to be punished is part of the meaning of punishment and conse-
quentialism provides the justification.41 Thus, if punishment is defined so
as to apply only to the guilty,42 then the problem of punishment of the inno-
cent for consequentialist theories is simply defined away.43 H.L.A. Hart
termed this argument the "definitional stop" and declared it impermissible
as an "abuse of definition." 44 Similarly, against the consequentialist criti-
cism that retributive theories, even if they may justify punishment in a par-
ticular case, cannot justify the state's institution of a system of
punishment,45 retributivists might reply that punishment by the state is part
of the definition of punishment.46 This too would seem to be a "definitional
stop" that simply defines away the substantive problem of justification.
47
It is the justification, rather than the definition, of punishment that is
considered to be of,48 and will be our, primary interest.49 The issue ofjusti-
fication is often distinguished between justification of the punishment (i) in
the particular case and, (ii) the general system of institutions of punishment.
If the harm inflicted be lesse than the benefit, or contentment that naturally followeth the crime
committed, that harm is not within the definition [of punishment]; and is rather the Price, or Re-
demption, than the Punishment of a Crime: Because it is of the nature of Punishment, to have for
end, the disposing of men to obey the Law ....
Id. at 166.
41 A.M. Quinton, On Punishment, 14 ANALYSIS 512 (1954), reprinted in PHILOSOPHICAL
PERSPECTrIVES ON PUNISHMENT, supra note 34, at 6, 10 ("The infliction of suffering on a person is only
properly described as punishment if that person is guilty. The retributivist thesis, therefore, is not a
moral doctrine, but an account of the meaning of the word 'punishment").
42 For an example of such an attempt to define away the issue of punishing the innocent see
HOBBES, supra note 21, at 168 ("All Punishments of Irmocent subjects, be they great or little, are against
the Law of Nature: For Punishment is only for Transgression of the Law, and therefore there can be no
Punishment of the Innocent.").
43 HART, supra note 11, at 6; Igor Primoratz, Mixed Rationales, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN
ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 17, at 559, 559-560.
44 HART, supra note 11, at 5.
45 C.L. TEN, supra note 35, at 48 ("But whatever the intuitive force of the claim that wrongdoers
deserve to suffer, it gives no support to the much stronger claim that the suffering should be deliberately
inflicted by the State on wrongdoers. And it is this stronger claim which is needed to support the re-
tributive theory of punishment."); Stanley I. Benn, Punishment, in 7 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY 29, 30 (Paul Edwards ed. 1967, reprint ed. 1972) (noting that retributivism is more persua-
sive in justifying a particular instance of punishment than in justifying "punishment as an institution").
46 GEORGE FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 38 (1998) (acknowledging that Kant's
"rationale for punishment hardly works to justify the institution of punishment at its initial historical
stages").
47 For view finding punishment to be broader than punishment imposed by the state, see, for exam-
ple, C.L. TEN, supra note 35, at 2 ("Punishment is administered not just by the State but also by others
such as teachers and parents."); Kurt Baier, Is Punishment Retributive?, 16 ANALYSIS 25 (1955), re-
printed in PHILISOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT, supra note 34, at 16, 16-17 (noting that pun-
ishment could be imposed by a father or teacher); Benn, supra note 45, at 29 (noting that punishment
includes that punishment which a parent gives to a child).
48 HART, supra note 11, at 6; Benn, supra note 45, at 29.
49 For the view that the definition ofpunishment plays an important role in the justification ofpun-
ishment, see DUFF, supra note 1, at 151-53.
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Although both retributivism and consequentialism purport to provide a jus-
tification on both levels, it is generally considered that retributivism pro-
vides a stronger justification on the first level and consequentialism a
stronger justification on the second level.50 A number of "mixed" theories
of punishment divide up the task of justification along these lines.
51
One commentator has declared that an adequate justification of pun-
ishment must provide answers to the following four questions: "Is the prac-
tice of punishment ever justifiable and if so under what conditions? What
kinds of punishment are justified and must they involve suffering? Whom
are we entitled to punish? Who is morally entitled to inflict punishment?1
52
In order to appreciate how retributivists' criticisms of consequentialist
theories of punishment may be turned back onto retributivism, it may be
helpful to broadly sketch the fundamentals of the debate over the justifica-
tion of punishment. This Part will canvass the principal versions of retribu-
tive and consequential theories and highlight the major moves and
countermoves in the modem debate. Readers familiar with this debate
might well choose to skip ahead to Part II.
A. Retributive Versus Consequential Theories of Punishment
The modem debate over the justification of punishment stems largely
from the impasse between retributivism and some form of consequential-
ism. 53 With retributivism being less susceptible to precise definition,54 it is
best understood in opposition to consequentialist theories of punishment.
55
50 Bern, supra note 45, at 30-32.
51 See generally HART, supra note 11; Rawls, supra note 1. For further discussion of mixed theo-
ries, see infra notes 128-136 and accompanying text.
52 A. Wesley Cragg, Punishment, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 17,
at 706, 707.
53 C.L. Ten, supra note 29, at 366 (retributivism and utilitarianism or consequentialism are the "two
main types of theories of punishment"); PRIMORATZ, supra note 1, at 9 (same); Oldenquist, supra note
17, at 749 (same); Quinton, supra note 41, at 6 (retributivism and consequentialism "exhaust the possi-
bilities" for justififing punishment).
54 C.L. TEN, supra note 35, at 38 ("There is no complete agreement about what sorts of theories are
retributive... :"). David Dolinko has argued:
it is curiously difficult to articulate [retributivism] in a perspicuous fashion. The central claim of
the rival deterrence theory can be summarized swiftly--"it's right to punish criminals because do-
ing so minimizes the net level of suffering." But correspondingly concise efforts to characterize
retributivism risk collapsing into "it's right to punish criminals because doing so is right."
Dolinko, supra note 12, at 507.
Rather than try to define retributivism, some commentators seek to explain retributivism by recourse
to a "cluster of moral concepts: rights, desert, merit, moral responsibility, and justice." JEFFRIB
MURPHY & JULES COLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 121 (1990).
55 Joel Feinberg, The Classic Debate, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 646, 646 (Joel Feinberg & Hyman
Gross eds., 1991); see also DUFF, supra note 1:
We can usefully talk of the common features, and the common logical structure, of consequential-
ist accounts of punishment: but can we usefully talk ofretributivist accounts in this way; or has the
label "retributivist" been applied to such a diversity of views and principles that it now lacks any
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Consequentialism is the view that the value of an action or course of con-
duct is to be assessed from its consequences.56 A consequentialist theory of
punishment would justify punishment on the basis of the good conse-
quences promoted by punishment. Versions of consequentialism vary
based on the type of consequence perceived to be relevant. The most well-
known version of consequentialism is Jeremy Bentham's utilitarianism in
which a course of conduct is evaluated by the principle of utility or the
amount of happiness and suffering that is generated by the conduct.5 7 Other
unambiguous or unitary meaning?
Id. at 4 (footnote omitted); Bagoric & Amarasekara, supra note 12, at 129 (footnotes omitted) (the vari-
ous versions of retributivism "do have one thing in common: they are not utilitarian.... It may well be
that the negation of utilitarianism is the distinctive badge worn by retributive theories.'); Dolinko, supra
note 12, at 507-08 (footnote omitted) ("One feature on which retributivists and their critics have gener-
ally agreed is that retributivism is very much a non-consequentialist theory.").
56 Berys Gaut, Consequentialism, in THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 176, 176
(Robert Audi ed., 2d ed. 1999).
57 Jeremy Bentham's theory of punishment is the leading utilitarian theory of punishment and the
principal influence on consequentialist views ofpunishment. PRIMORATZ, supra note 1, at 13 (claiming
that "the most comprehensive and thoroughly developed" consequentialist account of punishment is
Bentham's).
For general discussions of Bentham's account of punishment, see A.C. EwiNG, THE MORALITY OF
PUNIsHMENT 53-54, 59 (1929); HART, supra note 11, at 18-20, 40-41; MATr MATRAVERS, JuSTICE
AND PUNISHMENT: THE RATIONALE OF COERCION 13-16 (2000); PRiMORATZ, supra note 1, at 15-31;
C.L. TEN, supra note 35, at 87-89, 143-46.
For Bentham, conduct is to be judged according to the principle of utility, JEREMY BENTHAM, THE
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 2 (Prometheus Books 1988) (1781) ("By the principle of
utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to
the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party .... (footnote
omitted)) [hereinafter BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES], the maximization of pleasure or happiness and the
minimization of pain, id. at I ("Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign mas-
ters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine
what we shall do."), "the greatest happiness principle," id. at 5 n.1, "the greatest happiness of the great-
est number," id., and whether a particular course of conduct attains more happiness than pain, id. at 3
(an action or governmental action is "conformable to or dictated by the principle of utility ... when the
tendency which it has to augment the happiness of the community is greater than any which it has to di-
minish it"). Nothing is intrinsically good or bad, nothing is right or wrong, obligatory or prohibited in
and of itself uniess its consequences are in accord with the principle of utility. See PRIMORATZ, supra
note 1, at 17 (construing Bentham's utility principle).
Bentham arrives at the principle of utility by first rejecting three competing moral principles which
he conceives to be opposed to the principle of utility. First, the "principle of asceticism," which is like
the principle of utility, "but in an inverse manner: approving of actions in as far as they tend to diminish
his happiness; disapproving of them in as far as they tend to augment it." BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES,
supra, at 9. Second, the "theological principle... professes to recur for the standard of right and wrong
to the will of God." Id. at 21. Third, and of principal interest to us, is the "principle of sympathy and
apathy," which praises or condemns actions on the basis of intuition and feelings. Id. at 16. The princi-
ple assesses actions not based on utility "but merely because a man finds himself disposed to approve or
disapprove of them: holding up that approbation or disapprobation as a sufficient reason for itself, and
disclaiming the necessity of looking out for any extrinsic ground." Id. This third principle Bentham lo-
cates as the source of retributivism. See PRIMORATZ, supra note 1, at 18. The principle is, for Bentham,
"the real source of the retributive theory of punishment". Id. It "leads us to speak of offenses as deserv-
ing punishment." Id. (quoting JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 76 (Richard Hildreth
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versions of consequentialism judge acts based on their promotion of, for
example, autonomy, achievement, or fairness.58  The principal consequen-
tialist theories of punishment justify punishment based on the good conse-
quences of rehabilitating the offender so that she will not commit future
crimes,59 incapacitating the offender so that he cannot commit crimes dur-
ing the term of imprisonment, 60 deterring the offender from committing fu-
ture crimes (specific deterrence), and deterring others in society from
committing future crimes (general deterrence). 61
The most influential consequentialist theory justifies punishment based
on the general deterrence of future crime.62 To achieve general deterrence,
the appearance or publicity of punishment is crucial. Actual punishment,
without society's awareness, generates no general deterrent effect;63 but ap-
parent punishment, even if without actual punishment, does provide general
deterrence. 4 Actual punishment serves only to produce apparent punish-
ment.65 As a result, retributivists have criticized deterrence-based theories
trans., 2d ed. 1871)).
58 Gaut, supra note 56, at 177.
59 Influence of an offender, by punishment, is exerted on his "will, in which case it is said to operate
in the way of reformation ... ." BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES, supra note 57, at 170 n.I.
Influence of an offender, by punishment, is exerted on his "physical power, in which case it is
said to operate by disablement .... Id. at 170-71 n.1.
61 Regarding others in the community, punishment influences "their wills; in which case it is said to
operate in the way of example." Id.
62 Id. (punishment's general deterrent effect on others in the community, or example, as he terms it,
"is the most important end of all"); MuRPHY & COLEMAN, supra note 54, at 118 ("While incapacitation
and reform may sometimes figure in the [consequentialist] justification of punishment, deterrence has
always been the mainstay. ); PRIMORATZ, supra note 1, at 10 ("The most important consequences
of punishment are its preventive effects ....).
63 See BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES, supra note 57, at 192 ("Tunishment cannot act any farther than
in as far as the idea of it, and of its connection with the offence, is present in the mind. The idea of it, if
not present, cannot act at all; and then the punishment itselfmust be inefficacious."). Bentham has also
argued:
if delinquents were constantly punished for their offences, and nobody else knew of it, it is evident
that ... there would be a great deal of mischief done, and not the least particle of good... The
punishment would befai [sic] every offender as an-unforeseen evil. It would never have been pre-
sent in his mind to deter him from the commission of crime. It would serve as an example to no
one.
Jeremy Bentham, Principles of Penal Law, in 1 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 399 (John Bowring
ed., 1962).
64 Bentham argues in support that
it is the idea only of the punishment (or, in other words, the apparent punishment) that really acts
upon the mind; the punishment itself (the real punishment) acts not any farther than as giving rise
to that idea. It is the apparent punishment, therefore, that does all the service, I mean in the way of
example, which is the principal object
BENTHAM, supra note 57, at 193 (footnote omitted).
SBENTHAM, supra note 63, at 398 ("Ought any real punishment to be inflicted? Most certainly.
Why? For the sake of producing the appearance of it."). And the greater the appearance or perception
of punishment, the greater the deterrent effect As Bentham explains: "Mhe real punishment ought to
be as small, and the apparent punishment as great as possible. If hanging a man in effigy would produce
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for being unable to justify actual punishment.
66
All of these consequentialist justifications of punishment share the goal
of crime prevention.67 Both crime and punishment are evils, 68 but punish-
ment is only a qualified evil. 69 The evil of punishment may be outweighed
by the good consequences that it generates.70 That is, punishment is a nec-
the same salutary impression of terror upon the minds of the people, it would be folly or cruelty ever to
hang a man in person." Id.
66 According to this criticism, what does the real work of general deterrence is not actual punish-
ment but the perception or publicizing of punishment. PRIMoRATz, supra note 1, at 42-43; J.D. Mab-
bot, Punishment, in PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT 23, 23-24 (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum
eds., 1988). If an offender commits a crime and is punished, of which the general public is unaware, the
punishment fails to generate a general deterrent effect. In order to be deterred by punishment, awareness
of the punishment is required. Let us take the opposite situation in which an offender commits a crime
and is not actually punished, but the general public is misled into believing that the offender was pun-
ished. Though the offender was not actually punished, publicity of the faked punishment will have a
deterrent effect. Since actual punishment that is not publicized has no deterrent effect and faked pun-
ishment that is perceived to be actual punishment does have a deterrent effect, it is the perception of
punishment, and not actual punishment, which generates general deterrence. Retributivists conclude,
therefore, that the general deterrence theory of punishment fails to justify actual punishment but only the
faking of punishment.
Consequentialists respond that the general public would inevitably find out about the faked punish-
ments and the deterrent effect would ultimately be undermined. Again, retributivists respond, in turn,
that consequentialists would always be tempted to fake a punishment just once figuring that the general
public would never find out. And regardless of the resolution of this empirical issue, the general deter-
rence theory cannot explain why faking punishment would be wrong. But consequentialists might re-
spond that if the general deterrence effect could be generated without the costs and harms of punishing
(without the public finding out and the effect ultimately undermined), then faking punishment would be
justified.
67 For Bentham, "[t]he immediate principal end of punishment is to control action." BENTHAM,
THE PRINCIPLES, supra note 57, at 170 n.1. "General prevention ought to be the chief end of punish-
ment, as it is its real justification." Bentham, supra note 63, at 396.
A further, "collateral" end of punishment, according to Bentham, is the "pleasure or satisfaction"
punishment of the offender brings to the victim of the crime. BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES supra note 57,
at 170-71 n.l. Though this consequence is beneficial, it is not in and of itself a sufficient purpose to
impose punishment because "no such pleasure is ever produced by punishment as can be equivalent to
the pain [of punishment experienced by the offender]." Id.
68 Id. at 170 ("[A]II punishment is mischief. all punishment in itself is evil."). Hegel rejects conse-
quentialist theories precisely because of their conception of punishment as an evil which leads conse-
quentialist theories to stray from the dictates ofjustice:
This superficial character of [punishment as] an evil is the primary assumption in the various theo-
ries of punishment as prevention, as a deterrent, a threat, a corrective, etc.; and conversely, what is
supposed to result from it is just as superficially defined... as a good. But it is neither a question
merely of an evil nor of this or that good; on the contrary, it is definitely... a matter of wrong and
of'justice. As a result of these superficial points of view, however, the objective considerations of
justice, which is the primary and substantial point of view in relation to crime, is set aside ....
HEGEL, supra note 22, at 124-125.
69 BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES, supra note 57, at 170 (footnote omitted) (punishment "ought only to
be admitted in as far as it promises to exclude some greater evil").
70 It might also be expressed that, for consequentialist theories, the good consequences of punish-
ment are the only goods sufficient to outweigh the evil or costs of punishment. See Duff, supra note 6,
at5.
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essary evil that may be justified by its diminution of the incidence of
crime.7
1
Retributivism most broadly may be understood as a justification of
punishment that does not rely on the good consequences stemming from
punishment.72 Essentially, retributivism justifies punishment based not on
its consequences but solely because an offender deserves it.73 Immanuel
Kant74 declared that punishment "must always be inflicted upon . . . [a
criminal] only because he has committed a crime."7s Though this would
seem to preclude both the rehabilitative and deterrent effects of punishment,
Kant merely relegates these and other consequential goods to secondary
status: the offender "must previously have been found punishable [deserv-
ing of punishment] before any thought can be given to drawing from his
punishment something of use for himself or his fellow citizens. '76 Under
71 In Bentham's view,
when we consider that an unpunished crime leaves the path of crime open... to all those who may
have the same motives and opportunities for entering upon it, we perceive that punishment in-
flicted on the individual becomes a source of security to all. That punishment which, considered
in itself, appeared base and repugnant ... is elevated to the first rank of benefits, when it is re-
garded not as an act of wrath or vengeance ... but as an indispensable sacrifice to the common
safety.
Bentham, supra note 63, at 396.
72 See, e.g., Hugo Bedau, Concessions to Retribution in Punishment, in JUSTICE AND PUNISHMENT
51, 53 (J.B. Cederbloom & William L. Blizek eds., 1977) (the emphasis of retributivism "is on the of-
fense and nothing else, especially not any social costlbenefit or individual eugenics that can be calcu-
lated to result from punishments"); Gertrude Ezorsky, The Ethics of Punishment, in PHILOSOPHICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT, supra note 34, at xi, xviii ("For all retributivists punishment has moral
worth independently of any further desirable effects."); id. at xi (noting that for retributivism, if punish-
ment is justified, it is "irrespective of any further consequence" of punishment).
73 MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 88 (1997) ("The distinctive
aspect of retributivism is that the moral desert of an offender is a sufficient reason to punish him or
her .... ); Bedau, supra note 72, at 52 ("[A] retributivist holds that a punishment is just if and only if
the offender deserves it."); Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, 74 . CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 343, 347
(1981) (retributivism is the view that "punishment is justified because people deserve it"); see Bedau,
supra note 72, at 52 ("Probably the most widely held assumption about retribution in punishment is the
idea that it makes desert the central feature ofjust punishment.').
74 For general discussions of Kant's theory of punishment see EWING, supra note 57, at 15-21;
ROGER . SuLLIvAN, IMMANUEL KANT's MORAL THEORY 243-244 (1989); George Fletcher, Law and
Morality: A Kantian Perspective, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 533,551-52 (1987) (Symposium on Kantian legal
theory). See generally Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Kant on Wrongdoing, Desert, and Punishment, 18 L. &
PHIL. 407 (1999); Donald Scheid, Kant's Retributivism, 93 ETHICS 262 (1983).
75 KANT, supra note 22, at 140.
76 Id. at 141. The following passage also suggests that there is not only room for concerns of deter-
rence but that it might be of primary interest:
The only question is whether it is matter of indifference to the legislator what kinds of punishment
are adopted, as long as they are effective measures for eradicating crime (which violates the secu-
rity a state gives each in his possession of what is his), or whether the legislator must also take into
account respect for the humanity in the person of the wrongdoer (i.e., respect for the species) sim-
ply on grounds of Right.
Id. at 168.
Kant seems to be suggesting that punishment must first be efficacious in deterring crime and only
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retributivism, morally culpable wrongdoing or guilt 77 deserves, merits, or
warrants punishment.7 8 It is morally fitting that an offender should suffer in
proportion79 to her desert8° or culpable wrongdoing.
81
then does the question of also punishing justly come into play. Though in the following passage Kant
clearly answers the question in the affirmative, it is unclear whether crime prevention is still of primary
importance, or even of any importance: "I said that the ius talionis is by its form always the principle for
the right to punish since it alone is the principle determining this Idea a priori (not derived from experi-
ence of which measures would be most effective for eradicating crime)." Id. (footnote omitted).
7 Quinton, supra note 41, at 7 ("The essential contention of retributivism is that punishment is only
justified by guilt.").
78 In contrast, for consequentialism, morally culpable wrongdoing or the guilt of the offender does
not necessarily warrant punishment. Punishment of an offender is impermissible if the cost of punish-
ment outweighs its good consequences. According to Bentham, punishment should not be inflicted at
all under any of the following four conditions, where punishment would be: (i) "groundless" because
there is no crime or harm, (ii) "inefficacious" because the crime cannot be deterred, (iii) "unprofitable,
or too expensive" because the evil of the punishment would exceed the crime and, (iv) "needless" be-
cause the crime may be deterred by other means than punishment or does not require deterrence.
BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES, supra note 57, at 171-177, 314-323.
79 The proportionality or fit between the crime and the punishment is a central tenet of retributivism.
For Kant, the type and degree of punishment is to be determined by the principle of equality between the
crime and the punishment, KANT, supra note 22, at 141, "what is done to [the offender] in accordance
with penal law is what he has perpetrated on others," id. at 169. As Kant famously explains the princi-
ple of the lex talionis:
[W]hatever undeserved evil you inflict upon another within the people, that you inflict upon your-
self. If you insult him, you insult yourself; if you steal from him, you steal from yourself; if you
strike him, you strike yourself; if you kill him, you kill yourself. But only the law of retribution
(ius talionis)... can specify definitely the quality and the quantity of punishment; all other princi-
pIes are fluctuating and unsuited for a sentence of pure and strict justice because extraneous con-
siderations are mixed into them.
Id. at 141.
Georg W.F. Hegel adopts a more sophisticated version of Kant's lex talionis. Hegel acknowledges
that the simple version of the lex talionis is embodied in "the universal feeling of peoples and individu-
als towards crime [which] is ... that what the criminal has done should also happen to him." HEGEL,
supra note 22, at 127. But this simple version, Hegel recognizes, may be reduced to the absurd:
[It is easy to portray the retributive aspect of punishment as an absurdity (theft as retribution for
theft, robbery for robbery, an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth, so that one can even imagine
the miscreant as one-eyed or toothless); but the concept has nothing to do with this absurdity, for
which the introduction of that [idea of] specific equality is alone to blame.
Id. at 128 (footnote omitted). Rather than the specific equality in the simple version of the lex talionis,
the necessary identity or connection between crime and its retribution lies in its character and value.
Whereas the simple version of the lex talionis requires a specific equality between the crime and the
punishment (e.g., theft as retribution for theft), Hegel's more sophisticated version requires merely that
the crime and punishment be comparable in character or value. Hegel defines value as "the inner equal-
ity of things which, in their existence ... are specifically quite different .... " Id. at 128. That is, the
two must be generally equal, or comparable:
[E]quality remains merely the basic measure of the crime's essential deserts, but not of the specific
external shape which the retribution should take. It is only in terms of this specific shape that theft
and robbery [on the one hand] and fines and imprisonment etc. [on the other] are completely un-
equal, whereas in terms of their value, i.e. their universal character as injuries... they are compa-
rable.
Id. at 129. In this way, the absurdities of Kant's simple lex talionis are avoided. For example, a robber
who has nothing which can be robbed in retribution may still be properly punished by a punishment, e.g.
860
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Retributivism's justification of "it's right to punish criminals because
doing so is right' is both its strength and its weakness. Consequentialists
argue that the justification, as such, is more intuition than justification,82 is
circular or empty,8 3 and constitutes a denial of the need to supply a justifica-
tion.84 Moreover, even if the retributive intuition that deserving wrongdoers
deserve to suffer is accepted, retributivism cannot explain why the state has
the right or the duty to give them the suffering that they deserve.85 Though
imprisonment, so long as the robbery and the term of imprisonment are comparable in character and
value. Hegel, however, fails to explain precisely how we are to determine whether a crime and its corre-
sponding punishment, even if not of specific equality, are nonetheless of the requisite comparability in
terms of value and character. Hegel does warn us, however, of the consequences of the failure to see the
connection:
If we do not grasp either the connection, as it is in itself, between crime and its nullification, or the
thought of value and the comparability of crime and punishment in term of value, we may reach
the point of regarding a proper punishment as a purely arbitrary association of an evil ... with an
illicit action.
Id. at 129 (citation omitted).
s0 For the view that the term desert is susceptible to different meanings, see Jeffrie G. Murphy, Le-
gal Moralism and Liberalism, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 73, 91 (1995) (identifying five different types of desert).
81 Benn, supra note 45, at 30 (retributivism maintains that "the punishment of crime is right in itself,
that it is fitting that the guilty should suffer, and that justice, or the moral order, requires the institution
of punishment").
82 Wasserstrom notes that the retributivist justification for punishment--"the guilty ought to be pun-
ished because they deserve it"--is "not an argument but merely an assertion." Wasserstrom, supra note
34, at 337.
83 See, e.g., Hugo Bedau, Retribution and the Theory of Punishment, 75 . PHIL. 601, 603 (1978);
Dolinko, supra note 12, at 517. David Dolinko has argued:
The retributivist might claim that what is "fitting" and "proper" and "deserved" is not, after all,
that the criminal suffer or receive punishment, but precisely the act of inflicting the punishment on
the criminal. This, however, would seem to make the retributivist "theory" of why punishment is
morally justified nothing more than a conclusory "Because it is!" Foes of retributivism have in-
deed faulted it as just such an unenlightening ipse dixit....
Dolinko, supra note 2, at 1629-30 n.25.
84 Benn, supra note 45, at 30:
The most thoroughgoing retributivists, exemplified by Kant, maintain that the punishment of
crime is right in itself, that it is fitting that the guilty should suffer, and that justice, or the moral
order, requires the institution of punishment. This, however, is not to justify punishment but,
rather, to deny that it needs any justification. To say that something is right or good in itself
means that it does not need to be justified in terms of the value or rightness of anything else. Its
intrinsic value is appreciated immediately or intuitively. But since at least some people do doubt
that punishment is right, an appeal to intuition is necessarily unsatisfactory. Again, to say "it is fit-
ting" or "justice demands" that the guilty should suffer is only to reaffirm that punishment is right,
not to give grounds for thinking so.
Id.
85 Bagoric & Amarasekara, supra note 12, at 164-65 (footnote omitted) ("the claim that punishment
should be administered by the state does not follow from intrinsic retributivism: even if it shows that the
guilty deserve to suffer, it cannot support the claim that the suffering should be deliberately inflicted on
wrongdoers by the state"); Bern, supra note 45, at 32; Dolinko, supra note 12, at 518-22; Douglas
Husak, Why Punish the Deserving?, 26 NOUS 447 (1992) (even if we accept the retributivist premise
that deserving wrongdoers deserve to be punished, what justifies the state in giving such persons what
they deserve without some cost/benefit analysis that makes the state doling out desert, in the form of
punishment, worthwhile?); C.L. TEN, supra note 35, at 48 (same); C.L. Ten, supra note 29, at 368.
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perhaps circular or empty, the retributivist justification would seem to pre-
clude punishment of the innocent. This is because only those who deserve
punishment may be punished and innocents do not deserve punishment. In
contrast, though consequentialism provides a clear justification-
punishment's good consequences. Such a justification, however, is thought
to make the theory vulnerable to the charge of intentionally punishing the
innocent. This is because the good consequences--deterrence, for exam-
ple-that justify punishment might be attained regardless of the guilt or in-
nocence of the offender. Thus, consequentialism's strength in furnishing a
clear justification for punishment is also its weakness in seemingly allowing
punishment of the innocent. For retributivism, it is just the opposite.
Whereas consequentialism looks forward to the good results to be at-
tained by punishing, retributivism looks backward to the wrongdoing al-
ready committed.86 The retributivist justification for punishment lies in "its
relation to a past offence;" 87 retributivism "is the notion that there is a mys-
tic bond between wrong and punishment .... ,8 8 Georg W.F. Hegel,89 who
along with Kant is the leading influence on retributivism,90 arguably sup-
plies the richest explication of that bond or relationship.91 Hegel seeks to
forge a necessary connection between crime and punishment,92 and retribu-
tion is that connection. 93 Central to Hegel's account is that punishment
86 MORRIS, supra note 6, at 38; Bagoric & Amarasekara, supra note 12, at 129-131; Cragg, supra
note 52, at 707; Fletcher, supra note 14, at 516; Oldenquist, supra note 17, at 749.
87 DUFF, supra note 1, at 4 (finding the quoted explanation to be the common denominator of all re-
tributivist accounts). For a similar view, see BERNARD BOSANQUET, SOME SUGGESTIONS IN ETHICS
188 (1919) ("Punishment isprimafacie retrospective; it deals with the past.").
88 OLIVERW. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 42, (reprint ed. 1991) (1881).
89 For general discussions of Hegel's theory of punishment see EWING, supra note 57, at 21-26;
TED HONDERICH, PUNISHMENT: THE SUPPOSED JUSTIFICATIONS 45-48 (1969); ALAN W. NORRIE,
LAW, IDEOLOGY AND PUNISHMENT: RETRIEVAL AND CRITIQUE OF THE LIBERAL IDEAL OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 65-88 (1991); PRIMORATZ, supra note 1, at 67-82. See generally MARK TUNICK, HEGEL'S
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: INTERPRETING THE PRACTICE OF LEGAL PUNISHMENT (1992); Markus Dubber,
Rediscovering Hegel's Theory of Crime and Punishment, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1577 (1994) (book review);
Peter J. Steinberger, Hegel on Crime and Punishment, 77 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 858 (1983).
90 See PRIMORATZ, supra note I, at 13 ("The most important and influential among classical retribu-
tivists are Kant and Hegel.').
91 For the view that Hegel has developed a "richer" and more "systematic" account of retributivism
than Kant, see id. See also Dubber, supra note 89, at 1581 (in contrast to Kant's scant writings on pun-
ishment, "Hegel developed the deontological foundations of Kant's theory into an all-encompassing
theory of the logical connection between crime and punishment"). But see HONDERICH, supra note 89,
at 45 (dismissing Hegel's account as "obscure" and "of very secondary interest").
92 HEGEL, supra note 22, at 129 ("punishment is merely a manifestation of the crime, i.e. it is one
half which is necessarily presupposed by the other"); id. (committing the criminal "deed brings its own
retribution with it"); Dubber, supra note 89, at 1608 (footnote omitted) (interpreting Hegel's theory as
"[t]he offender, by committing the criminal act, herself posits the law that compels her punishment").
93 HEGEL, supra note 22, at 129 ("Retribution is the inner connection and the identity of two deter-
minations [the value and character of an offender's crime and punishment] which are different in ap-
pearance and also have a different external existence... in relation to one another.').
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cancels, negates, or annuls crime.94 Crime, the infringement of the
"Right,"95 is conceived of as the initial use of force or coercion.96 In the ab-
stract, force or coercion (and thus crime) is "contrary to right."97 Punish-
ment is also a form of force or coercion, and thus (in the abstract) also
wrong.98 But because "coercion is cancelled... by coercion; it [punish-
ment] is therefore not only conditionally right but necessary-namely as a
second coercion which cancels an initial coercion." 99 Since crime is an in-
fringement or negation of the right, and punishment cancels the crime,100
"punishment is merely the negation of the negation."10 1 In other words, it is
not so much that two wrongs make a right but that the two wrongs (in the
abstract) restore the right.102 But this retrospective outlook has led conse-
quentialists to claim that retributivism is merely a philosophical rationaliza-
tion for revenge, 03 retaliation, and vengeance.
104
94 See PRiMoRATz, supra note 1, at 74. Punishment as the annulment of an offense is "one of the
basic tenets of [Hegel's] theory of punishment." Id.
95 See HEGEL, supra note 22, at 122 ("Right, whose infringement is crime...
96 Id. at 121 ("The initial use of coercion, as force employed by a free agent in such a way as to in-
fringe the existence [Dasein] of freedom in its concrete sense-i.e. to infiringe right as right-is crime.").
97 I1d. at 120.
98 PRIMORATZ, supra note 1, at 69 (interpreting Hegel's view to be that "retribution is a kind of co-
ercion").
99 HEGEL, supra note 22, at 120 (§ 93).
100 Id.
101 Id. at 123.
102 Id. at 124 (referring to punishment of crime as "the restoration of right"); see id. at 252 (the law
"restores and thereby actualizes itself as valid through the cancellation... of the crime").
Hegel's doctrine that punishment annuls the crime done by the offender has been subject to some
ridicule. See, e.g., John L. Mackie, Morality and the Retributive Emotions, 1982 CRIm. JUST. ETHICS 3,
5 ("But [Hegel's annulment doctrine] really is incoherent. The punishment may trample on the criminal,
but it does not do away with the crime."). Though predating Hegel, Cesare Beccaria also wonders how
punishment can undo that which has been done. CEsARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 23
(Ch. XII) (David Young trans., 1986) (1764) ("The purpose of punishments is not to torment and afflict
a sentient being or to undo a crime which has already been committed. ... Can the cries of a poor
wretch turn back time and undo actions which have already been done?").
Others have wondered exactly how the second wrong (the suffering of the person punished) follow-
ing the first wrong (the commission of a criminal offense) makes a right. See, e.g., HART, supra note
11, at 234-35 ('CTo some critics it appears to be a mysterious piece of moral alchemy in which the com-
bination of the two evils of moral wickedness and suffering are transmuted into good .... "); Jean
Hampton, The Moral Education Theory of Punishment, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 208, 236 ("How is the
society that inflicts the second evil any different from the wrongdoer that has inflicted the first?').
103 The famous remark which perhaps has cemented the perception that retributivism is a rationale
for vengeance, but which could equally be used to distinguish retributivism from vengeance, is as fol-
lows: "The criminal law stands to the passion of revenge in much the same relation as marriage to the
sexual appetite." JF. STEPHEN, GENERAL ViEw OF THE CRRAINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 99 (1 st ed. 1863).
104 See PLATO, supra note 19, at 321 ("In punishing wrongdoers, no one concentrates on the fact
that a man has done wrong in the past, or punishes him on that account, unless taking blind vengeance
like a beast."); PRIMORATZ, supra note 1, at 83 ("One of the more popular objections to the retributive
theory is the claim that it is in fact a philosophical rationalization of vengefulness"); Cragg, supra note
52, at 707 ("The most common and pressing concem with retributivism is its association in the minds of
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For retributivism, punishment is not a means to other goods or conse-
quences but is an end in itself.105 As such, punishment is an intrinsic good
or has intrinsic value106 because it is valued for its own sake. "The state of
affairs where a wrongdoer suffers punishment is morally better than the
state of affairs where he does not; and it is better irrespective of any of the
consequences of punishing him."10 7 In contrast, for a consequentialist the-
ory, punishment is a qualified evil but is instrumentally good or of instru-
mental value 08 because its value lies in what good consequences
punishment might lead to. 1 9
These contrasting views on punishment generate each theory's criti-
cism of the other. Because for retributivism punishment is an end in itself,
consequentialists ask why bother inflicting suffering "if no further good is
achieved by doing so."110 But by consequentialism achieving a further
good beyond punishment itself, retributivists claim that consequentialism
immorally uses those punished as mere means or objects to attain that fur-
ther good."' In contrast, retributivism claims to respect and value the dig-
nity and personhood of offenders by treating those punished as ends in
themselves." 2 Retributivism, however, honors offenders to such a degree
that it conceives of punishment as the right of the offender." 3 Recognizing
many with the idea of vengeance."); Quinton, supra note 41, at 6 ("Retributivists, who seem to hold that
there are circumstances in which the infliction of suffering is a good thing in itself, are charged by their
opponents with vindictive barbarousness.").
For arguments attempting to distinguish retributivism from vengeance, revenge and retaliation, see,
for example, HEGEL, supra note 22, at 129, who notes: "What is at first sight objectionable about retri-
bution is that it looks like something immoral, like revenge, and may thus be interpreted as a personal
matter. Yet it is not the personal element but the concept itself which carries out retribution." Id.; see
also MOORE, supra note 73, at 89; ROBERT NOziCK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 366-68 (1981);
PRIMORATZ, supra note 1, at 83-85; Oldenquist, supra note 17, at 749.
105 Duff, supra note 6, at 6-7.
106 See infra notes 609-612 and accompanying text.
107 Rawls, supra note 1, at 5.
108 See infra notes 609-612 and accompanying text.
109 Duff, supra note 6, at 5-6.
110 MOORE, supra note 73, at 93 n.19 (acknowledging the criticism as "[t]he main problem with the
pure retributivist theory of punishment"); accord Cragg, supra note 52, at 708 (describing it as
"[p]erhaps the most telling criticism" of retributivism).
111 See infra notes 397-399 and accompanying text.
112 See infra note 400 and accompanying text.
113 Hegel is perhaps the first retributivist to declare that the offender has a right to be punished.
HEGEL, supra note 22, at 126 (§ 100) ("The injury which is inflicted on the criminal is not only just in
itself... it is also a right for the criminal himself .... '). Hegel explains that a criminal's right to be
punished is located in the fact that a rational being has committed the act constituting the criminal of-
fense:
For it is implicit in his action, as that of a rational being, that it is universal in character, and that,
by performing it, he has set up a law which he has recognized for himself in his action, and under
which he may therefore be subsumed as under his right.
Id.
For others holding the view that an offender has a right to be punished, see, for example, MORRIS,
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the view's seeming absurdity, 114 consequentialists have commented, "It is
an odd sort of right whose holders would strenuously resist its recogni-
tion."11
5
Who or what is the imposition of punishment supposed to serve? Re-
tributivists and consequentialists supply differing answers. For retributiv-
ists, punishment serves abstract justice or right. Punishment is simply
doing justice. If, for retributivism, punishment of deserving wrongdoers is
a morally better state of affairs, then, for consequentialism, punishment
generates a better state of affairs, regardless of one's conception of the
good. (Typically, however, a consequentialist's conception of a better state
of affairs will be less an abstract, but rather, a materially better state of af-
fairs-societal welfare, and in particular, the diminution of crime). These
are the responses to the "what" question. In response to the "who" ques-
tion-who is the imposition of punishment supposed to serve-it might be
argued that each theory serves different constituencies. If retributivism may
be said to do justice to the criminal offender (by only imposing fair and de-
served punishment), consequentialism might be said to do justice to future
innocent crime victims (by seeking to deter or prevent future crime). Re-
tributivists complain that consequentialism does justice to the latter by ex-
ploiting the former; consequentialists criticize retributivism for doing
justice to the former by ignoring the latter. Which theory may lay claim to
doing justice to past crime victims has recently become a contentious de-
bate and one we will visit in Part V.
B. Varieties of Retributivism
There are a considerable number of versions of retributivism,116 and in
order to see why retributivists living in glass houses should not throw
stones at consequentialism, it may be helpful to have some rudimentary un-
derstanding of the variety of glass houses that retributivists occupy. Forms
of retributivism differ as to how much a wrongdoer should be punished.
Weak, or negative, retributivism'17 merely requires that a wrongdoer must
not be punished more than she deserves;" 8 strong, or positive, retributivism
supra note 6, at 41 ("a person [i.e., a wrongdoer or offender] has a right to be punished, meaning by this
that a person had a right to all those institutions and practices linked to punishment"); JEFFMRE MURPHY,
REUrBuTION, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY 134 (1979) ("The right to bepunished and regarded as a respon-
sible agent, though sometimes painful when honored, at least leaves one's status as a moral person in-
tact') (emphasis added).
114 For discussion of this criticism and the retributivist responses, see PRiMORATZ, supra note 1, at
99-108.
115 Quinton, supra note 41, at 8-9.
116 John Cottingham, Varieties of Retribution, 29 PHIL. Q. 238 (1979) (finding nine distinct versions
ofretributivism); C.L. Ten, supra note 29, at n.366.
117 The term "weak retributivism" may stem from HART, supra note 11, at 233. The term 'negative
retributivism" may derive from Mackie, supra note 102, at 4.
118 Weak, or negative, retrihutivism would be satisfied, therefore, even if the wrongdoer received no
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requires that a wrongdoer be punished to the fullest extent of his just de-
serts. Retributivist theories also vary as to whether justified punishment is
obligatory" 9 or merely permissible.1 20 Versions of retributivism may differ
as to what punishment is imposed for. Moralistic retributivism justifies the
punishment of an actor's morally culpable wrongdoing even if it does not
amount to a violation of law. 12' Legalistic retributivism justifies the pun-
ishment of an actor's violation of law even if it does not amount to a moral
wrong.122 And the combined version joins the moralistic and legalistic ver-
punishment at all. Because weak or negative retributivism fails to provide an affirmative reason to pun-
ish a wrongdoer at all, it is infrequently employed as a complete justification for punishment. David
Dolinko, Some Thoughts About Retributivism, 101 ETHICS 537, 539-544 (1991); Duff, supra note 6, at 7
(negative retributivism "clearly provides no complete justification for it tells us that we may punish the
guilty (their punishment is not unjust), but not that or why we should punish them" (citation omitted)).
119 Because a wrongdoer not only deserves to be punished, but also has a right to punishment, re-
tributivism generally conceives the punishment of wrongdoers to be obligatory. Kaplow & Shavell, su-
pra note 28, at 1229 n.660 (referring to obligatory retributivism as the "standard retributive view");
PRIMORATZ, supra note 1, at 110 (the "dominant' view in retributivism is that the duty to punish,
though obligatory, is only of "paramount, but not absolute importance").
For obligatory retributivism, even if the consequences of punishment would be disastrous, the de-
mands of justice necessitate punishment of culpable wrongdoing irrespective of the consequences. C.L.
TEN, supra note 35, at 75 (criticizing the obligatory form of retributivism as "implausible" because pun-
ishment would be obligatory even if 'the skies will fall'). In contrast, under a consequentialist theory
wrongdoers need not (and perhaps must not) be punished unless the good consequences generated by the
punishment outweigh the various costs and harms of punishment.
For examples of obligatory retributivism, see HEGEL, supra note 22, at 251 (§ 218) ("[I]t would be
impossible for society to leave a crime unpunished."); id. at 127 (§ 100) ("Both the nature of crime and
the criminal's own will require that the infringement for which he is responsible should be cancelled
[punished]." (emphasis added)); KANT, supra note 22, at 141:
The principle of punishment is a categorical imperative, and woe to him who crawls through the
windings of eudaemonism in order to discover something that releases the criminal from punish-
ment or even reduces its amount by the advantages it promises, in accordance with the Pharisaical
saying, "It is better for one man to die than for an entire people to perish." For ifjustice goes there
is no longer any value in men's living on the earth.
Id.; Michael Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND THE
EMOTIONS, 179, 182 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987) ("For a retributivist, the moral culpability of an
offender also gives society the duty to punish. Retributivism, in other words, is truly a theory ofjustice
such that, if it is true, we have an obligation to set up institutions so that retribution is achieved.").
120 While obligatory retributivism requires that culpable wrongdoing be punished, permissive re-
tributivism does not mandate punishment but merely justifies its permissibility. See, e.g., K.G. Arm-
strong, The Retributivist Hits Back, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT: A COLLECTION OF PAPERS,
supra note 11, at 138, 155-57. For general discussions of permissive retributivism, see generally
RICHARD B. BRANDT, ETHICAL THEORY: THE PROBLEMS OF NORMATIVE AND CRITICAL ETHICS 501-
03 (1959); H.J. McCloskey, Utilitarian and Retributive Punishment, 64 J. PHIL. 91 (1967). For an ex-
ample of permissive retributivism, see H.J. MeCloskey, A Non-Utilitaian Approach to Punishment, 8
INQUIRY 249 (1965), reprinted in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT, supra note 34, at
119, 131-34 [hereinafter McCloskey, Non-Utilitarian].
121 For a critique of theories of punishment which couch their justification in moral terms, see Joel
Feinberg, On Justifying Legal Punishment, in NOMOS III: RESPONSIBILITY 152, 156-57 (Carl J. Frie-
drich ed., 1960).
122 The terms "moralistic retributivism" and "legalistic retributivism" come from Feinberg, supra
note 55, at 646-47.
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sions: both morally culpable wrongdoing and the violation of a criminal
law are independently necessary and jointly sufficient to justify punish-
ment.
123
Though observers generally contrast retributivism with consequential-
ism on the basis that only the latter justifies punishment upon the good con-
sequences attained by punishment, 24 a class of retributive theories (termed
conceptually consequential retributivism 125) justify punishment by resort to
what is claimed to be a special type of consequences-conceptual or logical
consequences.1 26 Conceptually consequential retributivism may be distin-
guished from pure or simple retributivism, which justifies punishment not
on the basis of consequences but solely because the offender deserves it.127
C. The Mixed Theory of Punishment
In response to the seemingly intractable debate between retributivist
and consequentialist theories of punishment, there have been attempts to
combine the two. These "mixed" theories are the intellectual heirs to Ce-
sare Beccaria's effort to fuse utility and justice.12 8 Among these mixed
123 See infra notes 236-238 and accompanying text
124 Duff, supra note 6, at 5-6 ("The common feature of all "consequentialist" accounts ... is that
they justify punishment in terms of its contingent or instrumental contribution to an independently iden-
tifiable good."); id. at 6 ("A nonconsequentialist insists that actions and practices may be right or wrong
in virtue of their intrinsic character, independently oftheir consequences.').
12 I take the term from Fletcher, supra note 14, at 516.
126 Conceptually consequential retributivism may be distinguished from consequentialism. Conse-
quentialist theories justify punishment based on the attainment of actual or contingent consequences that
may or may not occur. And whether or not they occur is subject to empirical verification. For example,
the consequences of the offender being rehabilitated, the offender not committing crime while incapaci-
tated, the offender being deterred not to commit future crimes, and members of the general public being
deterred from committing future crimes, may or may not occur and are susceptible to empirical assess-
ment. Conceptual or logical consequences, on the other hand, are those which are abstract or are
claimed to necessarily follow as a result of punishment. Examples of the conceptual or logical conse-
quences used to justify punishment by theories commonly perceived to be retributive include negation of
the crime, avoidance of society's complicity with the crime, vindication of the victim of the crime and,
reallocation of the wrongdoer's balance of society's benefits and burdens. See infra notes 579-593 and
accompanying text. All of these consequences are said to be abstract and necessarily follow from pun-
ishment.
127 Justifying punishment without resort to any consequences of any type is "[t]he most thoroughgo-
ing" form of retributivism, Berm, supra note 45, at 30, and, "represents the paradigm of retributive
thinking," Fletcher, supra note 14, at 516.
128 Perhaps the first comprehensive mixed theory was Cesare Beccaria's 1764 landmark On Crimes
and Punishments. By combining elements ofjustice and utility (or retributivism and consequentialism),
Beccaria sought to overturn the cruelty, torture and barbarism endemic to punishment practices of his
age. For Beccaria, the best way to minimize the evil and cruelty of punishment was to reduce its occur-
rence. Taking the premise that "[ilt is better to prevent crimes than to punish them," BECCARIA, supra
note 102, at 74 (Ch. XLI), Beccaria concludes that "a punishment for a crime cannot be deemed truly
just ... unless the laws have adopted the best possible means ... to prevent that crime," id. at 60 (Ch:
XXXI). Quoting Montesquieu, Beccaria asserted that "punishment which does not derive from absolute
necessity.., is tyrannical." Id. at 8 (Ch. 11).
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theories of punishment, the most influential is H.L.A. Hart's. 29 Hart dis-
tinguished the competing justifications of punishment into the separate is-
sues of what justified the general practice and institutions of punishment
(the General Justifying Aim) as opposed to who should be punished (Distri-
bution). 30 For Hart, the General Justifying Aim of our institutional practice
of punishment is the beneficial consequences that punishment generates.'
3'
As to who should be punished, the Distribution question should be an-
swered by retributivism--"only an offender for an offence.""' i3 2  Under
Hart's mixed theory, the justification for why punishment may be imposed
in general is answered by the aim of deterrence and the question of who
should be punished is answered partly by deterrence and partly by negative
retributivism. An offender may only be punished if he is guilty and if deter-
Rather than separating out concerns ofjustice and crime prevention, as we tend to do today, for Bec-
caria the concerns were inextricably intertwined. Justice lays precisely in punishing no more than is
necessary to preserve and promote public welfare. By justice Beccaria means nothing more than "the
bond necessary to hold private interests together." Id. at 9. Beccaria explains that "[a]ll punishments
that exceed what is necessary to preserve this bond are unjust by their very nature." Id. Contrary to our
view today that the goals of retributivism and deterrence are incompatible, for Beccaria, the more just
the punishment, the greater the crime prevention. As Beccaria puts it: "[Tihe foundation of the sover-
eign's right to punish crimes [is]: the necessity of defending the depository of the public welfare against
the usurpations of private individuals. Further, the more just punishments are, the more sacred and in-
violable is personal security .. " Id. at 8.
Though generally viewed as a utilitarian, Beccaria seems to be neither utilitarian nor retributivist.
As distinct from a thoroughgoing utilitarian, Beccaria prohibits punishment even where its consequences
are good or useful if the punishment is unjust. Id. at 43 (Ch. XXV) ("[E]ven if punishments produce a
happy result, they are not therefore just, for, in order to be just, they must be necessary. A useful injus-
tice cannot be tolerated .... "). Like retributivism's lex talionis, Beccaria argues that "to tighten even
further the connection between the misdeed and its punishment.., the latter should conform as closely
as possible to the nature of the crime." Id. at 37 (Ch. XIX). For example, "[w]hoever seeks to enrich
himself with the property of others ought to be deprived of his own." Id. at 39 (Ch. XXII). And Bec-
caria shares the retributivist concern for respecting the offender's rights and autonomy. See infra notes
404-406 and accompanying text. But Beccaria roundly rejects retributivism. Rather, the purpose of
punishment is deterrence, both specific and general. BECCARIA, supra note 102, at 23 (Ch. XII) ("The
purpose of punishment, then, is nothing other than to dissuade the criminal from doing fresh harm to his
compatriots and to keep other people from doing the same.").
If more consequentialist than retributivist, Beccaria might be considered a compassionate conse-
quentialist, rather than a utility-calculating consequentialist as was Jeremy Bentham. H.L.A. HART,
ESSAYS ON BENTHAm: STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICAL THEORY 51 (1982) ("there is in
Beccaria a respect for the dignity and value of the individual person which is absent in Bentham").
129 For other notable efforts to provide a mixed theory of punishment, combining elements of con-
sequentialism and retributivism see generally EWING, supra note 57, at 300 (unlike retributivism, pun-
ishment justified by the good consequence of preventing crime by expressing moral condemnation but
like retributivism, offenders should be punished only if guilty and only as much as their just deserts re-
fleet); Quinton, supra note 41, at 12-15 (consequentialist concerns justify punishment while retributiv-
ism provides the definition of punishment); Rawls, supra note 1, at 5-6 (rule utilitarian approach in
which the justification of punishment institutions is deterrence but the rules employed by the punishment
institutions are retributive); C.L. TEN, supra note 35, at 79-81.
130 HART, supra note 11, at 8-13.
131 Id. at 8.
132 Id. at 11.
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rence could be promoted.
The difficulty for most mixed theories is that either substantive issues
of justification are assumed away by definition or the instability of the
components leads to a collapse back into consequentialism. 133 While Hart's
mixed theory may avoid those problems,134 its own difficulty is in setting
the amount of punishment. The negative retributivism component sets the
upper limit, and deterrence concerns set the lower limit on how much pun-
ishment to impose. By ignoring positive retributivism, the mixed theory
has been criticized by retributivists as being disproportionately lenient in (i)
not justifying any punishment at all of guilty wrongdoers where deterrence
could not be promoted, 135 and (ii) not justifying the punishment of guilty
wrongdoers to the fullest extent of their just deserts where less punishment
satisfies the aim of deterrence.1 36 And by not fully embodying the aim of
deterrence, the mixed theory is disproportionately lenient where promotion
of deterrence requires a sentence exceeding in severity the limit set by nega-
tive retributivism.
The focus of this Article will be demonstrating that the four principal
criticisms retributivists have leveled against consequentialist theories of
punishment apply equally to retributivism. 137 As a result, it will be con-
cluded that retributivism's place on the high moral ground is misplaced.
Retributivism is no better than consequentialist theories of punishment and
retributivism is perhaps incoherent by failing to satisfy its own principles.
II. RETRIBUTIVISM'S INTENTIONAL PUNISHMENT OF THE INNOCENT
Two versions of retributivism-moralistic and legalistic-will be
shown to justify the intentional punishment of particular, identifiable inno-
cents. Moralistic retributivism justifies the intentional punishment of mor-
ally culpable wrongdoers who are legally innocent-by legally innocent, I
mean those individuals who, despite their moral wrongdoing, could not be
convicted of committing a criminal offence. Legalistic retributivism justi-
fies the intentional punishment of the legally, or criminally, guilty who are
morally innocent-by morally innocent I mean those individuals who, de-
spite their violation of a criminal statute, have not committed moral wrong-
doing. Before examining these two specific theories, let us first consider
the state of the debate between retributivists and consequentialists over this
133 Primoratz, supra note 43, at 560.
134 PRIMORATZ, supra note 1, at 145.
135 MOORE, supra note 73, at 97-102.
136 Primoratz, supra note 43, at 560.
137 For some additional criticisms of retributivism, see, for example, Cragg, supra note 52, at 708
(retributivism insufficiently values "compassion, forgiveness and mercy"); Kaplow & Shavell, supra
note 28, at 1236 (retributivism fails to "include a definition of what constitutes wrongful behavior de-
serving punishment" (footnote omitted)); Jeffrie G. Murphy, supra note 80, 78-79, 83-84 (retributivism
is inconsistent with liberalism's harm principle and liberalism in general).
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most crucial issue.
A. The Debate over Intentional Punishment of the Innocent
This subpart presents the retributivist charge that consequentialism jus-
tifies the intentional punishment of the innocent, and the various
consequentialist responses to that charge.
1. The Retributivist Charge: Consequentialism Justifies the Inten-
tional Punishment of the Innocent.-Retributivists' principal, and most
devastating, criticism of consequentialist theories of punishment is that they
justify punishment of the innocent.1 38  The force of this criticism has been
so powerful that it alone is considered a sufficient basis to reject consequen-
tialism.139 Because retributivism's justification for punishment is based on
the desert of the punished, and an innocent presumably does not deserve to
be punished, it would seem that retributivism cannot justify punishment of
the innocent.140 Consequentialist theories are susceptible to the criticism
precisely because they justify punishment by the good consequences to be
attained by punishment.14 1 If one of the good consequences sufficient to
justify punishment, for example, general deterrence, may be attained by
138 DUFF, supra note 1, at 154 ("A system of [consequentialist] punishment is most obviously defec-
tive if it involves the deliberate punishment of the innocent"); HART, supra note 11, at 5-6 (terming
consequentialist theories justifying punishment of the innocent as the "stock 'retributive' argument");
MOORE, supra note 73, at 93 n.19 ("The main problem with the pure utilitarian theory of punishment is
that it potentially sacrifices the innocent in order to achieve a collective good.'); PRIMORATZ, supra note
1, at 113 (punishment of the innocent is the "main objection" to consequentialist theories of punish-
ment); Benn, supra note 45, at 31 (justifying punishment of the innocent as the "dilemma" of conse-
quentialist theories); Cragg, supra note 52, at 708 (consequentialist theories justifying punishment of the
innocent is a "telling criticism"); Greenawalt, supra note 11. at 1341 ("the most damaging aspect of the
[retributivist] attack is that utilitarianism admits the possibility of justified punishment of the innocent");
Mabbot, supra note 66, at 23 (terming punishment of the innocent as the "central difficulty" for conse-
quentialist theories of punishment); Quinton, supra note 41, at 9 (Retributivists "crucial charge is that
utilitarians permit the punishment of the innocent."); C.L. Ten, supra note 29, at 366-67 (punishment of
the innocent is the "main problem" for consequentialist theories); see Murphy, supra note 6, at 4 ("Phi-
losophers have written at great length about the moral problems involved in punishing the innocent-
particularly as these problems have raised obstacles to an acceptance of the moral theory of Utilitarian-
ism.").
139 Consider the following expression of the general view that justifying punishment of the innocent
dooms consequentialism: "In short, if one maintains that punishment is justified by deterrence alone one
seems committed to the immorality of punishing the innocent. It seems that one is committed to deny-
ing the rule that only the guilty may be punished. Surely, then, the deterrence theory is unacceptable."
HONDERICH, supra note 89, at 62. For similar expressions of this prevailing view, see Bagoric & Ama-
rasekara, supra note 12, at 133 (that consequentialism may justify punishment of the innocent "has been
so persuasive that it alone has led many to reject utilitarianism as a general theory of morality'); Mi-
chael Philips, The Inevitability of Punishing the Innocent, 48 PHIL. STuD. 389, 389 (1985) (that conse-
quentialism may justify punishment of the innocent "is often taken to be a sufficient refutation of
Utilitarian theories of punishment and of utilitarianism in general").
140 Bagoric & Amarasekara, supra note 12, at 133.
141 For a good discussion of the range of various consequentialist responses to the criticism, see
PRIMORATZ, supra note 1, at 43-65; C.L. TEN, supra note 35, at 13-37.
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punishment of the innocent, then punishment of the innocent is justified un-
der consequentialism.
Let us consider an example, based on H.J. McCloskey's classic hypo-
thetical, of consequentialism perhaps justifying punishment of the innocent.
Suppose a particularly heinous crime is committed (whose perpetrator is
unknown) and the community erupts in violence and riots in which many
innocents are killed. If it is the case that many more innocents will be
killed in the violence until a plausible suspect is arrested, convicted, and
punished, a consequentialist "must conclude that he has a duty to bear false
witness in order to bring about the punishment of an innocent person."'142
Thus, if many innocent lives may be saved, consequentialism justifies the
punishment of an innocent person.143
2. Consequentialist Responses.-Consequentialist responses might
be classified so as to fall into three categories: (i) denial, (ii) acceptance
with a defense, and (iii) a countercharge that retributivism also intentionally
punishes the innocent.
a. Denial.--Consequentialists deny the charge in a variety of
ways. First, contrary to the general view, Benthamite classical utilitarian-
ism does not require, or even allow for, the punishment of the innocent.144
142 McCloskey, Non-Utilitarian, supra note 120, at 127.
143 For a defense of consequentialism in reply to McCloskey's example, see T.L.S. Sprigge, A Utili-
tarian Reply to Dr. McCloskey, 8 INQUIRY 272 (1965), reprinted in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECrIVEs ON
PUNISHMENT, supra note 34, at 66, 70-75 (expressing skepticism that punishment of the innocent
scapegoat, in McCloskey's example, would actually produce, on balance, the most preferable conse-
quences).
144 Frederick Rosen notes that "[i]f one examines Bentham's writings on punishment and the dis-
cussions surrounding them, it soon becomes obvious that punishing the innocent was not originally en-
visioned as a problem in his theory:' Frederick Rosen, Utilitarianism and the Punishment of the
Innocent: The Origins ofa False Doctrine, 9 UTILrrAS 23, 25 (1997) (footnote omitted). "Nor was it an
issue for Kant, who feared that the guilty would go unpunished or be insufficiently punished with the
adoption of utilitarianism rather than that the innocent would be punished." Id. at 25 n.7.
On the general view that utilitarianism justifies punishment of the innocent, Rosen argues that this
mistaken view is a result of a misunderstanding of Benthamite classical utilitarianism:
The mistake is to suppose that utilitarianism justifies punishment by deterrence alone, while deter-
rence in fact serves as one of several elements in the utilitarian theory of punishment. The mistake
comes from ignoring the pleasure-pain dimension of traditional Benthamite utilitarianism and
from thinking that utilitarianism begins with the general principle that utility (the maximization of
happiness) is the sole criterion of right action, which is then applied to topics like punishment in a
"top-down" fashion. In fact, classical Benthamite utilitarianism works in a "bottom-up" fashion
from secondary principles to the principle of utility.
Id. at 26.
One of these "secondary principles," justified by the principle of utility, is that the proportion be-
tween crimes and punishments should reflect the harm caused to the life and security of members of so-
ciety. Id. at 32. Thus, "if there was no harm, there would not be a crime, and without a crime,
punishment would be excluded." Id. at 33. Since an innocent person would not commit a harm, there
would be no crime and "punishment of the innocent would be generally excluded." Id.
That punishment of the innocent would only be "generally excluded," but not completely excluded,
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It is more an institutional theory of law, not a theory of ethics governing the
actions of individuals. 145 As such, Benthamite utilitarianism rests on no-
tions of transparency and openness of government actions which would
preclude deception and manipulation of the general public. 146 This, in turn,
is claimed to preclude the secret framing of innocents. 147 It is not clear,
however, that the charge may be evaded this easily in light of Bentham's
express statements that seem to allow for the possibility ofjustifying inten-
tional punishment of the innocent. 48  Second, punishment should be de-
fined in such a way as to make the guilt of the person punished part of the
definition of punishment. 49  In this way, punishment of the innocent is a
logical impossibility. 150 As discussed above, this "definitional stop"'51 sim-
ply assumes away the difficult issue of justification.
152
Third, punishment of the innocent would be counterproductive.
5 1
Once it became known that innocents as well as offenders were punished,
punishment would lose (some of) its deterrent value. 54 There would be less
reason to avoid committing criminal acts if that avoidance rendered one
allows the retributivist criticism to gain traction. Though perhaps retributivists have exaggerated the
frequency with which innocents would be punished under consequentialism, their argument gains a toe-
hold merely by the possibility that consequentialism might justify punishment of the innocent. And
Bentham does seem to explicitly state that justifying punishment of the innocent by the principle of util-
ity is possible. See infra note 161 and accompanying text.
145 The mistaken assumption of retributivists criticizing utilitarianism for justifying punishment of
the innocent is that "if it is good for governments to seek to establish utility-maximizing institutions and
policies it must be good for individuals to seek to perform utility-maximizing acts." Binder & Smith,
supra note 27, at 120. As Binder and Smith further explain:
[T]he charge of framing the innocent rests on a misunderstanding of utilitarian penology as an ap-
plication of an "act-utilitarian" ethic governing individual behavior. We contend that utilitarian-
ism began as a normative theory of law and legal process aiming at not just happiness in general,
but also at security in particular ..
Id. at 118-19.
146 "[Benthamite utilitarianism is] methodologically committed to publicity, regularity and
representativeness of legal decisionmaking. ... Indeed, utilitarian penology cannot endorse any pro-
gram of official manipulation of the public that restricts information to a putatively utilitarian elite." Id.
at 119 (footnote omitted).
147 In response to the retributivist charge that utilitarianism justifies the punishment of the innocent,
Binder and Smith conclude "[t]hat charge is a frame-up." Id. at 123. As Binder and Smith maintain:
"[U]tilitarian penology cannot endorse punishment of the innocent, which violates either the security
aim, or the publicity condition, or both .... It is simply not true that eschewing unnecessary punish-
ment of the guilty logically entails willingness to punish the innocent." Id. at 119.
148 See infra note 161 and accompanying text.
149 See, e.g., Quinton, supra note 41, at 10 ("The infliction of suffering on a person is only properly
described as punishment if that person is guilty.").
15O Id. at 12 ("[G]uilt is a logically necessary condition of punishment.").
151 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
152 See supra notes 40-49 and accompanying text.
153 HOBBES, supra note 21, at 249 ("IF]or there can arrive no good to the commonwealth by punish-
ing the innocent."); C.L. TEN, supra note 35, at 17-18; Beun, supra note 45, at 31; Rawls, supra note 1,
at 11-13; C.L. Ten, supra note 29, at 367.
154 Benn, supra note 45, at 31; Rawls, supra note 1, at 12.
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subject to punishment anyway. Therefore, consequentialists argue, pun-
ishment of the innocent is not justified by their theories. But retributivists
respond that punishment of the innocent would still be justified as long as
the general public never found out that innocents were being punished. If
innocents were punished, and the general public never found out, the pun-
ishment of the innocent would not undermine deterrence but promote deter-
rence. Consequentialists claim that the systematic punishment of the
innocent would inevitably be found out.
155 Even so, retributivists rejoin,156
a consequentialist would always be tempted to do it just once, figuring that
one instance would escape detection.1 57 Even if consequentialist theories of
punishment would not ever punish the innocent, they fail to provide a satis-
factory account of why the innocent should not be punished.1 58 The proper
rationale should address the injustice, and not merely the inefficacy, of pun-
ishing the innocent. That deterrence might be undermined by punishing the
innocent fails to adequately explain our intuitive abhorrence to the moral in-
justice of punishing the innocent.159
b. Acceptance with a Defense.-Rather than deny the charge
that consequentialism justifies punishment of the innocent, some conse-
quentialists might accept the charge but defend it by invoking a broader
perspective of what constitutes moral injustice. While punishment of the
innocent may be unjust, what is also unjust is retributivism's insistence on
inflicting punishment on an offender even if no good was to come of it and
despite the needless suffering of future crime victims which might have
been avoided by a deterrence-based approach to punishment. For example,
although Bentham explicitly maintains that the innocent ought to be pun-
ished in some special circumstances' 60 where utility could thereby be
155 Benn, supra note 45, at 31; Rawls, supra note 1, at 12.
156 One prominent retributivist, however, suggests an additional reason why punishment of the in-
nocent might be counterproductive for consequentialist theories of punishment. Hegel claimed that an
unjust threat of punishment might not deter crime, but rather, induce it. The unjust threat of punishment
"may ultimately provoke someone into demonstrating his freedom in defiance of it ...." HEGEL, supra
note 22, at 126 (§ 99). In other words, punishment of the innocent may be counterproductive by pro-
moting criminal violations rather than deterring them.
157 MURPHY & COLEMAN, supra note 54, at 122; C.L. TEN, supra note 35, at 18.
158 DUFF, supra note 1, at 160-161; Benn, supra note 45, at 31; C.L. Ten, supra note 29, at 367.
One possible consequentialist reply is to counter that retributivism cannot explain how much society
should spend both to increase the number of the guilty that are punished and to decrease the number of
innocents that are punished. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 28, at 1240-1242. Presumably a retributiv-
ist "would be willing to spend, say, one penny to ensure that an innocent individual be acquitted rather
than executed by mistake. But what is the most he would spend-the entire GDP?" Id. at 1241. While
consequentialism could easily reach a resolution, UL at 1242 n.686, the claim is that retributivism has no
satisfactory answer, nor could it even supply an answer to such a question in principle. Id. at 1242-43.
And as a result, retributivism "is seriously incomplete.' Id. at 1242 (footnote omitted).
159 DUFF, supra note 1, at 160-161; Ben, supra note 45, at 31.
160 One example might be collective criminality where it is known that some members of a group
are responsible for a crime and some are innocent, but it is not known which are which. If the punish-
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maximized, 161 retributivist punishment is unjust both to the general public
and to the offender.1 62 In other words, though deterrence theories may be
unjust in justifying the intentional punishment of innocents, retributivism is
unjust in exposing the innocent general public (innocent future crime vic-
tims) to a greater risk of victimization.
The second controversial consequentialist response, and perhaps the
"'more promising,"'163 is to embrace the charge and defend it on grounds of
utility.164 If punishing an innocent truly yields a better state of affairs than
not punishing, then of course we would want to punish that innocent. Why
would retributivism prefer a worse state of affairs over a better state of af-
fairs? 165  Though this response has been subject to some ridicule' 66-
consequentialists have been said to "outsmart' '1 67 themselves-nonetheless
it does have an undeniable common-sense appeal. It certainly might be dis-
ment of all the members of the group would maximize utility, then the intentional punishment of the in-
nocent might be justified for Bentham. PRIMORATZ, supra note 1, at 26.
161 Bentham, supra note 63, at 476:
To inflict punishment when... the infliction of such punishment is avoidable, is in the case of the
innocent, contrary to the principle of utility.... To punish, where ... such punishment is un-
avoidable, is not in either case contrary to the principle ofutility;--not in the case of the guilty: no,
nor yet in the case of the innocent.
Id.
162 Bentham explains:
Cruelty to the public, that is cruelty to the innocent [future crime victims], by suffering them, for
want of an adequate protection [through punishment which sufficiently deters crime], to lie ex-
posed to the mischief of the offence: cruelty even to the offender himself, by punishing him to no
purpose, and without the chance of compassing that beneficial end, by which alone the introduc-
tion of the evil of punishment is to be justified.
BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES, supra note 57, at 181.
163 Bagoric & Amarasekara, supra note 12, at 141-42.
164 For discussion of this claim, see HONDERICH, supra note 89, at 66-75.
165 See C.L. Ten, supra note 29, at 367 ("[Retributivists have difficulty in explaining why the
guilty should be punished at all if punishment fails to produce any good consequences ...
166 PRIMORATZ, supra note 1, at 54.
167 In response to the retributivist criticism that consequentialism justifies punishment of the inno-
cent, a consequentialist, J.J.C. Smart, embraced the criticism. Smart defends the consequentialist impli-
cation that to avert great misery, punishment of the innocent might be justified:
For if a case really did arise in which injustice was the lesser of two evils (in terms of human hap-
piness and misery), then the anti-utilitarian conclusion is a very unpalatable one too, namely that
in some circumstances one must choose the greater misery, perhaps the very much greater misery,
such as that of hundreds of people suffering painful deaths.
J.J.C. Smart, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, in J.J.C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS,
UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 3, 71-72 (1973).
In response to Smart's argument, the philosopher Daniel C. Dennett included the term "outsmart," as
a pun on Smart's name and as a comment on the wisdom of Smart's argument, in his satirical philoso-
phical dictionary. DANIEL C. DENNETr, THE PHILOSOPHICAL LEXICON (8th ed. 1987). The entry is as
follows: "[O]utsmart, v. -To embrace the conclusion of one's opponent's reductio ad absurdum argu-
ment. 'They thought they had me, but I outsmarted them. I agreed that it was sometimes just to hang an
innocent man."' Id. Dennett's dictionary is available online at http://www.blackwellpublishers.co.uk/
LEXICON/default.htm.
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puted whether punishment of an innocent would lead to a better state of af-
fairs. But if it did not then consequentialism would not justify punishment
of the innocent. But the consequentialist argument is that if punishment of
an innocent did lead to a better state of affairs, then that punishment is justi-
fied.
The argument may be put even more persuasively. If a retributivist
system of punishment dramatically increased the incidence of crime and the
number of innocent victims who were victimized by crime, as opposed to a
system of no punishment or a consequentialist system of punishment, re-
tributivism would still be committed to punishing. 168 And despite the pos-
sibility "that more innocents would be punished in a society governed by
retributivist, rather than utilitarian, principles,"'169 retributivists would be
committed to retributivism and the punishment of a greater amount of inno-
cents. 170  Even if retributivism led to (i) greater victimization of innocent
vietims, 171 (ii) a greater number of guilty who were acquitted, 172 and (iii) a
greater number of innocents punished, 17 as opposed to a consequentialist
168 C.L. Ten, supra note 29, at 369.
169 Ezorsky, supra note 72, at xviii.
170 Ezorsky explains why it would be possible:
[Flor utilitarians, punishment is justified only if, by comparison with other alternatives, e.g.,
treatment, punishment would maximize utility. Suppose a painless but expensive pill were de-
vised which cured any propensity to commit crime. The pill's utility surpassed that of other alter-
natives to punishment and slightly exceeded that of punishment itself. In that case utilitarians
should endorse adoption of the crime cure pill and abolition of punishment. But retributivists be-
lieve that punishment of the guilty is either necessarily just or has some intrinsic value. In that
case retributivists might refuse to substitute the crime cure pill for punishment But juries would
most likely remain fallible. Thus some innocents would be punished along with the guilty. Hence
ifretributivist principles held sway, some innocents would, as a consequence, be punished. While
if utilitarians had their way, not a single innocent would suffer punishment.
Id. at xviii-xix.
171 Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 28, at 1243-44. Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell question re-
tributivism's indifference to higher crime rates in determining just punishments:
[S]uppose that if the fair [retributivist] punishment for murder is applied, ten murders will be
committed, whereas if a greater and unfair [consequentialist] punishment is threatened, none will
be. Given that murder is considered by the retributivist to be a wrongful act-that the world in
which an act of murder occurs is less just than one in which it does not-it is hard to understand
how the retributivist can say that it does not matter in determining whether the supposedly fair
punishment is indeed fair that, as a consequence of insisting on fair punishment, ten murders will
occur.
Id.
172 Id. at 1244-45. Kaplow and Shavell argue:
In the example just mentioned [see supra note 171], when the fair punishment is employed and ten
murders occur, some of the murderers may escape ... let us say that five do so. Thus, for the re-
tributivist to recommend the fair punishment for murder means that he favors a regime under
which five people suffer no sanction for their wrong, which itself is unfair under retributive theory.
But if the unfairly high sanction is announced, it will by hypothesis discourage all murders, so that
no individuals will in fact experience an unfair sanction (either too high a sanction or getting away
scot-free).
Id. (footnote omitted).
173 By extending Kaplow & Shavell's reasoning, see supra notes 171-172, it could be shown that
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system of punishment, retributivists would still be committed to retributivist
punishment.1 74
Or instead suppose that not punishing an innocent would lead to catas-
trophic consequences, such as the destruction of an entire society or na-
tion. 175  In such cases, our intuition might be that even though the one
should not be sacrificed to save the many, nonetheless the one should be
sacrificed to prevent all from being lost.1 76 Throughout history, 177 as well
as today,178 we have often sacrificed the few to avoid catastrophic conse-
quences and often much less severe results-consider pretrial detention,
quarantine, and involuntary enlistment, to name only a few.
179
Retributivists claim that the demands of justice are absolute and no in-
nocent may be punished even if it were to prevent the extinction of man-
kind. This is the view of Kant, who declared that "if justice goes [perishes]
there is no longer any value in men's living on the earth."' 80 But this may
be too impracticable and implausible.
more innocents will be punished under the fair or retributivist system than the unfair or consequentialist
system. Suppose that in their example, under the retributivist system, some innocents will be brought to
trial and convicted for some of the ten murders, let us say two innocents. But under the consequentialist
system, which by hypothesis discourages all murder, there will be no crimes to be prosecuted and thus
no innocent will be convicted and punished. As a result, a retributivist is forced to favor a system in
which more innocents will be punished than under a consequentialist system.
For Kaplow & Shavell's own argument that more innocents might be mistakenly punished under a
retributivist system than a consequentialist system, see Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 28, at 1266-69.
174 A retributivist, however, could simply reply that the ends do not justify the means. Even when
the use of unfair or consequentialist means may produce a better state of affairs, we are not morally
permitted to do wrong (by punishing unfairly) to attain the good.
175 See, e.g., John 11:47-53, describing an innocent punished to prevent catastrophic consequences.
176 W.D. Ross, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD 61 (1967) ("[T]he interests of the society may be so
deeply involved as to make it right to punish an innocent man 'that the whole nation perish not.").
177 Consider the following instance of a lesser number of innocents being sacrificed to save the
many:
A pointed example is the decision by the British Prime Minister of the day, Winston Churchill, to
sacrifice the lives of the residents of Coventry in order not to alert the Germans that the English
had deciphered German radio messages. On 14 November 1940 the English decoded plans that
the Germans were about to air bomb Coventry. If Coventry were evacuated or its inhabitants ad-
vised to take special precautions against the raid, the Germans would have known that their code
had been cracked and the English would have been unable to obtain future information about the
intentions of its enemy. Churchill elected not to warn the citizens of Coventry, and many hun-
dreds were killed in the raid that followed. Their lives were sacrificed in order not to reveal a se-
cret that would hopefully save many more lives in the future.
Bagoric & Amarasekara, supra note 12, at 143.
178 On September 11, 2001, President Bush ordered that hijacked civilian passenger planes heading
toward significant targets with hostile intent be shot down by American fighter jets. Apparently, the ba-
sis for the order is that it is preferable to knowingly kill hundreds in order to save the lives of thousands.
See Dan Balz & Bob Woodward, America's Chaotic Road to War, WASH. POST., Jan. 27, 2002, at Al;
Bradley Graham, Military Alerted Before Attacks, WASH. POST., Sept. 15,2001, at A18.
179 The retributivist objection to consequentialist theories countenancing intentional punishment of
the innocent "loses its force when it is shown that punishing the innocent is in fact no worse than other
activities we condone." Bagoric & Amarasekara, supra note 12, at 143.
1O KANT, supra note 22, at 141.
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c. Retributivism Does It Too.-As a final response to the charge
that their theory justifies punishing innocents, consequentialists might claim
that regardless of the truth of that claim, retributivism also justifies inten-
tional punishment of the innocent. Unlike Kant, some retributivists might
concede the permissibility of punishing the innocent in order, for example,
"that the whole nation perish not." '' This seems to be the view of Michael
Moore, perhaps the most committed advocate of retributivism among legal
scholars, 82 who would justify punishment of the innocent if the adverse
consequences stemming from not punishing were severe enough.8 3 But
does not this concession ts4 defuse retributivism's critique of consequential-
ism's punishment of the innocent?185 After all, that even retributivists sug-
gest that we turn to consequentialism in the very moments of peril and
crisis-when the heat is on-suggests consequentialism's plausibility. 8 6 A
retributivist could still argue that retributivism might permit the punishment
of the innocent when it is the only way to prevent a catastrophic state of af-
fairs, whereas consequentialism might justify punishment of the innocent
whenever it produced even a slightly preferable state of affairs.187 Though a
181 ROSS, supra note 176, at 61.
182 Douglas Husak, Retribution in Criminal Theory, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 959, 960 (2000) ("No
contemporary criminal theorist rivals Moore in his unqualified enthusiasm for retribution.").
183 Moore rejects the absolutism of deontological duties which is "often attributed to Kant, who held
that though the heavens may fall, justice must be done." MOORE, supra note 73, at 719. Moore explains
that at a certain threshold of grievous harm, consequential principles outweigh deontological ones:
Despite my nonconsequentialist views on morality, I cannot accept the Kantian line. It just is not
true that one should allow a nuclear war rather than killing or torturing an innocent person. It is
not even true that one should allow the destruction of a sizable city by a terrorist nuclear device
rather than kill or torture an innocent person. To prevent such extraordinary harms extreme ac-
tions seem to me to bejustified.
Id. Thus, if an innocent may justifiably be tortured or killed to avert catastrophic consequences, then
punishment of the innocent to avert similarly catastrophic consequences would also seem to be justified.
184 For other nonconsequentialists also seeming to make this concession see NOzICK, supra note 36,
at 29 n.*; Thomas Nagel, War and Massacre, in THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS 53, 56 (1979).
185 For Moore's argument that it does not collapse into consequentialism see MOORE, supra note 73,
at 721-22. As Moore explains:
[Tihere is no collapse of agent-relative views [deontology] into consequentialism just because mo-
rality's norms can be overridden by horrendous consequences. A consequentialist is committed by
her moral theory to saying that torture of one person isjustified whenever it is necessary to prevent
the torture of two or more. The agent-relative view, even as here modified, is not committed to
this proposition. To justify torturing one innocent person requires that there be horrendous conse-
quences attached to not tortuting that person-the destruction of an entire city, perhaps, or of a
lifeboat of building full of people.
Id. at 721-22. Thus, according to Moore, threshold deontology, see infra note 188, does not collapse
into consequentialism because, unlike consequentialism, threshold deotology does not justify actions
violating a moral norm merely because they prevent a slightly unfavorable state of affairs. Under
threshold deontology, actions violating moral norms may only be justified if they prevent a catastrophi-
cally unfavorable state of affairs.
186 Bagoric & Amarasekara, supra note 12, at 143 ('The decisions we make in a real life crisis are
the best evidence of the way we actually prioritise [sic] important competing principles and interests.").
187 PRimORATZ, supra note 1, at 60.
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retributivist might make the concession in extraordinary circumstances, re-
tributivism per se, as a theory, would have difficulty in justifying punish-
ment of the innocent to avoid catastrophic consequences, without collapsing
into consequentialism.
1 8
Though not directly addressing the claim that retributivism would col-
lapse into consequentialism, H.L.A. Hart offers a partial way out for re-
tributivism:
In extreme cases [of impending social catastrophe] many might still think it
right to resort to these expedients [punishing the innocent to avert the catastro-
phe] but we should do so with the sense of sacrificing an important principle.
We should be conscious of choosing the lesser of two evils, and this would be
inexplicable if the principle sacrificed to utility were itself only a requirement
of utility.189
Retributivists have seized this argument to claim that even if retributivism
were to justify punishment of the innocent on consequentialist grounds, re-
tributivists "would also realize that this imposed a significant moral cost, a
significant wrong done to the innocent person, which the utilitarian cannot
recognize." 190 Such a version of retributivism might be thought of as con-
sequentialism with the guilt. Thus even where retributivism resorts to con-
sequentialist reasoning, rather than conceding that in particular extreme
cases consequentialism gets it right, retributivists proclaim that retributiv-
ism does consequentialism better. That is, retributivists make a virtue out
of theoretical inconsistency (its collapse into consequentialism) by trumpet-
ing that at least they suffer the appropriate pang of conscience. Regardless
of whether retributivists embrace the use of consequences with open arms
or with hands wringing, the resort to consequences to justify punishment
still may smack of consequentialist reasoning.
In addition to claiming that retributivism would collapse into conse-
quentialism, consequentialists might also deny Hart's claim. That is, con-
sequentialists are aware of the sacrifice being made and consciously choose
the lesser of two evils when an innocent is punished. Bentham states that
all punishment is evil; punishment may be justified, if at all, only to the ex-
tent that it may prevent some greater evil. 191 So contrary to Hart, for conse-
188 The view that a retributivist or deontologist might justify intentional wrongdoing in order to
avoid catastrophic consequences, without collapsing into consequentialism, has been termed "threshold
deontology." See MOORE, supra note 73, at 719-24. That is, the consequences of our actions are not
sufficient to justify them unless and until a sufficiently high threshold has been met whereby the conse-
quences of an action, or the failure to take action, are sufficiently severe. Id. For skeptical discussions
of whether threshold deontology is tenable, see Nancy (Ann) Davis, Contemporary Deontology, in A
COMPANION TO ETHIcs 205, 214-16 (Peter Singer ed., 1993); Larry Alexander, Deontology at the
Threshold, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 893, 895 (2000).
189 HART, supra note 11, at 12. For Hart's explanation of the same point in a slightly different way
seeid. at81.
190 Duff, supra note 2, at 423.
191 See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
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quentialists all punishment (not just punishment of the innocent) constitutes
a conscious choosing of what is the lesser evil. 192 And if consequentialism
does justify punishment of the innocent, it would do so with the sense that
important interests are being sacrificed.
19 3
Consequentialists might also tum back on retributivism Hart's argu-
ment 94 that when we intentionally impose pain, hardship, deprivation, and
suffering on someone-that is, when we punish-we should do so with the
sense of sacrificing important principles and interests. We should be con-
scious of choosing the lesser of two evils, and this would be inexplicable if
the principles or interests sacrificed were not a sacrifice at all but were con-
sidered inherently good. Since, for retributivism, punishment is inherently
or intrinsically good or right, retributivism has no sense that punishment in-
volves any choosing of the lesser evil or involves any sacrifice at all.
Another way that retributivism is claimed to justify intentional pun-
ishment of the innocent is that infliction of punishment on a guilty offender
will most likely inflict pain and suffering on his or her friends and family
who are innocent of the offense.1 95 Thus, "[a] retributively just punishment
for one person ... would thus involve a retributively unjust punishment for
several."' 196 Of course, a retributivist might reply that such suffering by
friends and family members fails to fall within the notion of what is meant
by punishment. Punishment is only inflicted on a person for wrongdoing or
an offense committed by that person. Though such a definition would pre-
clude the pain suffered by friends and family members of an offender from
falling within the ambit of punishment, such a definition would constitute a
"definitional stop' 97 making punishment of the innocent a logical impossi-
bility.198 Thus, if a retributivist is to answer the criticism by relying on a
particular definition of punishment, the retributivist charge that consequen-
192 While it is true that consequentialism cannot pun an innocent without the awareness that an im-
portant principle has been sacrificed, no theory with but a single principle can sacrifice it to another
principle without being inconsistent. Hart seems to be criticizing consequentialism for nothing more
than theoretical consistency.
193 See, e.g., Binder & Smith, supra note 27, at 136 ("[E]ven if a utilitarian were to accept punish-
ment of the innocent in some exceptional circumstance, she would do so with considerable regret.");
Shavell & Kaplow, supra note 28, at 1269 ("fAin analyst employing welfare economics [consequential-
ism] acts with a heavy heart when proposing a system of punishment that may involve any punishment
of the innocent.").
194 See supra text accompanying note 189.195 EWING, supra note 57, at 43.
196 Id.
197 Binder & Smith, supra note 27, at 130 ("[P]unishing an offender usually does inflict suffering on
an offender's family, an undeserved consequence of retribution which retributivists should not evade by
means of a definitional stop.'). For further explanation of the concept of a "definitional stop," see supra
note 44 and accompanying text.
198 This is because if punishment can only be imposed on a person for wrongdoing or an offense
committed by that same person, an innocent person, who by definition has not committed the offense,
cannot be subject to punishment so conceived.
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tialism justifies the innocent will be rendered logically impossible. 199
To conclude, if retributivism is willing to justify punishment of the in-
nocent in special circumstances, the difference between consequentialism
and retributivism may be small. In most instances, punishment of the inno-
cent, under consequentialism, would be groundless, unprofitable, and need-
less.200  Because punishing an innocent causes more suffering than
punishing a guilty person, Bentham states that "[t]o inflict punishment
when ... the infliction of such punishment is avoidable, is in the case of the
innocent, contrary to the principle of utility."20 1 It is only in special circum-
stances, then, that consequentialism would justify punishing the innocent.202
But if it is only in special circumstances that both retributivism and conse-
quentialism justify the intentional punishment of the innocent, how is re-
tributivism morally superior to consequentialism? While admittedly the
special circumstances warranting punishment for consequentialism might
be broader than for retributivism, the difference is only a matter of degree.
A consequentialist would justify punishment of the innocent, if at all, only
in those special circumstances where greater good would result; a retributiv-
ist might restrict such special circumstances to the prevention of catastro-
phic consequences. But if so, there is not a significant moral or qualitative
difference between the two theories as to punishment of the innocent, but
only a matter of degree.
An additional facet of the debate over the punishment of the inno-
cent203 is the significance of retributivism mistakenly punishing the inno-
cent, which we will address in Part IV. The next subpart, I.B, will present
the novel argument that retributivism justifies intentional punishment of the
innocent, not merely to prevent catastrophic consequences, but under sub-
stantially broader circumstances.
B. The Moralistic Version of Retributivism
Although most (if not all) retributivist theories justify the imposition of
punishment based on the offender deserving the punishment, retributivists
differ over what makes a wrongdoer or offender deserving of punishment.
199 A retributivist might more profitably answer the criticism by invoking some variant of the doc-
trine of double effect, see infra notes 306-308 and accompanying text, which we will focus on in Part
IV. In short, the pain and suffering inflicted on the offender's innocent friends and family by the of-
fender being punished might be punishment after all. However, the infliction of punishment on the
friends and family members is merely foreseen but not intended and thus, according to the doctrine of
double effect, permissible.
200 See supra notes 78, 161.
201 Bentham, supra note 63, at 476.
202 Bentham suggests that ordinarily punishment of the innocent would be unprofitable. "Punish-
ment then, as applied to delinquency, may be unprofitable .... By the danger there may be of its in-
volving the innocent in the fate designed only for the guilty." BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES, supra note
57, at 316 (emphasis added). For a similar expression ofthis view, see id. at 318.
203 For other consequentialist responses, see C.L. TEN, supra note 35, at 13-14.
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Perhaps the first to supply labels to the differing forms of retributivism as a
function of their differing conceptions of what it is that makes someone de-
serve punishment, Joel Feinberg distinguished between "moralistic" and
"legalistic" retributivism. 204 Under moralistic retributivism, moral guilt or
(moral) desert is a necessary and sufficient condition for the imposition of
justified punishment, even if the moral wrongdoing does not constitute the
commission of a criminal offense.205 In contrast, legalistic retributivism
justifies the imposition of punishment for the commission of a criminal of-
fense, even if the violation does not constitute moral wrongdoing.20 6 To
continue Feinberg's typology of forms of retributivism as a function of
what it is that makes a wrongdoer or offender deserve punishment, we
might also speak of two additional versions of retributivism. A conjunctive
moralistic and legalistic retributivism, or combined retributivism, would
justify punishment when the wrongdoer or offender committed an act that
constitutes or entails both (i) moral wrongdoing or moral guilt, and (ii) the
commission of a criminal offense.207 Another conceivable form of retribu-
tivism, which so far as I know has not previously been identified and has no
adherents, is a disjunctive moralistic or legalistic retributivism, in which
204 Joel Feinberg, Punishment, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 514, 515-16 (Joel Feinberg & Hyman Gross
eds., 2d ed. 1980).
205 Id. Feinberg supplies two accounts of moralistic retributivism. The more general account is as
follows:
Punishment is justified only on the ground that wrongdoing merits punishment. It is morally fit-
ting that a person who does wrong should suffer in proportion to his wrongdoing. That a criminal
should be punished follows from his guilt, and the severity of the appropriate punishment depends
on the depravity of the act. The state of affairs where a wrongdoer suffers punishment is morally
better than one where he does not, and is so irrespective ofconsequences.
Justification, according to these accounts, must look backward in time to guilt rather than for-
ward to "advantages"; the formulations are rich in moral terminology ("merits," "morally fitting,"
"wrongdoing," "morally better"); there is a great emphasis on desert. For these reasons we might
well refer to this as a "moralistic" version of the retribuitive theory.
Id. at 515 (footnote omitted). The comparatively more specific account, termed ' pure moralistic re-
tributivism," Feinberg describes "as consisting (at least) of the following propositions":
1. Moral guilt is a necessary condition for justified punishment.
2. Moral guilt is a sufficient condition ("irrespective of consequences") for justified punishment.
3. The proper amount of punishment to be inflicted upon the morally guilty offender is that
amount which fits, matches, or is proportionate to the moral gravity of the offense.
Id. at 516. By "pure" moralistic retributivism, Feinberg means only that it does not add consequentialist
considerations. Id. at 515 ("Both moralistic and legalistic retributivism have 'pure' and 'impure' vari-
ants. In their pure formulations, they are totally free of utilitarian admixture.").
206 As Feinberg explains:
[Legalistic retributivism justifies punishment for] lawbreaking, not (necessarily) for wrongdoing.
Legalistic retributivism holds that the justification of punishment is always to be found in the fact
that a rule has been broken for the violation of which a certain penalty is specified, whether or not
the offender incurs any moral guilt. The offender, properly apprised in advance of the penalty,
voluntarily assumes the risk of punishment, and when he or she receives comeuppance, he or she
can have no complaint.
Id.
207 This form ofretributivism will be discussed infra, Part Ill.
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punishment is justified if an actor's conduct constitutes either (i) moral
wrongdoing or moral guilt, or (ii) the commission of a criminal offense.
208
It is not entirely clear which particular retributivists subscribe to which
forms of retributivism, or which form is more influential. Not only do most
retributivists not identify their accounts as either moralistic or legalistic,
they also fail to carefully identify the sufficient conditions for justified pun-
ishment, from which we might identify which version they endorse. Kath-
leen Moore explains a possible source of the difficulty: "[I]t should not be
inferred that any given retributivist holds one to the exclusion of the other.
Most retributivist positions can be found along a continuum connecting the
two views... ,"209 Although Feinberg supplies only one example each of
moralistic retributivism210 and legalistic retributivism, 21 he does suggest
that moralistic retributivism is the more prevalent form.212 Martin Gardner
suggests the opposite-that legalistic retributivism is more common.213
Moore asserts that retributivists are "split" between the two versions.
214
The moralistic version of retributivism justifies the punishment of
morally culpable wrongdoers, even if their moral wrondoing is not suffi-
cient to warrant conviction for a criminal offense.215 For example, Michael
Moore maintains that morally culpable wrongdoers must be punished in ac-
cordance with their just deserts.216 Another commentator declares that pun-
ishment must "be justified by reference to a moral wrong which the person
punished has allegedly committed." 217 This is because a defendant may be
found guilty in an invalid legal proceeding, or even in a valid adjudication,
but be nonetheless innocent as a matter of fact. Or, a defendant may be fac-
208 Because this form has no known adherents and does not avoid any of the problems that will be
raised for the other versions of retributivism, it will not be discussed fIrther.
209 KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 95 (1997).
210 Feinberg, supra note 204, at 515 (after the explanation of the account of moralistic retributivism,
Feinberg cites Rawls, supra note 1, at 4, 5).
211 Feinberg, supra note 204, at 515 (citing, as an example of an account adhering to legalistic re-
tributivism, Mabbott, supra note 66).
212 Feinberg, supra note 204, at 516 (referring to moralistic retributivism as "that popular variant of
the theory").
213 Gardner, supra note 4, at 781 (noting that a particular theory is "somewhat uncommon in its em-
phasis on moral, as opposed to merely legal, desert").
214 MOORE, supra note 209, at 94. Referring to the moralistic and legalistic versions, Moore notes
that "[t]hrough all the different permutations of retributivist theory, there can be seen two different,
identifiable traditions or strains." Id.
215 See, e.g., C.L. TEN, supra note 35, at 46 ("We can then formulate retributive theories of punish-
ment as those theories which maintain that punishment is justified because the offender has voluntarily
committed a morally wrong act.").
216 Moore, supra note 119, at 179 ("[P]unishment is justified by the moral culpability of those who
received it."); MOORE, supra note 73, at 173 ("ITihe moral desert of an offender is a sufficient reason to
punish [the offender].").
217 DUFF, supra note 1, at 153. Duff, however, would not subscribe to moralistic retributivism. Id.
at 153-54.
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tually and legally guilty of committing an act that may have been unjustly
defined to be a crime. (For example, a status crime such as being a drug
addict218 or a crime of engaging in consensual, homosexual intercourse by
adults in the privacy of one's home.219) To avoid justifying the punishment
of moral innocents, moralistic retributivism 2 0 limits the application of its
justification of punishment to those who are morally culpable, but not nec-
essarily legally convicted, wrongdoers.221 This limitation triggers two prob-
lems. Applying the moralistic version of retributivism to actual, legal
punishment is both underinclusive and overinclusive. First, it is underin-
clusive because some of those validly adjudicated to be guilty may not jus-
tifiably be punished. This underinclusiveness, however may not be a
serious problem. As discussed above, retributivism may have a compelling
reason for not justifying punishment of those who are legally guilty but not
morally culpable: they are morally innocent. Thus, moralistic retributiv-
ism's underinclusiveness may be less a defect than a virtue. Its overinclu-
siveness, however, is more serious in that it justifies punishment of those
who are morally culpable yet legally innocent.
To truly see the problem of moralistic retributivism justifying punish-
ment of the morally guilty but legally innocent, it is helpful to consider
those morally culpable wrongdoers who have a valid legal defense that does
not negate their moral culpability. These so-called extrinsic2m or nonexcul-
patory defenses22 include diplomatic immunity, immunity pursuant to a
plea agreement, double jeopardy, the statute of limitations, and the principle
of legality.2 4 It would seem that moralistic retributivism would justify the
218 See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (overturning the conviction of a defendant
in violation of a statute making it a crime to be addicted to the use of narcotics).
219 See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding the conviction of a defendant for
violating a state statute prohibiting consensual homosexual intercourse, even in one's home).
220 For other examples of moralistic retributivism, see Gardner, supra note 4, at 799 n.123 (citing,
as examples, KANT, supra note 22; HONDERICH, supra note 89, at 13; JEROME HALL, GENERAL
PRINCIPLES OF CRIMNALLAW (2d ed. 1960); JOHN KLEINIG, PUNISHMENTAND DESERT 32-33 (1973)).
221 Moralistic retributivists typically do not specify precisely what constitutes moral wrongdoing
sufficient to justify the imposition of punishment. Obviously, most moralistic retributivists would agree
that murder, rape, and torture are moral wrongs. But they might disagree, for example, as to whether
consensual homosexual intercourse, or abortion, is or is not a moral wrong. But what unites moralistic
retributivists is that moral wrongdoing, however that may variously be understood, and even if it does
not amount to a criminal offense, is sufficient to justify the imposition of punishment.
222 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAw 184 (2d ed. 1995) (so-called extrinsic de-
fenses "raise public-policy factors extrinsic to substantive criminal law doctrine" and which are unre-
lated to the culpability or wrongdoing of the defender).
223 PAUL ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW 569 (1997). Though in a sense any defense that successfully
prevents a finding of guilt, as do the defenses above, is exculpatory, these defenses have come to be
called nonexculpatory because they do not affect our substantive assessment of the defendant's conduct.
They are procedural defenses representing public policy interests.
224 Arguably, a defense based on the principle of legality might be thought to be an exculpatory de-
fense that relates to a person's culpability or blameworthiness. But for malum in se crimes (where the
act, even if unprohibited, is obviously wrong), a defense based on legality may be considered to be an
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punishment of a morally culpable wrongdoer despite the fact that she is le-
gally innocent by virtue of satisfying one of the above defenses.
Retributivists acknowledge the problem. To avoid it, Michael Moore,
for example, concedes that retributivists are not "monomaniacal" in the pur-
suit of the goals of retributivism. 221 Punishing deserving wrongdoers is
"subject to being overridden by other goods that outweigh the good of
achieving retributive justice. ' 226 One such good that, for Moore, outweighs
the good of achieving retributive justice is the principle of legality. 2 7
Therefore, despite moralistic retributivism justifying the punishment of a
morally culpable wrongdoer that could not legally be punished because of
legality concerns, a consideration extrinsic to retributivism, in this case le-
gality, overrides the dictates of moralistic retributivism and precludes the
imposition of punishment. In essence, Moore's move is that a valid legal
adjudication of guilt is a precondition for punishment under moralistic re-
tributivism. In this way, a moralistic retributivism system of punishment
would be precluded from punishing a legal innocent.
This solution, however, is not entirely satisfactory. That a considera-
tion extrinsic to moralistic retributivism precludes the imposition of pun-
ishment of legal innocents does not alter the fact that moralistic
retributivism per se does justify the punishment of particular, identifiable
legal innocents. Moralistic retributivism is saved from that unfortunate re-
sult only by something outside itself. Therefore, moralistic retributivism
per se is still subject to the criticism that it justifies the intentional punish-
ment of particular, identifiable legal innocents.
As a result, retributivism's principal argument against a consequential-
ist theory of punishment also applies to retributivism. Moralistic retributiv-
ism, no less than consequentialist theories, justifies the intentional
punishment of particular, identifiable legal innocents. If such an abhorrent
result renders consequentialist theories of punishment untenable, then mor-
alistic retributivism should be considered equally untenable.
On the other hand, if employing a valid legal adjudication of guilt as a
precondition for justifying punishment was considered a satisfactory solu-
tion, it might also serve as a solution for consequentialism. If we allow the
valid legal adjudication of guilt to be a precondition of the application of re-
tributive punishment-in order to avoid the intentional punishment of par-
ticular, identifiable legal innocents-then consequentialist theories could
equally adopt that precondition. Though a consequentialist theory per se
might justify the punishment of the innocent, it could equally avoid doing
so by justifying punishment of only those who had been validly adjudicated
to be legally guilty. As a result, with the precondition in place, consequen-
extrinsic or nonexculpatory defense.
225 MOORE, supra note 73, at 186.
226 Id. at 187.
227 Id. at 186-87.
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tialist theories of punishment would no longer justify intentional punish-
ment of the innocent. Retributivism's principal argument against conse-
quential theories of punishment would then no longer apply.
Either way, moralistic retributivism fares no better than consequential-
ism.
C. The Legalistic Version of Retributivism
To avoid the criticism of justifying the intentional punishment of par-
ticular, identifiable legal innocents, retributivists could simply shift to an-
other version of retributivism-legalistic retributivism. Under this theory,
punishment is justified not for those who with moral culpability commit
wrongdoing regardless of legal culpability, but instead for those who are le-
gally convicted of committing a criminal offense regardless of their moral
culpability. 28 Legalistic retributivism thereby avoids the intentional pun-
ishment of particular, identifiable legal innocents.
In avoiding the problem of moralistic retributivism, however, legalistic
retributivism is subject to the claim that it is violative of the very principles
underlying retributivism. Legalistic retributivism "would imply that pun-
ishment is sometimes morally legitimate precisely because it is retribution
for the violation of a morally illegitimate law." 9 In finding legalistic re-
tributivism to be incompatible with the essence of retributivism, C.L. Ten
declared that "to restrict the justification of punishment to illegal acts, irre-
spective of the moral quality of these acts, would also sever the link be-
tween punishment and moral wrongdoing which lies at the heart of
retributive theories."' 30 And from the perspective of moralistic retributiv-
ism, legalistic retributivism is also underinclusive in failing to justify the
punishment of morally culpable wrongdoing that is not defined to be a
criminal offense.
Even though it avoids the problem incurred by moralistic retributivism,
legalistic retributivism incurs one problem moralistic retributivism avoids.
A defendant who is factually and legally guilty of committing an act which
has been unjustly defined to be a crime-such as the status crime of being a
drug addict or the crime of engaging in consensual, homosexual intercourse
between adults in the privacy of one's home-would not justifiably be pun-
ished under moralistic retributivism but would be justifiably punished under
legalistic retributivism. As a result, legalistic retributivism is overinclusive
in justifying the intentional punishment of particular, identifiable moral in-
nocents.
Both versions of retributivism-moralistic and legalistic-justify the
228 See, e.g., Mabbott, supra note 66, at 28 ("No punishment is morally retributive or reformative or
deterrent. Any criminal punished for any of these reasons is certainly unjustly punished. The only justi-
fication for punishing any man is that he has broken a law").
229 PRIMORATZ, supra note 1, at 13.
230 C.L. TEN, supra note 35, at 72.
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intentional punishment of particular, identifiable innocents. Moralistic re-
tributivism justifies the intentional punishment of particular, identifiable le-
gal innocents (those who have not even committed an act satisfying the
definition of a criminal offense or those who have done so but have a valid,
extrinsic defense). Legalistic retributivism justifies the intentional punish-
ment of particular, identifiable moral innocents (those who are guilty of
committing an act which is unjustly defined to be a criminal offense). Un-
der either version, retributivism justifies the intentional punishment of par-
ticular, identifiable innocents.
D. Objection
It might be objected that moralistic and legalistic retributivism's justi-
fication of the intentional punishment of particular, identifiable legal and
moral innocents, respectively, is not problematic.231 Neither theory is pun-
ishing innocents relative to its own definition of innocent. Moralistic re-
tributivism, justifying the punishment of actors committing morally
culpable wrongdoing, is not designed to preclude the punishment of legal
innocents and is properly indifferent to the punishment of legal innocents.
Similarly, legalistic retributivism, justifying the punishment of actors com-
mitting criminal offenses, is not designed to preclude the punishment of
moral innocents and is properly indifferent to the punishment of moral in-
nocents. It would only be a failing of moralistic retributivism if it justified
the punishment of moral innocents; and, it would only be a failing of legal-
istic retributivism if it justified the punishment of legal innocents. Neither
theory is justifying the punishment of what each theory would consider to
be innocents.
The objection is unpersuasive for a number of reasons. First, retribu-
tivists have criticized consequentialist theories for not only justifying pun-
ishment of the innocent but, more importantly, for not being able to explain
the wrong of punishing the innocent.232 Moralistic and legalistic retributiv-
ism succumb to the same criticism, for they are equally unable to explain
the wrong of justifying the punishment of legal and moral innocents, re-
spectively. The above objection seems to deny the importance for a theory
of being able to explain why punishment of the innocent is wrong. Second,
it is not merely from a consequentialist perspective but also a retributivist
perspective that justifying the intentional punishment of particular, identifi-
able innocents is problematic. From the viewpoint of moralistic retributiv-
ism, legalistic retributivism's punishment of moral innocents is a serious
failing. And from the perspective of legalistic retributivism, moralistic re-
tributivism's punishment of legal innocents is a serious failing.
But let us assume arguendo that the objection is persuasive. If so, then
231 I am grateful to Ken Ehrenberg for posing this possible objection.
232 See supra notes 158-159 and accompanying text.
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consequentialism may equally avail itself of the argument contained in the
objection, for if it is good for moralistic and legalistic retributivism, then it
also is good for consequentialist theories. As a result, against the retributiv-
ist criticism that consequentialist theories justify punishment of the innocent
and are unable to explain the wrong of punishing the innocent, consequen-
tialists now have a persuasive reply. Consequentialist theories, justifying
punishment on the basis of the good consequences it generates, are not de-
signed to prevent punishment of the innocent and may be properly indiffer-
ent to punishment of the innocent. Consequentialism's justification of
punishment of the innocent and its inability to explain why doing so is
wrong is not a failing from its own perspective. It is only problematic from
a retributivist perspective. And as such, it should not be counted as a seri-
ous failing for consequentialism.
Moreover, if for determinations of whether a theory justifies punish-
ment of the innocent, innocence is to be defined from each theory's own
perspective, then consequentialism could also define innocence in such a
way that it never justifies punishment of the innocent. A consequentialist
might define innocence functionally: a defendant is "innocent" if his pun-
ishment would fail to generate good consequences sufficient to outweigh its
costs.233 Under this conception, consequentialism would never justify pun-
ishment of the innocent. Of course, this is an odd and unfortunate concep-
tion of innocence. But if we allow moralistic and legalistic retributivism to
define innocence from their own respective perspectives, then we must al-
low consequentialism to do so as well. As a result, if innocence may be de-
fined from the perspective of each theory, neither moralistic retributivism
nor legalistic retributivism nor consequentialism justifies intentional pun-
ishment of the innocent.
Regardless of whether the objection is persuasive or not, moralistic and
legalistic retributivism fare no better than consequentialist theories. If the
objection is unpersuasive, then moralistic and legalistic retributivism justify
the intentional punishment of particular, identifiable innocents and are un-
able to explain why doing so is wrong. If the objection is persuasive, then
neither these retributivist theories nor consequentialism justify the inten-
tional punishment of the innocent. Either way, as to justifying the inten-
tional punishment of the innocent, the moralistic and legalistic versions of
retributivism are no better than consequentialist theories.
E. Conclusion
The most important criticism retributivists have leveled against conse-
quentialist theories of punishment is that they justify the intentional pun-
ishment of particular, identifiable innocents. But this criticism may be
23 Cf EWING, supra note 57, at 55 (construing a deterrence-based theory functionally: punishment
"does not imply that the man punished has done wrong, only that it is desired to prevent future wrongdo-
ing").
887
96:843 (2002)
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
turned back against some forms of retributivism. Moralistic retributivism
justifies the intentional punishment of particular, identifiable legal inno-
cents; legalistic retributivism justifies the intentional punishment of particu-
lar, identifiable moral innocents.
One possible solution for moralistic retributivism is to require the pre-
condition of a valid legal adjudication of guilt before punishment could be
imposed. Although this would prevent legal innocents from being pun-
ished, it is a requirement extrinsic to moral retributivism itself. As such,
moralistic retributivism per se is still subject to the criticism that it inten-
tionally justifies the punishment of particular, identifiable legal innocents.
If the solution was deemed to be satisfactory, however, consequentialism
could equally avail itself of it. By incorporating a valid legal adjudication
of guilt precondition into their theories, consequentialists also would no
longer intentionally punish particular, identifiable innocents. Without the
precondition, moralistic retributivism is subject to the same criticism re-
tributivists have leveled at consequentialist theories. With the precondition,
consequentialist theories are no longer subject to their most significant
criticism. Either way, as to justifying the intentional punishment of particu-
lar, identifiable innocents, moralistic retributivism fares no better than con-
sequentialist theories.
One possible objection is that neither moralistic nor legalistic retribu-
tivism justifies the punishment of innocents as they define innocent. But
this critique fails to recognize that neither moralistic nor legalistic retribu-
tivism can explain why the punishment of legal and moral innocents, re-
spectively, is wrong. If consequentialism's failure to explain the wrong of
punishing the innocent renders consequentialism untenable, then the same
failure of these two versions of retributivism renders them equally unten-
able. On the other hand, if the objection was considered persuasive-that is
if each theory is entitled to construe what constitutes punishment of the in-
nocent from its own perspective-then consequentialism can likewise de-
fine innocent in such a way that consequentialism also does not punish the
innocent. Either way, as to the intentional punishment of particular, identi-
fiable innocents, neither moralistic nor legalistic retributivism fares better
than consequentialism.
III. RETRIBuTiviSM'S INABILITY TO PROVIDE A PRINCIPLED
ACCOUNT OF THE DEGREE OF DESERT
The previous Part demonstrated that two versions of retributivism-
moralistic and legalistic-justify the intentional punishment of particular,
identifiable legal and moral innocents, respectively. This Part will consider
another version of retributivism--combined moralistic and legalistic re-
tributivism or, simply, combined retributivism-which, in part, avoids the
problem of justifying the intentional punishment of particular, identifiable
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innocents . 34 But the combined version does this, it will be shown, only by
losing the capacity to provide a principled account of the degree of an of-
fender's desert and punishment. This is a significant shortcoming of the
combined version of retributivism because it is retributivists who have criti-
cized consequentialist and mixed theories for their failure to supply a prin-
cipled determination of the degree of an offender's desert and punishment.
This Part presents retributivists with the following dilemma: either re-
tributivism justifies the intentional punishment of particular, identifiable in-
nocents (under moralistic and legalistic retributivism) or it is unable to
provide a principled, coherent account of the degree of an offender's desert
and punishment (under combined retributivism). The concern of this Part is
not the familiar objection that retributivism cannot determine the precise
degree of desert and amount of punishment to be imposed.235 Instead, a
novel problem will be identified: the combined version of retributivism
supplies contradictory determinations of the degree of desert and punish-
ment to be imposed. This will arise where the degree or gravity of the
moral wrong of an action or course of conduct significantly diverges from
the degree or gravity of the legal wrong.
A. The Moralistic and Legalistic Combined Version of Retributivism
To avoid one of the shortcomings of both the moralistic and legalistic
versions of retributivism, C.W.K. Mundle was perhaps the first to suggest a
form of retributivism combining both the moralistic and legalistic ver-
sions.236 Under the combined version, morally culpable wrongdoing and
legal guilt are independently necessary and jointly sufficient to justify the
imposition of punishment. Thus, the combined version only justifies the
punishment of morally culpable wrongdoers who are legally guilty, 37 and
would not punish moral or legal innocents. However, it is not entirely
without difficulties.
238
Though it avoids the problem of overinclusiveness (in punishing the
234 The combined moralistic and legalistic version of retributivism does not completely avoid the
problem because it would still justify strict liability, see infra section 1V.B.1, which a prominent retribu-
tivist has declared amounts to justifying intentional punishment of the innocent, see infra text accompa-
nying note 335.
235 See infra notes 250-270 and accompanying text.
236 C.W.i. Mundle, Punishment and Desert, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT, supra note 11,
at 65, 75-79. "Punishment of a person by the State is morally justifiable, if and only if he has done
something which is both a legal and moral offence ...." Id. at 79.
237 For other accounts of retributivism as the combined moralistic and legalistic version, see, e.g.,
DUFF, supra note 1, at 153-154 (suggesting that punishment is only applicable for the commission of a
criminal offense the violation of which constitutes moral wrongdoing); PRIMORATZ, supra note 1, at 13
("When retributivists claim that the moral justification of punishment is in the offense committed, by
'offense' they mean only a violation of a morally legitimate criminal law.").
238 For an interpretation of retributivism that assumes the combined version, see PRIMOiA'rz, supra
note 1, at 95-96 (discussing, and defending retributivism from, criticism that it justifies punishment of
violators of any positive law, no matter how unjust).
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innocent) that both the moralistic and legalistic versions possess, the com-
bined form shares the problem of underinclusiveness with moralistic and
legalistic retributivism. From the perspective of moralistic retributivism,
the combined version is underinclusive in failing to justify the punishment
of morally culpable wrongdoing that does not satisfy the definition of a
criminal offense. From the perspective of legalistic retributivism, the com-
bined version is underinclusive in failing to justify the punishment of those
who are legally guilty of a criminal offense that does not involve morally
culpable wrongdoing. Thus, the combined version of retributivism avoids
the problems of overinclusiveness in both moralistic and legalistic versions,
but compounds the problems of underinclusiveness. By avoiding the justi-
fications of the intentional punishment of moral and legal innocents, how-
ever, the combined version would seem preferable to either of the other two
versions. But the combined version is beset by a more serious problem than
underinclusiveness-the inability to supply a principled determination of an
offender's degree of desert and punishment. Before demonstrating that
combined retributivism generates contradictory desert determinations, let us
briefly canvass the debate as to the proper role of the degree of desert in the
theory of punishment.
B. The Retributivist Claim That Only Retributivism Can Provide a
Principled Determination of the Degree of Desert
Retributivists criticize consequential and mixed theories for justifying
the degree or extent of punishment based not on the gravity of the of-
fender's wrongdoing but, rather, on the amount of deterrence that is needed
or by what is necessary for an effective rehabilitation.239 Bentham, for ex-
ample, propounds an elaborate set of rules for determining the degree of
punishment that includes, but fails to treat as dispositive, the offender's de-
sert or culpability. The lower limit of punishment for a particular offense is
based on "what is sufficient to outweigh that of the profit of the offence,
'240
the relative degree of temptation to commit the offense,241 and the relative
degree of "mischief' or harm the offense entails.242 The upper limit of the
degree of punishment, because punishment itself is an evil, is no more than
what is "necessary" to deter crime.
243
Retributivists claim their approach avoids this failing because they
29 Id. at 37-38; Benn, supra note 45, at 32; Leo Katz, Criminal Law, in A COMPANION TO THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY, supra note 14, at 80, 80; C.L. Ten, supra note 29, at 367-68.
240 BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES, supra note 57, at 179 (Ch. XIV) (emphasis omitted) (footnotes
omitted).
241 Id. at 180 (the greater the degree of temptation to commit the offense, the greater the degree of
punishment is required).
242 Id. at 181 (emphasis omitted).
243 Id. at 182 (emphasis omitted). In addition to these three rules, Bentham formulates ten other
rules regarding the proper proportion between punishments and offenses. See id. at 181-88.
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base the degree of punishment solely on the desert of the wrongdoer.244
Minor wrongdoing warrants only minor punishment, grave wrongdoing
warrants grave punishment. But for consequentialist theories, the degree of
punishment depends not on the offender's desert but instead on how best to
effectuate the good consequences to be promoted.245 For example, consider
the offense of jaywalking, which is ordinarily a minor offense. Suppose
there is an epidemic of jaywalking that the threat of minor punishment has
not sufficiently detered. In order to successfully reduce the incidence of
jaywalking, a deterrence-based theory of punishment might justify a dis-
proportionally harsh penalty. Now consider the grave offense of murder,
which ordinarily carries a substantial punishment. But suppose that in a so-
ciety there has not been a single murder in fifty years. Because in such a
society there is little need to deter its citizens from committing murder, a
deterrence theory of punishment might only justify a comparatively minor
punishment. Thus, under extreme circumstances, retributivists argue, a de-
terrence theory of punishment might justify the same or greater punishment
of a jaywalker than of a murderer.
2 46
Consequentialists have offered a number of responses. First, conse-
quentialism does include a limited proportionality requirement. 247 As Jus-
tice Scalia notes, however, proportionality is essentially a retributive
concept.248 Second, the retributivist argument for the proportionality prin-
ciple is more assertion than argument.249 Though retributivism's rationale
244 HEGEL, supra note 22, at 127-29 (§ 101); KANT, supra note 22, at 141; Bern, supra note 45, at
32 (retributivism "insists that the punishment must fit the crime"); Greenawalt, supra note 73, at 347-48
(under retributivism, "the severity of punishment should be proportional to the degree of wrongdoing").
245 For the view that the crime prevention rationale properly justifies disproportionate punishments,
see generally Alexander, supra note 36; Quinn, supra note 36.
246 See PRIMORATZ, supra note 1, at 37-38.
247 The consequentialist sense of a proportionality requirement, however, allows significantly
greater latitude. The minimum amount of punishment is determined by a number of factors. First, it
must be sufficient to outweigh the offender's incentive to commit the offense. See supra notes 240-241
and accompanying text. Second, it must not "depreciate the seriousness" of the offense. AMERICAN
LAW INSTrrTE, MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 7.01 l(c) (1985) [hereinafter MPC] (pro-
viding for incarceration when "a lesser sentence will depreciate the seriousness of the defendant's
crime"). Third, it must not "imply a license to commit" the offense. Herbert Wechsler, Sentencing,
Corrections, and The Model Penal Code, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 465, 468 (1962) (the minimum amount of
punishment for an offense must be such "that it does not depreciate the gravity of the offense, whatever
that may be, and thus imply a license to commit if). The upper limit is set by the consideration that the
degree of punishment be no more than what is necessary to deter crime. See supra note 243 and accom-
panying text.
248 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 989 (1991) (Scalia, J.) ("lilt becomes difficult even to
speak intelligently of 'proportionality,' once deterrence and rehabilitation are given significant weight.
Proportionality is inherently a retributive concept....").
249 Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 28, at 1235:
[The] retributive theory's rationale for the degree of punishment ... is difficult to identifi'. It
seems that most retributivists believe that the proportionality principle is self-evident or follows
directly from the understanding that the purpose of punishment is to restore moral balance in the
universe; consequently, the principle is not seen to require explicit justification.
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for the proportionality principle is undoubtedly thin (and perhaps nonexis-
tent), that punishment should be in some way proportional to the crime is an
intuition (like the wrong of punishing the innocent) that is so widely shared
as to make its attack unpersuasive.
The third, and most successful, consequentialist response is that re-
tributivism has no precise calculus for determining what a wrongdoer's de-
sert is, and thus how much punishment is deserved.25 0 However flawed,
consequentialist theories at least have a comparatively more precise method
for determining how much punishment is justified.25' For retributivism, the
idea is that the punishment should fit the crime, it should be proportional to
the crime. But this gives insufficient guidance as to how much punishment
a specific crime warrants.252 For example, is twenty years imprisonment the
deserved punishment for armed robbery, or is twenty-five years imprison-
ment?2 53 Retributivism has no basis to answer this question.
254
The lex talionis is inadequate.255 As expressed in the Bible, "You shall
give your life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for
foot, bum for bum, wound for wound, stripe for stripe."256 Blackstone re-
jected the lex talionis as insufficient to guide the amount of punishment for
all crimes: "[T]here are very many crimes, that will in no shape admit of
these penalties, without manifest absurdity and wickedness. Theft cannot
be punished by theft, defamation by defamation, forgery by forgery, adul-
Id. (citing Jeffrie Murphy, Does Kant Have a Theory of Punishment?, 87 COLUm. L. REV. 509, 532
(1987) ("And why should we aim at proportionality so characterized? Kant does not attempt to argue
for this view, but seems to think that the claim is self-evident or intuitively obvious.")).
250 HART, supra note 11, at 233 ('To many the most perplexing feature of the [retributive] model is
its requirement that the punishment should in some way 'match' the crime."); PRIMORATZ, supra note 1,
at 85 ("Of all arguments against the retributive theory, probably the most popular is the one directed at
the demand that punishment should fit the offense committed."); Bedau, supra note 83, at 611-14;
Benn, supra note 45, at 32; Cragg, supra note 52, at 707-08; Dolinko, supra note 2, at 1636 ("[I]t has
long been a stock objection to retributivism that there is simply no workable way to determine just what
punishment a criminal deserves.") (emphasis omitted).
251 See supra notes 239-243, 247 and accompanying text. For example, take the society with the
jaywalking epidemic. The degree ofpunishment can be increased until the optimal level of deterrence is
reached. This optimum level would be determined by maximizing the margin by which the benefit of
the punishment exceeds its costs. Of course, whatever precision may result from such a determination
depends on accurate empirical assessments of the benefits and costs of imposing the punishment.
252 Cragg, supra note 52, at 702; Dolinko, supra note 2, at 1636.
253 Katz, supra note 239, at 80-81:
The most important challenge to retributivism has been its alleged vagueness: everyone may agree
that five years in prison is unjustly harsh desert for shoplifting, or that a five dollar fine is unjustly
lenient desert for rape, but beyond such clear cases our intuitions seem to fail us. Is two years, five
years, or ten years the proper sanction for a rape?... Our sense of just deserts here seems to de-
sert us.
Id.
254 Contra id. at 81 (citing empirical evidence ofpsychophysics studies which suggest "that under-
lying our punishment practices is a fairly refined sense ofjust deserts").
255 Cragg, supra note 52, at 707-08; C.L. Ten, supra note 29, at 370.
256 Exodus 21:23-25.
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tery by adultery, and the like."2 7 The problem is even more acute when
translating the gravity of offenses to numerical terms of imprisonment.
Perhaps, at best, retributivism can determine the roughly appropriate
punishment by comparatively ranking offenses in such a way as murder
warrants greater punishment than rape, which warrants greater punishment
than armed robbery, and so on.258 But it cannot determine whether rape
warrants twenty, thirty, forty years imprisonment.259 Though retributivism
cannot set cardinal or absolute levels of punishment, its advocates insist that
they can set ordinal, or relative, levels of punishment (for example, murder
warrants greater punishment than larceny).260 But retributivism cannot even
satisfactorily determine degrees of punishment ordinally.26' For example,
even if we assume that, all other things being equal, murder warrants
greater punishment than armed robbery, does negligent homicide warrant
greater punishment than intentional rape or intentional armed robbery? Re-
tributivism has no answer. This is the serious flaw in Kant's lex talionis
and even G.W.F. Hegel's more sophisticated version.262 Both fail to take
into account differing culpability levels stemming from the various levels of
mens rea or mental states that accompany the commission of wrongdo-
ing.263 Retributivism has no answer to the issue of whether greater wrong-
doing done with lower culpability (for example, negligence or recklessness)
warrants more or less punishment than comparatively minor wrongdoing
with a greater level of culpability (such as intention or purpose). Thus, re-
tributivism can determine neither the ordinal nor the cardinal ranking of
crimes and their concomitant degrees of punishment.
Punishment theorists contest the significance of retributivism's inabil-
ity to impose punishments precisely reflecting offenders' just deserts. One
commentator argues that retributivism's inability to impose punishments
that are precisely what wrongdoers deserve constitutes an immoral use of
the wrongdoers as mere means.264 Even Hegel himself, along with Kant the
most influential retributivist, concedes retributivism's inability to determine
the just punishment for any particular offense:
It is impossible to determine by reason, or to decide by applying a determina-
tion derived from the concept, whether the just penalty for an offence is corpo-
257 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARiES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 1223 (J. Dewitt Andrews
ed., 4th ed., 1899).
258 PRIMORATZ, supra note 1, at 89; Oldenquist, supra note 17, at 749.
259 PRIMORATZ, supra note 1, at 89; Oldenquist, supra note 17, at 749.
260 See, e.g., KLEiNIG, supra note 220, at 115-119; Michael Davis, How to Make the Punishment Fit
the Crime, 93 ETHICS 726,738-741 (1983).
261 Dolinko, supra note 2, at 1638-1640.
262 See supra note 79.
263 C.L. Ten, supra note 29, at 370.
264 Dolinko, supra note 2, at 1635. For the significance ofretributivism using persons punished as
mere means see infra Part V.
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ral punishment of forty lashes or thirty-nine, a fine of five dollars as distinct
from four dollars and twenty-three groschen or less, or imprisonment for a
year or for 364 days or less, or for a year and one, two, or three days.
265
And quite significantly, Hegel goes on to explain that even a slightly incor-
rect punishment constitutes an injustice: "And yet an injustice is done if
there is even one lash too many, or one dollar or groschen, one week or one
day in prison too many or too few. '266 If it is virtually impossible to give an
offender his precise just deserts through punishment,267 and if even a
slightly incorrect punishment constitutes an injustice, then virtually every
instance of retributive punishment will be unjust.268 As a result, by retribu-
tivism's very principles, retributive punishment should not be imposed.
269
Seemingly contradicting Hegel, modem retributivists respond that this im-
precision in determinations of desert and the degree of punishment is not
problematic.
270
C. Combined Retributivism Supplies Contradictory
Determinations of the Degree of Desert
The difficulty of the combined version of retributivism, in some situa-
tions, is not merely imprecision, but rather internal inconsistency in deter-
mining an offender's appropriate level of desert and punishment. The
moralistic version determines the level of desert and degree of punishment
based on the gravity of the morally culpable wrongdoing.271 The legalistic
version determines the amount of desert and punishment based on the se-
verity of the legal violation.272 But under the combined version, what de-
termines the degree of punishment and desert? Perhaps in most instances
the severity of the moral wrong and the legal violation will coincide. But in
some instances they will surely diverge. That which is a grave moral wrong
265 HEGEL, supra note 22, at 245 (§ 214). The editor explains that in Hegel's time there were 24
groschen in one dollar. Id. at 446.
266 Id. at 245.
267 "There is no estimate which can determine degrees of moral guilt in actual individual cases.
Such a thing is wholly inconceivable. It would demand an insight into motive and temptation which it is
impossible to possess for others, and all but impossible for oneself." BOSANQUET, supra note 87, at
203.
268 EWING, supra note 57, at 40:
[O]wing to the impossibility of estimating the moral guilt of the offender and the degree of pun-
ishment proportionate to it ... almost all punishments will be unjust. But to do injustice seems
worse than to do nothing at all .... Ought the State to aim at retributive justice, if the overwhelm-
ing probability is that each time it tries to inflict it it will do serious retributive injustice?
Id. (footnote omitted).
269 Id. at 39 (explaining that because of the near impossibility of punishing according to an of-
fender's actual desert under retributivism, "it is wrong even to attempt to apply it").
270 KLEINIG, supra note 220, at 114; PRIMORATZ, supra note 1, at 94; WOJCIECH SADURSKI, GIVING
DESERT ITS DUE 239 (1985).
271 See supra notes 215-217 and accompanying text.
272 See supra notes 228-230 and accompanying text.
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might be a minor legal violation and that which is a grave legal violation
might be a minor legal wrong. In such cases, how would the combined ver-
sion determine the amount or degree of an offender's desert and punish-
ment?
Let us first consider examples of serious legal violations that are com-
paratively less serious moral wrongs. While violations of federal drug laws
carry quite stiff penalties, their moral wrongness is arguably less serious
than the legal wrong. To take a more specific example, the penalties for of-
fenses involving crack cocaine are substantially higher than penalties for
cocaine in powder form.273 But the moral wrongness of possessing or sell-
ing cocaine is arguably the same regardless of the particular form of the co-
caine.274 Or consider the "three strikes and you're out" legislation 7 5 The
commission of a third (even minor) felony may carry a life sentence, but the
moral wrongness of the third felony may be considerably less than a felony
that would alone merit a life sentence. 276 Under the combined version of re-
tributivism, should the punishment of these offenses reflect their substantial
legal wrongness or their comparatively less serious moral wrongness? Pro-
ponents of combined retributivism have no answer.
Let us next consider examples of minor legal violations that might con-
stitute grave moral wrongs. While lying is a serious moral wrong, at least
under Kantian ethics,277 perjury is a comparatively minor criminal of-
fense. 278 Similarly, blackmail is perceived to be a great moral wrong279 but
27 Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)-(B) (1994) (imposing a mandatory mini-
mum sentence often years for sale of either 5000 grams of powder cocaine or 50 grams of crack or rock
cocaine, and a five year mandatory minimum sentence for either 500 grams of powder or 5 grams of
crack cocaine). This amounts to a 100:1 ratio in the severity of punishment for crack cocaine as com-
pared to the same amount of powder cocaine.
274 See, e.g., William Spade, Jr., Beyond the 100:1 Ratio: Towards a Rational Cocaine Sentencing
Policy, 38 ARiz. L. REv. 1233, 1279-83 (1996) (describing the unfairness of the disparate sentences, as
expressed by prosecutors, juries and Justice Kennedy).
275 In perhaps the most well-known example, in Rummel v. Estelle, the defendant, Rummel, de-
frauded a bar owner in the amount of $129.75. 445 U.S. 263 (1980). But this was Rummel's third fraud
conviction and thus he qualified, under the statute, for life imprisonment without parole. Id. at 284l-85.
276 See George Fletcher, The Recidivist Premium, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Summer-Fall 1982, at 54,
57-59 (arguing that increased penalties for habitual offenders is not morally justified within a retributiv-
ist framework). But see VON HIRSCH, supra note 6, at 84-88 (defending increased penalties for recidi-
vists as morally justified within retributivism).
277 For Kant, lying violated a person's duty to himself:
The greatest violation of man's duty to himself regarded merely as a moral being (the humanity in
his own person) is the contrary of truthfulness, lying .... By a lie a man throws away and, as it
were, annihilates his dignity as a man. A man who does not himself believe what he tells another
... has even less worth than if he were a mere thing.... [Lying is] a crime of a man against his
own person and a worthlessness that must make him contemptible in his own eyes.
KANT, supra note 22, at 225-26 (emphasis omitted).
278 Perjury is a third-degree (minor) felony. MPC, supra note 247, § 241.1(1).
279 Consider the following account:
The criminal offence of blackmail is universally feared. By many in this country it is "considered
the foulest of crimes-far crueller than most murders because of its cold-blooded premeditation
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in the hierarchy of criminal offenses it is comparatively low. 280 Under the
combined version of retributivism, should the punishment of these offenses
reflect the seriousness of the moral wrong or their comparatively less seri-
ous legal wrong?
Let us consider a more abstract example. Suppose that conduct X
committed in jurisdiction A renders an offender subject to little, or even no,
punishment, and the identical conduct committed in jurisdiction B qualifies
the offender for severe punishment. Though the degree of punishment
specified by the legislatures for the identical conduct varies from jurisdic-
tion A to jurisdiction B, presumably the degree of moral wrongdoing is the
same in both jurisdictions.28" ' For the purposes of our argument it will not
matter what that degree of moral wrongdoing may be. That different people
will have differing views on the degree of moral wrongness does not mean
that a single act can be both a minor moral wrong and a grave moral wrong.
The important point is that though the offender's legal desert will vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction her moral desert will not. As a result, in (at least)
one of the jurisdictions there will necessarily be a substantial disparity be-
tween the offender's moral and legal desert. In such a jurisdiction, how
would combined retributivism determine the degree of the offender's desert
and just punishment? The legalistic retributivism component would give
one answer and the moralistic retributivism component would supply a sub-
and repeated torture of the victim; incomparably more offensive to the public conscience than the
vast majority of other offences which the law seeks to punish."
MIKE HEPWORTH, BLACKMAIL: PUBLICnY AND SECRECY IN EVERYDAY LIFE 1 (1975) (footnote omit-
ted) (quoting C.E. Bechhofer Roberts, in his foreword to the transcript of a cause celebre of the 1920s,
THE MR. A CASE (1950). Blackmail is also described as "moral murder." For an account of the usage
of the term, "moral murder," to describe blackmail, see HEPWORTH, supra, at 20-23.
280 Blackmail, under the rubric of criminal coercion, is either a misdemeanor or a third-degree fel-
ony. MPC, supra note 247, § 212.5(2).
281 This is not merely of hypothetical interest. George Fletcher explains that common law jurisdic-
tions (as well as France) have a dramatically different view of complicity than some civil law jurisdic-
tions, notably Germany. Common law jurisdictions hold to the "equivalence" theory of complicity in
which all participants or accessories should be punished to the same degree as the principal perpetrators.
See, e.g., MPC, supra note 247, § 2.06. In contrast, in Germany an accessory is only punished to the
extent of her participation or contribution. An accessory who only makes a minor contribution to the
commission of the offense would receive comparatively light punishment and an accessory that made a
major contribution would receive comparatively greater punishment For a discussion of these differing
approaches to complicity see FLETCHER, supra note 46, at 188-200; FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 649-57.
So let us suppose that our offender is a minor accessory in a murder. In America, the offender's
conduct would constitute a grave legal wrong and she might receive a severe punishment, perhaps life
imprisorment. In Germany, the very same conduct by our offender would be a substantially lesser legal
wrong and she might receive an appreciably lighter sentence. Though there may be disagreement as to
the extent of the moral wrong, regardless of the degree of moral wrong, presumably it is the same degree
of moral wrong whether it is committed in Germany or in the United States. Thus, in at least in one of
the jurisdictions, the two components of combined retributivism will supply substantially different an-
swers as to the degree of the offender's desert and just punishment. Because of the incompatibility of
the two components, combined retributivism could not arrive at a principled determination of our of-
fender's desert. The two components of combined retributivism would supply contradictory answers.
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stantially different answer.
In all of these examples where there is a disparity between the gravity
of the moral and the legal wrong, the combined version of retributivism
could come to no principled resolution of the amount of desert of the of-
fender and the degree of just punishment. I take it that this criticism of the
combined version of retributivism-that in certain instances it cannot arrive
at a principled determination of the amount of desert and punishment of the
offender-is fair. After all, this is the same criticism retributivists have
leveled against consequentialism 28 2 and the mixed theory of punishment
(deterrence justifying punishment with negative retributivism as a side-
constraint).
2 3
If consequentialist and mixed theories are considered untenable by re-
tributivists, then the combined legalistic and moralistic version of retribu-
tivism is equally untenable. Combined retributivism, consequentialism, and
the mixed theory all fail to determine the degree of desert and punishment
in a principled manner. Since the same failing besets all three, and retribu-
tivists deem that failing to be sufficient to render consequential and mixed
theories unsatisfactory, then retributivists must agree that the combined ver-
sion of retributivism is also unsatisfactory for the same reason. Retributiv-
ists can, of course, avoid this criticism by shifting to either the legalistic or
moralistic versions of retributivism. Either version is able to give a noncon-
tradictory account of the degree of an offender's desert and punishment.
But shifting to either of these versions of retributivism retriggers the prob-
lem of retributivism justifying the intentional punishment of particular,
identifiable innocents.
The combined version of retributivism is the only version that affords
partial escape from the criticism that retributivism justifies the intentional
punishment of particular, identifiable innocents. If combined retributivism
is untenable, the problem of retributivism justifying the intentional punish-
ment of particular, identifiable innocents is reintroduced.
D. Conclusion
Retributivists have criticized consequentialist and mixed theories for
being unable to give a principled account of an offender's degree of desert
and punishment. But this criticism may be turned back on to retributivism.
While the combined (moralistic and legalistic) version of retributivism par-
tially avoids justifying the intentional punishment of particular, identifiable
moral and legal innocents, it does so only at the expense of being unable to
give a principled account of an offender's desert. In some instances, the
moralistic and legalistic components of the combined version diverge and
282 Retributivists have criticized consequentialism for failing to adhere to any proportionality be-
tween the gravity of the offense or wrongdoing and the degree of punishment. See supra notes 239,
245-246 and accompanying text.
283 See supra notes 135-136 and accompanying text.
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give contradictory assessments of an offender's degree of desert and pun-
ishment. Under either the combined version, which partially avoids justify-
ing the intentional punishment of particular, identifiable innocents but
cannot give a principled account of the degree of desert and punishment, or
either of the moralistic and legalistic versions, which do give a principled
account of the degree of desert and punishment but cannot avoid intentional
punishment of the innocent, retributivism is subject to the very criticisms
retributivists have directed against consequentialist theories.
The resulting dilemma for retributivism is that either (i) it intentionally
justifies punishment of particular, identifiable innocents (under legalistic or
moralistic retributivism) or, (ii) it avoids the above criticism but supplies a
contradictory account of the degree of an offender's desert and punishment
(under the combined version of retributivism). Retributivism, therefore,
can avoid either one of the criticisms, but not both. Furthermore, retributiv-
ism's susceptibility to either one of the criticisms is sufficient to render it
untenable. After all, it is retributivists themselves who leveled these criti-
cisms at consequential and mixed theories and, as a result, found both de-
fective. Since the same criticisms apply to retributivism, then retributivism
is equally unsatisfactory.
IV. RETRIBUTIVISM'S INDIRECT PUNISHMENT OF THE INNOCENT
In Part II, the principal retributivist criticism against consequential
theories of punishment284 was turned back on to retributivism. Moralistic
and legalistic retributivism justify the intentional punishment of particular,
identifiable legal and moral innocents, respectively. Combined retributiv-
ism does not justify the punishment of innocents, but as seen in Part III, is
subject to other difficulties.28 5 This Part will demonstrate that all versions
of retributivism justify indirect punishment of the innocent.
Punishment of the innocent may take on a variety of forms. Perhaps
the most serious form, at least from a retributivist perspective, is the inten-
tional punishment of particular, identifiable innocents.286 But other varie-
ties include punishing offenders who lack fault, culpability,
blameworthiness, or mens rea, and punishing offenders with valid excuses.
Punishing such offenders is often expressed as punishment under strict li-
ability. Another form of punishing the innocent may be the erosion or
elimination of procedural safeguards designed to prevent conviction and
punishment of the innocent. Retributivists maintain that consequentialism
does, and retributivism does not, justify punishment under strict liability,
287
2 See supra notes 138-139.
285 Combined retributivism, in some instances cannot arrive at a principled determination of the de-
gree of offenders' desert and punishment because its two components are in contradiction. See supra
subpart 11.C.
286 See infra notes 303-304 and accompanying text.
287 See infra note 325 and accompanying text.
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under eroded procedural safeguards 288 and without due regard to offenders'
fault,289 culpability,290 mens rea291 and excuses.292 One leading retributivist
argues that consequentialism's justification of punishment under strict li-
ability is not merely tantamount to punishing the innocent but constitutes
intentionally punishing the innocent.
293
These retributivist criticisms of consequentialism will be turned back
on to retributivism by showing that retributivism is compatible with justify-
ing punishment under (i) strict liability, (ii) a presumption of guilt standard
of proof, (iii) guilty verdicts by a non-majority of jurors, and (iv) an ex-
treme form of absolute liability. While punishment under these conditions,
practices, or standards may or may not constitute intentional punishment of
the innocent, it does dilute or weaken the concepts of guilt and innocence to
such a degree as to undermine our sense that offenders being punished truly
"deserve" their punishment.294 In addition, the number of innocent defen-
dants punished greatly increases. By punishing under the first three prac-
tices above, many, if not virtually all, innocent defendants would be
convicted and punished. And under the fourth practice-an extreme form
of absolute liability--all innocent defendants would be convicted and pun-
ished.
A. The Debate over Mistaken Punishment of the Innocent
and the Doctrine of Double Effect
To see how retributivism justifies adoption of, and punishment under,
standards and practices in which most or all innocent defendants would be
convicted and punished, we first need to briefly examine the debate be-
tween retributivists and consequentialists over the significance of mistaken
punishment of the innocent. It is retributivists' reliance on the doctrine of
double effect,295 in this debate, that renders retributivism subject to the
charge of justifying the punishment of most or all innocent defendants.
1. The Consequentialist Charge: Retributivism Is Unjust by Mistak-
288 See infra notes 340-343 and accompanying text
289 See infra note 325.
290 Id.
291 Id.
292 See infra notes 325-334.
293 See infra note 335 and accompanying text.
294 One critic of retributivism argues that it has no meaningful notion of what constitutes guilt, but
only a formal conception. Quinton, supra note 41, at 14-15. In Quinton's view the essential retributiv-
ist thesis is that "only the guilty are to be punished.' Id. at 9. But that thesis, and thus retributivism, can
tell us nothing about what rules are to be used to determine guilt. Under retributivism, the concept of
"[g]uilt is irrelevant to the setting up of rules, for until they have been set up the notion of guilt is unde-
fined and without application." Id. at 15. The implication is that retributivism would allow any standard
whatsoever, no matter how weak, for determining guilt. Its only concern is with punishing the guilty,
regardless of how guilt is defined.
295 See infra notes 305-308 and accompanying text.
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enly Punishing the Innocent.-In response to retributivists' criticisms that
consequentialism justifies punishment of the innocent, consequentialists ar-
gue that any actual punishment institution, including retributivist systems of
punishment, will inevitably result in the punishment of the innocent.296 Re-
tributivism justifies the knowing or intentional implementation and utiliza-
tion of necessarily fallible legal institutions of punishment in which it is
foreseeable that some unknown innocents will inevitably be mistakenly
punished.297 By justifying such fallible institutions, retributivism is know-
ingly punishing the innocent.298  In addition, "retributivists who advocate
punishment are relevantly like utilitarians who will sacrifice the welfare of
innocents for the greater good, since retributivists are willing to trade the
welfare of the innocents who are punished by mistake for the greater good
of the punishment of the guilty."299 Under this critique, retributivism faces
the dilemma of either giving up all legal institutions of punishment300 or
conceding that a retributivism system of punishment is unjust by its own
criteria.3 01
2. The Retributivist Response: Invocation of the Doctrine of Double
Effect.-Retributivists readily acknowledge that innocents will mistakenly
be punished, but dismiss it as an insignificant problem.302 Retributivists
claim that though they know that some unknown innocents will be mistak-
enly punished, no particular, identifiable innocent is intentionally punished
under retributivism. 30 3 In contrast, consequentialist theories of punishment
296 Jeffrey Reiman & Ernest Van Den Haag, On the Common Saying That It Is Better That Ten
Guilty Persons Escape Than That One Innocent Suffer. Pro and Con, 7 Soc. PHIL. & PoL. 226, 240-41
(1990) ("The conviction of some innocents is an unintended, yet unavoidable, byproduct ofbringing the
guilty to justice. We are prepared to risk punishing some innocents for the sake of punishing the
guilty.'); George Schedler, Can Retributivists Support Legal Punishment?, 63 MONIsT 185, 187 (1980)
("We know all too well that a system of legal punishment will on occasion convict and punish by mis-
take individuals who are innocent ....").
297 Bagaric & Amarasekara, supra note 12, at 144; Dolinko, supra note 12, at 510; Husak, supra
note 85, at 450-51; see also Richard Lempert, Desert and Deterrence: An Assessment of the Moral
Bases of the Case for Capital Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1177 (1981). See generally Schedler, su-
pra note 296.
298 Schedler, supra note 296, at 187 ("[R]etributivists who would support systems of legal punish-
ment are subject to the same moral criticism that they lodge against utilitarians [who would intentionally
punish the innocent] ... such people support systems of punishment that they know will condemn inno-
cent people.").
299 Id. at 189.
300 Id. ("We could simply refuse to lend support to any system which we know will cause innocent
people to suffer."); id. at 189-90 ("[W]e have open to us the alternative ofrefusing to establish systems
that cause innocent people to suffer.").
301 Id. at 196 ("(A] consistent and coherent retributivist must condemn all systems of legal punish-
ment, and... retributive justice is not a standard that can be met by legal systems of punishment").
302 See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 73, at 158.
303 For example, Michael Moore makes this point:
The probable punishment of the innocent by any real-world punishment scheme is not much of a
worry.... We rightly set up many social institutions where we know that some percentage of in-
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do not merely lead to the mistaken punishment of the innocent, but also jus-
tify the intentional punishment of particular, identifiable persons known or
believed to be innocent. As R.A. Duff declares, retributivists, or nonconse-
quentialists:
[A]re not yet committed to the kind of perversion of punishment which a con-
sequentialist must allegedly sanction, so long as we do not aim to procure the
punishment of the innocent. There is, for a non-consequentialist, a crucial dif-
ference between the demand that we should take every possible precaution
against the risk of punishing those who are in fact innocent, and the demand
that we must never aim to procure the punishment of those whom we believe
to be innocent.... [W]e thus consent to the expected punishment of'some
who are in fact innocent; but their punishment is, in terms of our and the sys-
tem's aims, mistaken-it occurs despite our intention and our efforts to avoid
it. But a system of punishment can, and properly should, satisfy the latter de-
mand; and it is that demand which a consequentialist is allegedly willing to
flout, by intending to procure the punishment of those whom she believes to be
innocent.3°4
Implicit in the retributivist argument is that the unintended but foreseen
punishment of some unknown innocents is distinguishable, in a morally
significant sense, from the intentional punishment of particular, identifiable
innocents. 05 The former, attributable to retributivism, is permissible, but
the latter, attributable only to consequentialism, is impermissible. This is
essentially an appeal to some form of St. Thomas Aquinas's doctrine of
double effect,30 6 as Duff acknowledges.307 Simply put, the doctrine or prin-
ciple is that an act which has two effects or consequences, one bad and one
good, is impermissible if the bad consequence is intended; but the act is
permissible if the good consequence is intended and the bad consequence is
neither intended as an end nor as a means to one's end, even if the bad con-
dividuals affected by them will be hurt or even killed, for example, coal mining, high-rise con-
struction, and speed limits on freeways. That we know that some percentage of individuals will
likely suffer these harms if we arrange these institutions as we do arrange them is not to be equated
with either our intending that they be so harmed, or knowing that some identified individual will
suffer that harm. Agent-relative moral norms bind us absolutely only with respect to evils we ei-
ther intend or (on some versions) knowingly visit on specified individuals. One can thus arrange
safeguards in coalmines, highrise construction, automobile travel, and punishment in ways that
predictably will hurt some who do not deserve to be hurt, without for a moment ceasing to be an
agent-relative theorist about morality.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also RONALD DwoRKiN, A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE 79-89 (1985); Larry
Alexander, Retributivism and the Inadvertent Punishment of the Innocent, 2 LAw & PHIL. 233, 236-239,
244-46 (1983).
3G4 DUFF, supra note 1, at 159 (footnote omitted).
305 See supra notes 303-304 and accompanying text.
306 AQUINAS, supra note 20, at I1-Il, quest. 64, 7th art.
307 Duff acknowledges that to counter the consequentialist argument that retributivism is unjust be-
cause it justifies institutions of punishment which inevitably lead to the mistaken punishment of the in-
nocent, "a retributivist response must appeal to some version of the 'doctrine of double effect': the
retributivist must claim that the punishments of the innocent under a retributivist system are foreseen but
not intended." Duff, supra note 2, at 423 (footnote omitted).
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sequence is known or foreseen.308 Thus, applying the doctrine to retributiv-
ism's punishment of the innocent, justifying institutions of punishment
known to be inevitably fallible will have (at least) two effects-one bad and
one good. The good effect, which is intended, is punishment of the guilty;
the bad effect, which is known or foreseen but unintended, is mistaken pun-
ishment of the innocent. Since to retributivists the bad effect is neither in-
tended as the end of punishing the guilty nor the means to that end,
justifying institutions of punishment known or foreseen to punish some
unidentifiable innocents may be permissible.
Let us term retributivism's application of some variant or version of
the doctrine of double effect to the issue of mistaken punishment of the in-
nocent "DDE." That is, let DDE be understood as the claim that a retribu-
tivist system of punishment knowingly justifying the punishment of some
unknown innocents is permissible as long as it does not justify the inten-
tional punishment of particular, identifiable innocents. This is the most
prevalent and significant of the retributivist replies to the consequentialist
claim that retributivism's knowing punishment of some unknown innocents
forces retributivists to either abandon actual punishment or concede that a
retributivist system of punishment is unjust. As Duff admits, a retributivist
must invoke some variant of the doctrine of double effect "so that the [re-
tributivist] system can therefore be justified as being just."309 It also forms
the basis of the most significant criticism of consequentialist theories of
punishment-that consequentialism justifies the intentional punishment of
308 For a more complete exposition of the doctrine, see BLACKBuRN', supra note 23, at 109 ("[A]n
action is permissible if (i) the action is not wrong in itself, (ii) the bad consequence is not that which is
intended, (iii) the good is not itself a result of the bad consequence, and (iv) the two consequences are
commensurate."); Philip E. Devine, Principle of Double Effect, in THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 56, at 737, 738 ("[Olne may produce a forbidden effect, provided (1) one's ac-
tion also had a good effect, (2) one did not seek the bad effect as an end or as a means, (3) one did not
produce the good effect through the bad effect, and (4) the good effect was important to outweigh the
bad one.").
The fourth clause or condition, in each of the above formulations appears to involve consequentialist
reasoning. Some have argued that the doctrine of double effect collapses into consequentialism:
Underlying the doctrine of double effect, and the only coherent basis for distinction adverted to by
the doctrine, is nothing more than the consequentialist view that it is permissible to do that which
is "merely foreseen" if the adverse consequences of the act are outweighed by the "intended" good
consequences.
Bagaric & Amarasekara, supra note 12, at 146-47 (footnote omitted). While Duff acknowledges that
the doctrine utilizes some aspect of consequentialist reasoning, he denies that it constitutes a collapse
into consequentialism per se. Duff, supra note 2, at 424 (footnote omitted) ("[Whilst the doctrine does
serve to allow deontologists to attend to consequences in their practical reasoning, this does not make
their views consequentialist, since consequentialists hold that only consequences ever matter.").
Warren Quinn, the doctrine's "most sophisticated and resourceful recent exponent," Dolinko, supra
note 2, at 1634, argues that the "most important and plausible" version of the doctrine is found in its first
three conditions and ignores the more controversial fourth condition. Warren Quinn, Actions, Inten-
tions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Double Effect, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 334, 334 n.3 (1989).
For a critique of Quinn's version of the doctrine, see Dolinko, supra note 2, at 1634 n.42.
309 Duff, supra note 2, at 423.
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particular, identifiable innocents.
Consequentialists and critics of retributivism have sought to resist
DDE by criticizing the significance of the distinction between foreseen and
intended consequences in general,310 and in particular, the significance of
the distinction between the foreseen punishment of some unknown inno-
cents and the intentional punishment of particular, identifiable innocents. 311
But the debate as to whether a retributivist system is proper in justifying the
foreseen punishment of some unknown innocents has stalled; it has degen-
erated into an argument over the validity of the doctrine of double effect.
Though the doctrine of double effect is "controversial, 312 and faces "fierce
attacks," 313 rather than fight it let us accept the DDE, for the sake of argu-
ment, and demonstrate that retributivism's reliance on the doctrine entails
its acceptance of practices that retributivists have criticized consequential-
ists for justifying.
With respect to two versions of retributivism (moralistic and legalistic
retributivism), DDE is inapplicable. For DDE to apply, the bad effect-
punishment of the innocent-must be unintentional. But moralistic and le-
galistic retributivism do justify the intentional punishment of particular,
identifiable innocents, as we have already demonstrated in Part II. Thus for
moralistic and legalistic retributivism, the conditions for DDE's application
are not satisfied. As a result, without recourse to DDE, moralistic and le-
galistic retributivism, for their mistaken punishment of the innocent, are
subject to the charge that they are unjust by retributivism's own criteria.
Nonetheless, let us assume, arguendo, that DDE is applicable in order
to demonstrate that all versions of retributivism punish the innocent in a va-
riety of ways. That is, if it is permissible for retributivism to justify the
knowing punishment of some foreseen, but unidentifiable, innocents, then it
may be shown that retributivism justifies punishment under standards, prac-
tices and doctrines which fail to give due regard to offenders' fault, culpa-
bility, mens rea, excuses, and innocence. As a result, retributivism will be
shown to justify punishment of virtually all innocent defendants.
310 For general criticisms of the doctrine of double effect, see PHIPPA FOOT, VIRTUES AND VICES
AND OTHER ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 19 (1978); Judith Jarvis Thompson, Self-Defense, 20 PH.
& PUB. AM. 283,292-96 (1991).
For a more sophisticated exposition of the doctrine designed to remedy the doctrine's persistently
pointed out shortcomings, see Quinn, supra note 308.
311 For criticisms of the doctrine of double effect in general, as well as its application to retributiv-
ism's mistaken punishment of the innocent, see Bagaric & Amarasekara, supra note 12, at 144-47;
Dolinko, supra note 2, at 1632-35; Lempert, supra note 297, at 1184; Schedler, supra note 296, at 187-
90. For a particularly detailed and comprehensive critique, see Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 28, at
1273-77 & n.757.
For a nonconsequentialist's defense of the doctrine of double effect and its application to retributiv-
ism's mistaken punishment of the innocent, see Duff, supra note 2, at 423-24.
312 BLACKBURN, supra note 23, at 109.
313 Dolinko, supra note 2, at 1634.
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B. Retributivism 's Punishment of the Innocent by Substantive Means
In this subpart, retributivism, via its reliance on DDE, will be shown to
justify punishment of the innocent under substantive standards of liability in
which the absence of offenders' fault and culpability is irrelevant. The two
standards of liability on which we will focus are strict liability and an ex-
treme form of absolute liability.
1. Retributivism's Justification of Punishment Under Strict Liabil-
ity.-While subject to various conceptions, 14 criminal strict liability is gen-
erally understood as a type of liability pertaining to offenses for which a
defendant may be convicted despite the absence of mens rea, culpability, or
fault, and despite the presence of an excuse. 315 Finding offenders guilty of
serious offenses such as murder, rape, or robbery under a strict liability
standard has generally been considered anathema in the criminal law.316 As
314 There is some confusion over the precise parameters of what constitutes strict liability. For the
view that no single conception of strict liability enjoys a consensus, see Douglas N. Husak, Varieties of
Strict Liability, 8 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 189 (1995).
For the distinction between strict liability doctrines and strict liability offenses, see DRESSLER, supra
note 222, at 125; for the distinction between strict liability and absolute liability, see Michael Davis,
Strict Liability, Criminal, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 17, at 841, 841;
for the distinction between strict liability and negligence, see Richard Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in
the Criminal Law, 12 STAN. L. REV. 731, 741-45 (1960); for the distinction between strict liability and
vicarious liability, see DRESSLER, supra note 222, at 125 n.3 and Davis, supra, at 841.
315 DRESSLER, supra note 222, at 125 (defining strict liability simply as "conviction in the absence
of mens rea"); FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 716 ("We define strict liability to mean liability imposed for
an act or omission in violation of the law, without considering at trial whether the defendant may excul-
pate himself by proving a mistake or accident bearing on the wrongfulness of the violation.");
ROBINSON, supra note 223, at 251 ("An offense may be made one of strict liability either by a determi-
nation that no culpability is required or a determination that a reasonable mistake is no defense.");
Davis, supra note 314, at 841 ("If conduct is faulty only insofar as it does wrong intentionally, know-
ingly, recklessly, or negligently, then strict liability is liability without fault."); Wasserstrom, supra note
314:
[S]trict liability offenses might be tentatively described (although not defined) as those in which
the sole question put to the jury is whether the jury believes the defendant to have committed the
act proscribed by the statute. If it finds that he did the act, then it is obliged to bring in a verdict of
guilty... [I]t is perhaps sufficient to observe that whatever it is that the concept of mens rea is
thought to designate, it is this which needs not be shown to be predicable of the defendant.
Id. at 733-34 (footnotes omitted).
316 See MPC, supra note 247, § 205 cmt., at 282 (footnote omitted) (the Code "makes a frontal at-
tack on ... strict liability in the penal law"); HART, supra note 11, at 17-24, 195-209. Wasserstrom
provides an account of the degree of disapproval strict liability has engendered:
The proliferation of so-called "strict liability" offenses in the criminal law has occasioned the vo-
ciferous, continued, and almost unanimous criticism of analysts and philosophers of the law. The
imposition of severe criminal sanctions in the absence of any requisite mental element has been
held by many to be incompatible with the basic requirements of our Anglo-American, and, indeed,
any civilized jurisprudence.
Wasserstrom, supra note 314, at 731. But see LADY BARBARA WOOTrON, CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL
LAw: REFLECrIONS OF A MAGISTRATE AND SocIAL SCIENTIST 46-57 (1963) (forcefully advocating for
strict liability throughout the criminal law); Wasserstrom, supra note 314, at 734-45 (mounting a limited
defense of strict liability).
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far back as the thirteenth century, St. Thomas Aquinas pronounced that "a
man should never be condemned without fault of his own to an inflictive
punishment."317 And today, "[m]ost modem criminal law scholars do not
look kindly upon the abandonment of the mens rea doctrine." 318 H.L.A.
Hart commented that "'strict liability' is generally viewed with great odium
and admitted as an exception to the general rule, with the sense that an im-
portant principle has been sacrificed." 319 The Commentary to the Model
Penal Code trumpets "the Code's insistence that an element of culpability is
requisite for any valid criminal conviction." 320 The Supreme Court has held
that as to the necessity for mens rea (thereby precluding the strict liability
standard), "The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when
inflicted [with mens rea] is no provincial or transient notion. It is ... uni-
versal and persistent in mature systems of law."
321
Suppose Lady Wootton's infamous suggestion 322 of punishing serious
crimes, such as murder, rape, or robbery, as strict liability offenses 323 was
incorporated into a retributivist system of punishment. Presumably, at least
some of those convicted under a strict liability standard would, in fact, be
morally culpable. Many offenders would also be convicted who lacked
mens rea, had valid excuses, and in general were not morally culpable. But
since such criteria of culpability would be irrelevant as to determining their
guilt under this system, evidence of the lack of moral culpability would be
inadmissible. As a result, the retributivist system would never know
whether any particular, identifiable defendant was morally culpable, though
For a review of the arguments both for and against strict liability see, e.g., FLETCHER, supra note 1,
at 713-36; Larry Alexander, Reconsidering the Relationship Among Voluntary Acts, Strict Liability, and
Negligence in CriminalLaw, 7 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y. 84, 87-88 (1990).
For an overview of the debate over strict liability as it relates to issues of punishment see C.L. TEN,
supra note 35, at 86-122.
317 AQUINAS, supra note 20, IL part 2-2, quest. 108, 4th art.
318 DRESSLER, supra note 222, at 127.
319 HART, supra note 11, at 20. "We condemn legal systems where they disregard this principle" of
foregoing punishment of actors who have valid excuses. Id. at 21.
320 MPC, supra note 247, § 2.02, explanatory note at 23.
321 Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246,250 (1952).
322 WOOTON, supra note 316, at 46-57. For H.L.A. Hart's famous rejoinder, see HART, supra
note 11, at 195-209.
323 The basis for Lady Wootton's promotion of strict liability throughout the criminal law was to in-
crease the preventive effect of criminal prohibitions:
If the law says that certain things are not to be done, it is illogical to confine this prohibition to oc-
casions on which they are done from malice aforethought; for at least the material consequences of
an action, and the reasons for prohibiting it, are the same whether it is the result of malicious plot-
ting, of negligence or of sheer accident....
... [A]n action does not become innocuous merely because whoever performed it meant no
harm. If the object of the criminal law is to prevent the occurrence of socially damaging actions, it
would be absurd to turn a blind eye to those which were due to carelessness, negligence or even
accident.
WOOTTON, supra note 316, at 5 1-52.
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it would know that many unidentifiable defendants would be convicted who
were not morally culpable. No particular, identifiable innocent (that is, a
defendant without moral culpability) would be intentionally convicted and
punished.
Would this system be compatible with retributivism? Yes, by recourse
to DDE. Just as retributivism claims it does not intentionally punish the in-
nocent despite intentionally erecting and maintaining fallible institutions of
punishment in which, inevitably, innocents are mistakenly punished, so too
a retributivist system punishing offenders under a strict liability standard in
which the nonculpable are mistakenly punished could claim that no particu-
lar, identifiable nonculpable defendants are intentionally punished. The
adoption of, and punishment under, a strict liability approach to serious
criminal offenses would have two effects. The intended good effect would
be the punishment of the guilty; the unintended bad effect would be the
punishment of innocent or faultless defendants. Consequently, via DDE,
retributivism can permit and justify the adoption of, and punishment under,
a strict liability approach.
That a retributive system would justify, via DDE, punishment under
strict liability is particularly striking because commentators often claim that
strict liability is incompatible with retributivism.3 24 Moreover, compatibil-
ity with strict liability is usually a criticism retributivists direct at conse-
quentialist or deterrence-based theories.325  Part of that criticism is that
324 FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 713 ("Liability despite a good excuse is 'strict' in the sense that the
criteria of liability deviate from the principles ofjust punishment."); MORRIS, supra note 6, at 44 (noting
that punishment under a strict liability approach is a "glaring example" of that which would not satisfy a
"just system" of punishment); Alexander, supra note 316, at 88 ("Strict liability crimes ... are surely
inconsistent with any version of retributivism that absolutely condemns punishment of the non-
culpable."); see DRESSLER, supra note 222, at 105 ("IT]he principle of mens rea has its roots far deeper
in retributive than in utilitarian soil.'); id. at 127 ("[Ihe requirement of mens rea is consistent with the
retributive principle that one who does not choose to cause social harm, and who is not otherwise mor-
ally to blame for its commission, does not deserve to be punished.').
[The avoidance of strict liability is] necessitated by the need to preserve the essentially punitive
[retributivist] function of the criminal law.... If that function is conceived less in terms of [re-
tributivist] punishment than as a mechanism of prevention these fears [of strict liability's prob-
lems] become irrelevant...
If, however, the primary function of the courts is conceived as the prevention of forbidden acts,
there is little cause to be disturbed ....
WOOTrON, supra note 316, at 50-51. Another account of strict liability's incompatibility with retribu-
tivism is based on strict liability imposing a duty of"super care":
Retributivists object ... to the justice of demanding super care. For (most) retributivists, a law
imposing criminal liability for negligence is justified, if it is, only because there is a natural duty
of reasonable care. "Evil mind"-a mind not up to the standard of the ordinary reasonable mind-
is still part of justifying punishment for negligent crime. The retributive objection to strict crimi-
nal liability is that no such natural duty exists for super care. Since failing to exercise super care is
not failing in a natural duty, crimes of strict liability must (it is said) punish for failure to take un-
reasonable precautions, bad luck, or some other nonfault. No one can deserve punishment for that.
Davis, supra note 314, at 843.
325 See, e.g., Bern, supra note 45, at 31 (arguing that consequentialist justification for legal excuses
is "unsatisfactory"); Ezorsky, supra note 72, at xvi (criticizing consequentialist theories for their com-
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consequentialist theories cannot convincingly explain why excused conduct
should be exempt from punishment.326 Bentham attempted to account for
excuses by claiming that since excused conduct could not be deterred, pun-
ishment would be "inefficacious" or "unprofitable," that is, useless.
327
H.L.A. Hart famously replied that "Bentham's argument is in fact a spec-
tacular non sequitur."328 All Bentham's argument demonstrates is that "the
threat of punishment will be ineffective so far as the class of persons who
suffer from these [excusatory] conditions is concerned."32 9 But "the actual
infliction of punishment on those persons, may secure a higher measure of
conformity to law on the part of normal persons than is secured by the ad-
mission of excusing conditions. '330 In other words, though Bentham may
be right that punishing excused actors will not generate specific deter-
rence,331 he overlooks the possibility that punishing excused actors will still
yield general deterrence. 332 Thus, Bentham's rationale for not punishing ac-
tors who have excuses under a consequentialist theory fails. 333  Hart con-
cludes that modem consequentialist theories fare no better.
334
One prominent critic of consequentialist theories, R.A. Duff, makes the
case against a deterrence-based theory that might employ a strict liability
standard to promote deterrence:
If for the sake of general deterrence we make liability for an offence so strict
patibility with justifying punishment under strict liability); Huigens, supra note 3, at 956 (footnote omit-
ted) ("Consequenfialism authorizes not only nonintentional criminal liability, such as negligence, but
also nonfault, or strict, criminal liability."); id. at 957 (footnotes omitted) ("IThe elimination of fault
from the criminal law has been a goal of the reformist impulse in deterrence theory.'); id. at 958 ("The
central failure of... deterrence theory involves the inability to develop a conception of nonintentional
fault.'); MeCloskey, Non-Utilitarian, supra note 120, at 124 (arguing that consequentialism justifies
punishment "of those not responsible for their acts"); id. at 125 ("Utilitarianism involves the conclusion
that if it is useful to punish lunatics, mentally deranged people... it is obligatory to do so.').
326 The consequentialist rationale for not punishing excused conduct "is nothing but a fragile con-
struct of logical fallacies." FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 813; cf. Alexander, supra note 316, at 88:
[S]trict liability crimes do serve some retributive and consequentialist values at the same time that
they disserve other retributive values. Strict liability crimes serve the retributive value of seeing
that the culpable do not go unpunished in that by omitting the necessity to prove culpability be-
yond a reasonable doubt, they make it easier to convict the culpable.
Id. (footnote omitted).
327 BENTrAM, THE PRINCIPLES, supra note 57, at 173-75 (Ch. XIII).
328 HART, supra note 11, at 19.
329 Id.
330 Id.
331 See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
332 See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
333 For another critique of Bentham's explanation of why punishing excused actors is pointless, see
FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 813-17.
334 HART, supra note 11, at 20. Hart anticipates a wide variety of arguments consequentialists
might make in attempting to account for excuses. Id. at 19-21. But even if they were to be successful,
Hart maintains, consequentialism still cannot explain why it would be wrong to punish actors with valid
excuses. Id. at21.
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that one who conducts a legitimate activity with all reasonable care may still
be guilty in law of an offense ... we do not simply consent to the mistaken
punishment of some who are actually innocent: we intend to convict and pun-
ish some whom we believe to be properly innocent, in order to encourage oth-
ers or to ensure the punishment of the guilty.335
Though speaking about the possibility of a deterrence approach utilizing a
strict liability standard, Duff s comments are also applicable to retributiv-
ism using the same standard. Duff concludes that the adoption of a strict li-
ability standard amounts to intentionally punishing the innocent! Since we
have shown that retributivism, via DDE, would justify punishment under
strict liability, then, according to Duff s comment, retributivism's justifying
punishment under strict liability might also amount to intentionally punish-
ing the innocent.
That retributivism is compatible with a standard of culpability for seri-
ous offenses that fails to take into account any criteria of mens rea, excuse,
culpability, or fault may demonstrate that either retributivism or DDE is
problematic. Either way, retributivism faces a serious dilemma. Retributiv-
ism is either (i) with DDE, subject to the criticism that it justifies punish-
ment under strict liability for serious offenses or, (ii) without DDE, unjust
by retributivism's own criteria by intentionally maintaining punishment in-
stitutions that inevitably mistakenly punish the innocent.
2. Retributivism's Justification of Punishment Under an Extreme
Form ofAbsolute Liability.-In this section it will be shown that retributiv-
ism justifies punishment under a standard of liability-an extreme form of
absolute liability-in which not merely many, but every, innocent defendant
would be convicted and punished. Absolute liability may perhaps be best
understood as distinguished from strict liability. Whereas strict liability
eliminates the necessity of mens rea (and some excuses) as a condition for
liability and punishment, absolute liability eliminates both the mens rea and
the actus reus, as well as the applicability of all excuses, as conditions for
liability and punishment.336 That is, under absolute liability, a defendant
might be convicted and punished despite the presence of an excuse, and de-
spite the absence of mens rea, culpability, fault, or even an act. 337 But not
all defendants would be convicted under absolute liability. Certain defenses
could still apply. The so-called policy, extrinsic, or nonexculpatory de-
fenses 338 might still exonerate a defendant under absolute liability.
Although retributivism, via DDE, could justify punishment under abso-
lute liability, retributivism is also compatible with justifying punishment
335 DUFF, supra note 1, at 159-60 (emphasis added). For a similar view, see MoRRIS, supra note 6,
at 35 (punishment of persons who have valid excuses constitutes punishment of the innocent).
336 Davis, supra note 314, at 841.
337 Id. (the basis for liability may be nothing more than "a mere event, reflex, or external cause").
338 See supra notes 222-223. For examples of such defenses, see text accompanying note 224.
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under an even more extreme form of liability-what I shall term "absolute
liability plus." Under this fictional absolute liability plus, as I conceive it,
every defendant is automatically found guilty and punished. Suppose that
even serious offenses such as homicide, rape, and robbery were punished
under this form of liability. Under this form of liability, all the "actually
guilty" would be convicted and punished, but so would all of the "actually
innocent."
How could retributivism possibly be compatible with justifying pun-
ishment under such a standard? By recourse to DDE. The adoption and use
of "absolute liability plus" would have two effects--one good and one bad.
The intended good effect would be punishment of the guilty; the bad side
effect of punishment of every innocent defendant would be unintended.
Though it would be known or foreseen that every innocent defendant would
be convicted and punished, no particular, identifiable innocent would inten-
tionally be convicted and punished. This is because it would not be known
which defendants are actually guilty and which are innocent. Via DDE, re-
tributivism permits and justifies the conviction and punishment of defen-
dants under "absolute liability plus."
The dilemma for retributivism is that with DDE, retributivism justifies
the adoption of, and punishment under, an approach to liability in which
every innocent defendant would be convicted and punished. But without
DDE, retributivism is conceded to be unjust339 for justifying punishment in
an inevitably fallible system in which it is known that at least a few un-
known innocents will be mistakenly punished.
C. Retributivism 's Punishment of the Innocent by Procedural Means
Retributivists contend that consequentialism, if it is in the best interests
of society, would justify the erosion or elimination of procedural safeguards
in criminal trials designed to prevent punishment of the innocent and insure
the accuracy of trial outcomes.340 Herbert Morris notes that a consequen-
tial, rehabilitative system of punishment would disregard a number of pro-
cedural safeguards due to a lack of concern with punishment of the
innocent.341 Ronald Dworkin argues that "a society that submits questions
339 See supra text accompanying note 309.
340 See, e.g., McCloskey, Non-Utilitarian, supra note 120, at 124. McCloskey details the variety of
ways in which the elimination of safeguards against punishment of the innocent would be justified under
a deterrence-based approach to punishment:
We may sometimes best deter others by punishing, by flaming, an innocent man who is generally
believed to be guilty, or by adopting rough and ready trial procedures, as is done by army courts
martial in the heat of battle in respect of deserters, etc.; or we may severely punish a person not re-
sponsible for his actions, as so often happens with military punishments for cowardice, and in civil
cases involving sex crimes where the legal definition of insanity may fail to cover the relevant
cases of insanity.
Id. (emphasis added).
341 Morris compares the level of procedural safeguards in a punishment, or retributive, system with
those in a therapy, or consequential, rehabilitative system:
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of criminal procedure to an ordinary utilitarian calculus does not recognize
the independence or importance of moral harm, or, if it does, does not rec-
ognize that even an accidental conviction of an innocent person is an occa-
sion of moral harm."3 42  As a result, Dworkin assumes that a
consequentialist or "cost-efficient" society is defective.
343
But these criticisms of consequentialism may be turned back on re-
tributivism. In this subpart retributivism, via DDE, will be shown to justify
punishment under procedures of determining guilt that dilute the concept of
guilt to such an extent that virtually all innocent defendants would be con-
victed and punished. These procedures include a presumption of guilt stan-
dard of proof and guilty verdicts by a non-majority ofjurors.
1. Retributivism's Justification of Punishment Under a Presumption
of Guilt Standard of Proof.-One way to punish the innocent (albeit not
necessarily intentionally) is to lower the standard of proof required for con-
viction. The lower the standard of proof, the greater the number of defen-
dants, both guilty and innocent, who will be convicted and punished.344 Our
standard of proof in criminal trials34 5 -the presumption of innocence unless
guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt-serves to insure that many
of the guilty, but few of the innocent, will be convicted and punished.
[A] variety of procedural safeguards we associate with [retributivist] punishment have less signifi-
cance in a [consequential] therapy system. To the degree objections to double jeopardy and self-
incrimination are based on a wish to decrease the chances of the innocent being convicted and
punished, a therapy system, unconcerned with this problem, would disregard such safeguards.
MORRIS, supra note 6, at 40.
342 DWORKIN, supra note 303, at 83-84. Dworkin sets out to determine the degree of procedural
protections to which a defendant is entitled. Id. at 72. In trying to find a middle ground, he rejects both
extremes of a defendant being entitled to the most accurate trial possible (which would be very expen-
sive) as well as a defendant not being entitled to any procedural protections. Id. at 72-73. The latter
extreme he associates with consequentialism:
If people are not entitled to the most accurate trials possible, hang the cost, then to what level of
accuracy are they entitled? Must we flee to the other extreme, and hold that people accused of
crime are entitled to no particular level of accuracy at all? That would be our assumption if we
chose trial procedures and rules of evidence entirely on the basis of cost-benefit calculations about
the best interests of society as a whole, balancing the interests of the accused against the interests
of those who would gain from public savings in a greatest-good-of-the-greatest-number way.
Would that cool utilitarian approach be consistent with our fervent declaration that the innocent
have a right to go free?
Id.
343 Id. at 84.
344 Binder & Smith, supra note 27, at 131 ("The lower the proof standard, the more guilty offenders
will be punished, but also the more innocent suspects."); Reiman & van den Haag, supra note 296, at
240 ("[H]igh standards of proof make sure that fewer innocents are convicted, but also that fewer crimi-
nals are, and.., low standards of proof make sure that more criminals are convicted, but also more in-
nocents."); id. at 241 ("[S]tandards ofproofcodetermine conviction rates .... ").
345 The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' due process clauses guarantee that a defendant should
not be found guilty unless the prosecutor persuades the judge or jury of her guilt "beyond a reasonable
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime" for which she is charged. In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358, 364 (1970).
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Given that mistakes are inevitable, it reflects a preference for false acquit-
tals over false convictions, and it finds expression in William Blackstone's
adage that it is better that ten guilty escape punishment than one innocent be
punished.3 46 Given the importance retributivists place on not punishing the
innocent, it is not surprising that retributivism has been said to have pro-
foundly influenced the presumption-of-innocence standard.347 In contrast,
retributivists point out, consequentialist theories justify intentional punish-
ment of the innocent and are unable to explain the wrong of doing so. As
Dworkin's critique suggests, if it would benefit society (for example, by in-
creasing deterrence) consequentialism might well justify lowering the stan-
dard of proof required for conviction and punishment,348 thereby increasing
the number of innocents mistakenly punished. And Morris maintains that a
consequential, rehabilitative system would have little need for a presump-
tion-of-innocence standard of proof.
349
Before turning back these criticisms on to retributivism by showing
how retributivism justifies dramatically lowered standards of proof, let us
briefly visit the debate as to whether retributivism is indeed compatible with
the presumption of innocence. Ernest van den Haag argues that retributiv-
ism cannot justify the presumption-of-innocence standard350 because it is
incompatible with retributivism's 35' twin absolute dictates to punish the
guilty and to acquit the innocent.3 52 Van den Haag explains the difficulty in
346 The maxim is generally, and most famously, associated with the great English jurist William
Blackstone. IV WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 358 (Ch. 27)
(1844 ed.) (1765) ("jT]he law holds that it is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent
suffer."). For a brief history of the maxim, see Jeffrey Reiman & Ernest van den Haag, supra note 296,
at 226.
347 Cragg, supra note 52, at 707.
348 For example, one consequentialist argues in favor of lower standards of proof-either a clear-
and-convincing-evidence or preponderance-of-the-evidence standard-depending on the circumstances.
Reiman & van den Haag, supra note 296, at 241, 248. Van den Haag (writing separately from his co-
author) sets the lower limit on the standard of proof by "when the number of innocents being convicted
so nearly approaches the number of criminals that punishment would no longer be perceived to be di-
rected at [criminals]." Id. at 241.
349 MORRIS, supra note 6, at 40.
350 More precisely, van den Haag argues that retributivism cannot justify the "punishment con-
straint," by which he means our criminal law standard of presumed innocence unless guilt is proved be-
yond a reasonable doubt as expressed in the saying that it is better that ten guilty persons escape than
that one innocent is punished. Reiman & van den Haag, supra note 296, at 226, 240-44.
351 Van den Haag is presumably referring to obligatory or positive retributivism. See supra notes
118-119 and accompanying text. In contrast, negative retributivism merely demands that no innocents
be punished. But even the reasonable doubt standard ensures that some, even if only a few, innocents
will be convicted and punished. As a result, negative retributivism would seem to be incompatible with
our presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt standard. To satisfy negative retributivism, the rea-
sonable doubt standard of guilt would have to be changed to a more stringent presumption of innocence
standard-"innocence unless there is absolute certainty as to guilt." Only in this way could the dictate
of negative retributivism, that no innocents be punished, be satisfied. While such a standard would sat-
isfy negative retributivism, virtually no guilty would be punished under that standard.
352 See supra notes 73, 75, 119 and accompanying text.
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determining the standard of proof justified by retributivism:
How, then, do retributivists determine which has priority: the obligation to
punish the guilty, or the obligation not to punish the innocent? They don't....
[R]etributivism tells us that we have an obligation to punish the guilty and not
to punish the innocents. We are not told which duty has priority. Should we
try to convict fewer innocents and risk letting more of the guilty escape, or try
to convict more of the guilty, and, unavoidably, more of the innocent? Re-
tributivism (although not necessarily retributivists) is mute on how high stan-
dards of proof ought to be; it can neither impose nor oppose the [presumption-
of-innocence standard].
353
That is, since retributivism does not prioritize between the two duties, re-
tributivism cannot justify the presumption-of-innocence standard, which re-
flects the comparatively greater value placed on not punishing the innocent.
It might be added that the presumption-of-innocence standard, which inevi-
tably will result in some mistaken punishment of the innocent, not only
does not satisfy the categorical duty to punish the guilty but also fails even
to satisfy the categorical duty not to punish the innocent.
While some retributivists insist that punishment of the innocent is a
greater evil than letting the guilty go unpunished,354 that our standard of
proof should reflect that,355 and that such a presumption-of-innocence stan-
dard is compatible with retributivism, 356 others maintain that both the pre-
353 Reiman & van den Haag, supra note 296, at 242-43.
354 For the view of a retributivist that punishing the innocent is worse than foregoing punishment of
the guilty, see, for example, MORRis, supra note 6, at 35:
The resolution arrived at in the system I am describing consists in weighing as the greater evil the
punishment of the innocent.... [I]t is determined to be a greater evil for society to interfere
unjustifiably with an individual by depriving him of good than for the society to fail to punish
those that have unjustifiably interfered.
Id.
355 For the view that standards of proof should reflect the greater evil of punishing the innocent than
foregoing punishment of the guilty, see, for example, id. at 36:
[Tlhe deprivation, in this just system of punishment, is linked to ... procedures that strike some
balance between not punishing the guilty and punishing the innocent... in which it is evident that
the evil ofpunishing the innocent is regarded as greater than the nonpunishment of the guilty.
Id.
356 Reiman & van den Haag, supra note 296, at 230-34. Terming the saying that it is better to let
ten guilty escape than punish one innocent the "punishment constraint," Reiman (writing separately
from his co-author) argues that for retributivism to be plausible, punishment of the innocent must be
worse than nonpunishment of the guilty:
I shall make use of the assumption that (for crimes and their punishments of comparable harm a la
lex talionis) punishment of the innocent and crime against innocent are equally bad. If this is so,
then, it follows that to deny the punishment constraint, retributivism must insist that nonpunish-
ment of the guilty is as bad as crime against the innocent. But, once we consider the losses that the
various failures of duty impose on those to whom they are owed, we shall see that the claim that
nonpunishment of the guilty is as bad as crime against the innocent is implausible. To be plausi-
ble, then, retributivism must accept that crime against the innocent is substantially worse than
nonpunishment of the guilty. But, since punishment of the innocent is as bad as crime against the
innocent, it follows that, to be plausible, retributivism must grant that punishment of the innocent
is substantially worse than nonpunishment of the guilty.
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sumption-of-innocence standard and the preponderance-of-the-evidence
standard (roughly equalizing the number of false acquittals and false con-
victions) are compatible with retributivism 35 7 Though there is no standard
that satisfies both duties, 358 perhaps the civil law preponderance-of-the-
evidence standard constitutes a compromise that equalizes the importance
of both duties.359  The compromise, 360 however, entails the elimination of
the presumption of innocence, which fundamentally marks the difference
between civil and criminal law. Moreover, the use of a preponderance-of-
the-evidence standard would substantially increase the number of innocents
punished. That retributivism, which severely criticizes other theories of
punishment for justifying punishment of the innocent, is compatible with
the civil law standard of liability is a startling admission.
Retributivism, however, may be shown to justify punishment under a
dramatically lower standard-a fictitious standard of proof in which virtu-
ally all innocent defendants would be convicted and punished. This stan-
dard, let us term it the "presumption-of-guilt" standard of proof, presumes
the guilt of a defendant unless absolute evidence of innocence is proven to
the satisfaction of the judge or jury. The adoption of the standard would
Id. at 232-33.
357 MOORE, supra note 73, at 157:
The retributivist might adopt a principle of symmetry here-the guilty going unpunished is exactly
the same magnitude of evil as the innocent being punished-and design his institutions accord-
ingly. Or the retributivist might share the common view (that the second is a greater evil than the
first) and design punishment institutions so that "ten guilty persons go unpunished in order that
one innocent not be punished."
Id. at 157 n. 11.
358 There is no standard that is capable of satisfying the twin dictates ofpositive retributivism. Posi-
tive retributivism demands (i) that not a single innocent be punished, and (ii) that not a single deserving
wrongdoer escape the punishment that she deserves. To satisfy the first demand that no innocents be
punished, the standard would have to be "innocence unless there is absolute certainty as to guilt." But
such a standard would allow almost all guilty defendants to be acquitted. To satisfy the second duty that
all guilty defendants be punished, we might choose what I will term the "presumption of guilt standard."
Under that standard, guilt would be presumed unless evidence of absolute innocence was established.
But such a standard would ensure that virtually every innocent would be convicted and punished.
Therefore, neither standard, nor any single conceivable standard, would satisfy both duties or dictates of
positive retributivism.
359 If utilized in a criminal trial, a defendant would be convicted if her guilt was established by a
preponderance of the evidence-that is, if the evidence established that her guilt was more likely than
not. The preponderance standard would serve to roughly equalize the number of convictions and acquit-
tals. It would reflect the thought that punishing the guilty and aquitting the innocent are equally impor-
tant; and that acquitting the guilty was as wrong as punishing the innocent. The preponderance-of-the-
evidence standard constitutes a compromise on the standard of guilt required by both of the absolute dic-
fates ofpositive retributivism-to compromise between no false guilty verdicts and no false acquittals.
360 The compromise would be satisfactory to neither negative nor positive retributivism. Negative
retributivism would not be satisfied because many innocents would be found guilty and punished. The
compromise standard satisfies negative retributivism even less well than our reasonable doubt standard.
The compromise standard also fails to satisfy either of the twin dictates of positive retributivism.
Though equalizing the number of false acquittals and false guilty verdicts, the preponderance standard
would convict many innocents and acquit many of the guilty.
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serve to insure that no guilty person would escape conviction and punish-
ment. It would also have the effect that virtually every innocent defendant
would be convicted and punished.
361
How could retributivism, which stresses the importance of not punish-
ing the innocent, justify such an extreme standard? By recourse to DDE.
Though it would be known or foreseen that virtually all innocent defendants
would be convicted and punished, it would also be known or foreseen that
at least some of the defendants found guilty would actually be guilty. The
intended good effect in adopting the presumption-of-guilt standard would
be to punish the guilty, the bad side effect of punishment of virtually all in-
nocent defendants would be unintended. Retributivism would not be inten-
tionally punishing any particular, identifiable innocent. As a result,
retributivism, via DDE, can permit and justify the adoption and utilization
of the presumption-of-guilt standard.
This presumption-of-guilt standard does satisfy one of the categorical
demands of retributivism-that the guilty be punished. That the standard
fails to satisfy the duty that no innocent be punished hardly makes it incom-
patible with retributivism, because no single standard can satisfy both of the
duties, 362 and standards which satisfy neither mandate are nonetheless
claimed to be compatible with retributivism. 363 That retributivism would be
compatible with a standard that leads to the punishment of virtually all in-
nocent defendants while simultaneously (i) demanding that no innocent be
punished, and (ii) criticizing consequentialist theories for justifying the pun-
ishment of the innocent is, to say the least, implausible. But retributivism,
via DDE, justifies punishment under the presumption-of-guilt standard.
Retributivism, then, is subject to the same claim that retributivists have
leveled against consequentialist theories. According to Dworkin, it is con-
sequentialism that justifies the erosion or elimination of procedural safe-
guards designed to prevent innocents being from punished and to insure the
accuracy of criminal trials.364 But as demonstrated, retributivism also
would justify the elimination of a procedural safeguard-the presumption-
of-innocence standard of proof. While retributivists claim that consequen-
tialism cannot explain why punishment of the innocent is wrong, retributiv-
ism cannot explain why it would be wrong to punish defendants after
finding them guilty under a presumption of guilt standard.
That DDE can justify implementation, in a retributivist system, of a
standard in which almost all innocent defendants are found guilty and pun-
ished may demonstrate either that retributivism justifies punishment of the
innocent on a mass scale or that DDE is untenable or proves too much. The
361 After all, how many defendants, even truly innocent ones, could demonstrate absolute evidence
of innocence?
362 See supra notes 350-351, 358-360 and accompanying text.
363 See supra notes 356-357 and accompanying text.
364 See supra notes 342-343 and accompanying text
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resulting dilemma for retributivism is that either (i) with DDE, retributivism
is subject to the criticism that it justifies punishment under a standard of
proof that will find guilty virtually every innocent defendant, or (ii) without
DDE, retributivism is subject to the criticism that, by intentionally main-
taining fallible punishment institutions which inevitably, mistakenly punish
the innocent, it is unjust by its own criteria.
2. Retributivism's Justification of Punishment By Guilty Verdicts
from a Non-Majority of Jurors.-Retibutivists make a general critique of
consequentialism as justifying the erosion or elimination of procedural
safeguards designed to protect the innocent in, and insure the accuracy of,
criminal trials. One particular example on which they focus is the jury sys-
tem. Dworkin suggests that consequentialism would justify weakening the
size, and unanimity requirement, of juries.3 65 Morris declares that a conse-
quential, rehabilitative approach might eliminate juries altogether.366 But
like other attacks on consequentialism, these criticisms may also be turned
back on retributivism. For Dworkin, even a minor erosion of the jury sys-
tem, as justified by consequentialism, would constitute an "injustice. '367
This section will demonstrate that retributivism, via DDE, justifies punish-
ment of offenders found guilty in a jury system in which both the size and
unanimity requirements are not merely slightly, but dramatically, eroded.
The traditional arrangement of a jury rendering a guilty verdict is that
all twelve jurors must vote unanimously in favor of conviction. While this
still holds in federal courts36 and in most states,3 69 both the size and the
unanimity requirement have been relaxed in some states. The Supreme
Court has held that state laws allowing juries as small as six members are
constitutional,370 and non-unanimous guilty verdicts are permissible as long
365 D\VORKIN, supra note 303, at 72, 90-91.
366 Morris compares the role of the jury in a system ofjustice, or retributivism, with a consequen-
tial, or rehabilitative, system: "[A] jury system which, within a system of justice, serves to make ac-
commodations to the individual situation and to introduce a human element, would play no role or a
minor one in a world where expertise is required in making determinations of disease and treatment."
MORRIS, supra note 6, at 40-41.
367 As Dworkin explains it:
Mhe number of jurors is plainly so important a consideration in guarding an accused against in-
justice, when a unanimous verdict is required to convict him, that any substantial change in that
number for capital cases or cases threatening severe punishments-say reducing the number to
six-would count as a violation of the rights of the accused just because it would be a substantial
diminution in the level of safety provided at the center of the criminal process for so long.
DWORKIN, supra note 303, at 90-91.
368 FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(a), 3 1(a) (requiring, in order for a conviction, a jury of twelve persons
unanimously voting for a guilty verdict).
369 DRESSLER, supra note 222, at 4.
370 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (holding that a six-person jury is constitutional under
the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial); see Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978) (finding a five-
person jury unconstitutional).
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as they represent a "substantial majority. '371 The requirement of unanimity,
or at least a substantial majority, in order to convict and punish, roughly
parallels our presumption of innocence under which a defendant may not be
convicted unless the prosecution establishes proof of guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt. Both the size and unanimity (or substantial majority) require-
ments reflect a bias in favor of acquitting the guilty rather than punishing
the innocent.
But even with a requirement of a unanimous verdict of twelve jurors to
convict, some innocents will be convicted and punished.372 "Perhaps if the
concern were solely with guaranteeing that no innocent man be convicted, a
twenty or thirty man jury in which unanimous consent was required for
conviction would do a better job."373  And, of course, a fifty or one-
hundred-person jury requiring unanimous consent for conviction would do
an even better job still of avoiding punishment of the innocent. While do-
ing so would come close3 74 to satisfying one of the duties of retributiv-
ism-not punishing the innocent-it would do a poor job of satisfying the
other duty of retributivism-punishing the guilty.
375
If, instead, equal importance were placed on not punishing the innocent
and on punishing the guilty, then the traditional use of a unanimous vote of
twelve jurors would be eliminated. Rather than a unanimous vote of twelve
jurors, a non-unanimous vote of, for example, six (out of twelve) jurors
would be implemented. This might very roughly equalize the number of
false acquittals and false convictions. Though not satisfying either one of
the categorical duties of retributivism, a vote of six jurors for conviction on
a twelve-person jury would very roughly value the two duties equally. Of
course, implementation of such a jury system would lead to a substantial in-
crease (over our traditional unanimous twelve-person jury practice) in pun-
ishment of the innocent.
And if, instead, comparatively greater importance was placed on the
retributivist absolute dictate of conviction and punishment of the guilty,
then our traditional practice of conviction based on a unanimous vote of
twelve jurors could be replaced with a system of guilt unless there was a
unanimous vote for acquittal. That is, even, an 11-1 vote in favor of acquit-
tal would constitute a guilty verdict. And, of course, a system of guilt
unless a fifty or one-hundred person jury unanimously voted for acquittal
371 Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972) (finding a 9-3 guilty verdict constitutional).
372 DWORKIN, supra note 303, at 72 ("If we continue to use only twelve jurors in order to save the
extra expense [of a 25-person jury], that will result in some people being convicted though innocent.").
373 Wasserstrom, supra note 314, at 739.
374 Of course, even with the unanimous consent of a one-hundred person jury, at least some inno-
cents would be mistakenly convicted.
375 If a unanimous vote of, for example, a 100-person jury was required for conviction, substantially
fewer guilty defendants would be convicted. The implementation of such a jury in a retributivist system
would reflect the comparatively greater importance placed on avoiding punishment of the innocent over
foregoing punishment of the guilty.
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would come even closer still to attaining the retributivist duty of punishing
the guilty. While implementing such a system would allow markedly fewer
guilty defendants to escape punishment, it would greatly increase the num-
ber of innocents who would be punished.
Given a standard of "guilt unless there is a unanimous vote for acquit-
tal of an X person jury," where X is a sufficiently high number, virtually
every innocent defendant would be convicted. Retributivism, via DDE,
would justify such a jury standard for guilt in criminal trials. Though it
would be known or foreseen that virtually all innocent defendants would be
convicted and punished under such a jury standard, it would also be known
or foreseen that at least some (if not virually all) factually guilty defendants
would be found guilty. It would not be known that any particular, identifi-
able innocent was found guilty; no particular, identifiable innocent would
be intentionally convicted and punished. The intended good effect in
adopting and maintaining such a jury standard would be conviction and
punishment of the guilty; the bad side effect of conviction and punishment
of virtually every innocent defendant would be unintended. Thus, via DDE,
retributivism permits and justifies the adoption of, and punishment under,
such a jury standard.
The retributivist criticism-that consequentialism justifies the erosion
of procedural safeguards designed to protect the innocent-may be turned
back on retributivism. It is retributivism, because of DDE, that is unable to
explain the wrong of such a jury system in which virtually every innocent
defendant would be found guilty and punished. Again, perhaps the problem
lies not with retributivism but with its reliance on DDE. But without DDE,
retributivism's intentional maintenance of fallible punishment institutions
which are known to inevitably and mistakenly punish the innocent is unjust
by retributivism's own criteria.
D. Objections
This subpart will consider three possible objections to the conclusion
that DDE renders retributivism compatible with justifying indirect punish-
ment of the innocent, that is, punishment without due regard to defendants'
fault, culpability, or guilt. First, retributivism would not justify punishment
under standards of presumed guilt, strict liability, an extreme form of abso-
lute liability, or guilty verdicts by a non-majority of jurors because that
would fail to constitute efforts to avoid punishment of the innocent. Sec-
ond, retributivism does not justify punishment under such standards and
practices because it would amount to failing to take reasonable efforts
against punishing the innocent. And third, even if retributivism does justify
punishing under such standards, this is not a shortcoming of retributivism as
a theory but is due only to its application to the real world. All of these ob-
jections will be shown to be either unpersuasive or, even if persuasive,
equally applicable to absolve consequentialism of retributivists' criticisms.
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1. Efforts to Avoid Punishment of the Innocent.-The creation and
maintenance of institutions that seek to punish defendants under standards
of presumed guilt, strict liability, an extreme form of absolute liability, or
non-majority jury verdicts might fail to constitute efforts to avoid punish-
ment of the innocent, faultless, or non-culpable.376  According to Duff,
though a retributivist need not "take every possible precaution against the
risk of punishing those who are in fact innocent," punishment of the inno-
cent should only occur "despite our intention and our efforts to avoid it."
377
Thus, according to the objection, retributivism would not be compatible
with, and would not justify, punishment under these standards.
The objection is unpersuasive. DDE does make retributivism compati-
ble with such standards. As Duff noted, retributivism need not take every
possible precaution against punishing the innocent. After all, the standards
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and preponderance of the evidence
(both of which are claimed to be compatible with retributivism 378) do not
take every possible precaution against punishing the innocent. Retributiv-
ists acknowledge that even under the reasonable-doubt standard it is ex-
pected and known that some percentage of defendants found guilty and
punished will be innocent. If retributivism wished to take every possible
precaution against punishing the innocent, it is free to adopt a standard of
"presumption of innocence unless absolute evidence of guilt is established."
But retributivists' concern with avoiding punishment of the innocent does
not extend this far (perhaps because of the equal duty to punish the guilty).
The standards of strict culpability, presumption-of-guilt standard of proof,
and non-majority jury verdicts do constitute some effort to avoid punish-
ment of the innocent. The standards allow some innocents to escape con-
viction and punishment.
379
Since the standards of (i) preponderance of the evidence and (ii) pre-
sumption of innocence are claimed to be compatible with retributivism, and
thus apparently constitute some effort to avoid punishment of the innocent,
then the standards of (iii) strict culpability, (iv) presumption of guilt and (v)
non-majority jury verdicts are also compatible with retributivism and con-
stitute efforts to avoid punishment of the innocent. None of these five stan-
dards constitutes taking every possible precaution against punishing the
innocent. True, the former two perhaps constitute more of an effort and the
latter three constitute less of an effort. Nonetheless, all five constitute some
effort to avoid punishment of the innocent. The only difference between
the former two standards and the latter three is a matter of degree.
380
376 I am grateful to George Fletcher for posing this possible objection.
377 DUFF, supra note 1, at 159.
378 See supra notes 356-357 and accompanying text.
379 The same is not true, however, for punishing under our extreme form of absolute liability.
380 The objection might still be made that it is not merely a matter of degree. Retributivism justify-
ing punishment (i) of strict liability offenses, (ii) under a presumption of guilt standard and, (iii) non-
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2. Reasonable Efforts to Avoid Punishment of the Innocent.-A re-
tributivist might still object that something more than "some" effort to
avoid punishment of the innocent might be required for a standard or prac-
tice to be justified by retributivism. So, between making some effort and
every possible effort to avoid punishment of the innocent what exactly is
the quanta of effort required to avoid punishment of the innocent? Duff
suggests that the proper measure is those efforts that are "reasonable." 381
Unfortunately, Duff does not elucidate what would constitute reasonable
precautions.
Let us assume that from a common-sense perspective the standards and
practices we have sought to make compatible with retributivism would
plainly not constitute reasonable efforts to avoid punishment of the inno-
cent. This is because under such standards and practices many, or virtually
every, innocent defendant would be convicted and punished.382 Implement-
ing standards and practices that lead to punishing virtually every innocent
defendant hardly constitutes, from a common-sense perspective, reasonable
efforts to avoid punishment of the innocent.
But the common-sense perspective may not be available to retributiv-
ism. To see why, we need only consider why Duff and other retributivists
refuse to take all possible precautions against punishing the innocent. For
majority jury verdicts is not merely quantitatively, but also qualitatively, different from punishing under
the standards of reasonable doubt, preponderance of the evidence and jury verdicts meeting constitu-
tional size and unanimity (or substantial majority) requirements. Though punishment under both the
former three and latter two standards will inevitably lead to the punishment of the innocent, the former
will lead to punishment of the innocent to such a greater extent as to constitute either aiming at punish-
ment of the innocent or for the extent to be so great as to not be a matter of degree but qualitatively dif-
ferent. As such, retributivism does not justify punishment under the former three standards.
The objection is unpersuasive. Justifying punishment of defendants convicted under nonmajority
jury verdicts is merely quantitatively different than justifying punishment under our current jury size and
unanimity (or substantial majority) requirements. Requiring a unanimous vote of 12 jurors for convic-
tion is only different by a matter of degree from a unanimous vote of 10, 6 or 2 jurors. But every de-
crease in the number ofjurors will incrementally increase the odds of punishing the innocent Similarly,
replacing the present system of a unanimous vote of 12 jurors for conviction is only different by a matter
of degree from a standard requiring (out of a 12 person jury) only 10, 6 or 2 votes for conviction. But
each decrease in the number ofjuror votes for guilt required for a conviction will incrementally increase
the number of innocent defendants found guilty. And requiring for conviction only 2 (out of 12) guilty
votes is different only by a matter of degree from requiring, for an acquittal, a unanimous not guilty vote
of 12 jurors, 100 jurors or 1000 jurors. But each increase in the number of unanimous juror votes for an
acquittal will incrementally increase the number of innocent defendants mistakenly convicted.
381 DUFF, supra note I, at 159 ("A practicable system of punishment cannot satisfy the former de-
mand [of taking every possible precaution against punishing the innocent]; it can take all 'reasonable',
but not all possible, precautions against the risk."); Duff, supra note 2, at 424 (requiring "reasonable
safeguards against mistaken convictions (this being what retributivists must accept as a feature of any
human system ofpunishment)").
382 It might be quibbled that punishing under a strict liability standard will not significantly lead to
more innocents punished than under a preponderance of the evidence standard. And since the latter is
claimed to be compatible with retributivism, see supra note 357 and accompanying text, so should the
former.
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all of retributivists' rhetoric about the moral abhorrence of punishing the
innocent, it might seem odd that retributivists do not advocate making all
possible efforts to avoid punishing the innocent. Even short of making all
possible efforts, retributivists do not even advocate making additional ef-
forts (beyond those already in place in our current systems) to avoid pun-
ishment of the innocent.3 83 Surprisingly, retributivists even suggest that we
could make less effort to avoid punishment of the innocent. Recall that re-
tributivists have suggested the possibility of punishing under the standard of
proof used in civil cases (guilt by a preponderance of the evidence). 384 This
is all because in addition to not punishing the innocent, retributivism has the
affirmative duty to punish the guilty. The more efforts are made to avoid
punishing the innocent, fewer of the guilty are punished.
385
From the retributivist perspective, then, what shall be deemed reason-
able? Given the two duties of retributivism, which in a practical sense are
countervailing, it does not seem to be intelligible for retributivism to speak
of reasonable efforts to avoid punishment of the innocent. Any practicable
effort made to avoid punishing the innocent is equally an effort to avoid
punishing the guilty. Because of the affirmative duty to punish the guilty
and the negative duty to not punish the innocent, to the extent that the two
duties are practicably reconcilable, it would seem that any arrangement that
achieved one or the other duty, or some combination thereof, would be con-
sidered reasonable. If so, then standards and practices that convict and pun-
ish many or all guilty defendants, despite convicting and punishing virtually
all innocent defendants, are reasonable, not from a common-sense perspec-
tive, but from a retributivist perspective.
But let us suppose for the sake of argument that (i) the requirement of
making reasonable efforts to avoid punishment of the innocent is intelligi-
ble under retributivism, and (ii) standards and practices in which all (or vir-
tually all) of the guilty and the innocent are punished do not constitute
reasonable efforts to avoid punishment of the innocent. DDE still makes
such standards compatible with retributivism. These standards and prac-
tices do not entail the intentional punishment of any particular, identifiable
innocent. Though it is known or foreseen that virtually every innocent de-
fendant would be convicted and punished, no particular, identifiable inno-
cent is intentionally punished. Since only the good effect of punishment of
the guilty is intended and the bad side effect of punishment of the innocent
or nonculpable is unintended, the conditions for DDE's applicability are
satisfied. This holds true even for the extreme form of absolute liability in
which every innocent defendant would be convicted and punished. It is re-
tributivists themselves who have informed us, via DDE, that known or fore-
383 See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 303, at 79-92 (defending the position that further procedural
safeguards are not necessary in order for our system of criminal procedure to be just).
384 See supra note 357 and accompanying text.
385 See supra notes 344, 367, 373 and accompanying text.
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seen punishment of some unknown innocents is permissible as long as no
innocents are intentionally punished. If justifying the implementation of
standards and practices in which all, or virtually all, innocents would be
convicted and punished satisfies DDE, but still does not constitute reason-
able efforts to avoid punishing the innocent, then the reasonable efforts re-
quirement is inconsistent with DDE.
386
To avoid the inconsistency, retributivism would be forced to eliminate
its reliance on one or the other. If DDE were eliminated, retributivism
would have no defense to consequentialist criticisms that retributivism is
unjust by its own criteria because it justifies the implementation of punish-
ment institutions where it is foreseen that innocents will inevitably be con-
victed and punished. But if retributivism eliminates the requirement of
making reasonable efforts to avoid punishment of the innocent, it is com-
patible with standards and practices in which virtually every innocent de-
fendant will be convicted and punished. Either way, retributivism, as to
punishment of the innocent, is no better than consequentialism, and perhaps
worse.
3. Theory Versus Application.-The objection might be that, as a
theory, retributivism has no problem with justifying punishment of the in-
nocent, and that it is only retributivism's application to the uncertainties of
real world punishing that raises difficulties.387 Suppose the finder of guilt
and innocence is God388 or is omniscient. Guilt, innocence, and culpability
would be known with absolute certainty. There might then be no need for
standards of guilt, innocence, and culpability.389 The guilty would simply
be punished and the innocent acquitted under retributivism; no guilty would
be mistakenly acquitted and no innocent would be mistakenly punished, be-
cause there would be no mistakes. Retributivism's problems with justifying
extreme standards of proof and culpability would thereby be eliminated. It
is not retributivism as a theory that is problematic, one could argue, but
merely its application to punishment under conditions of epistemic uncer-
tainty in the real world.
The objection is unpersuasive for a number of reasons. First, retribu-
tivism does not merely aspire to theoretical validity. Retributivism is in-
voked as relevant for punishment in the real world where virtually every
386 Even if the reasonable efforts requirement is consistent with DDE, punishing under a strict li-
ability standard might still bejustified, via DDE, by retributivism. Presumably, punishing under a strict
liability standard would not lead to punishing an appreciably greater number of innocents than punishing
under a preponderance of the evidence standard, which is claimed to be compatible with retributivism
and thus presumably constitutes reasonable efforts to avoid punishing the innocent. Therefore, if the
preponderance of the evidence standard is compatible with retributivism and constitutes reasonable ef-
forts to avoid punishment of the innocent, then the same holds true for strict liability.
387 I am grateful to Ken Levy for posing this possible objection.
388 See Schedler, supra note 296, at 193-94 (suggesting that retributivism might require God or an
omniscient factfinder for retributivism to realize its ambitions).
389 Id.
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instance of punishing is under conditions of epistemic uncertainty.
3 °
Unless retributivism is willing to be purely an ethical theory with no appli-
cation to legal punishment, its application to the real world is relevant and
crucial.
Second, it is retributivism as a theory that is compatible with, or justi-
fies (via DDE), punishing under the standards of strict liability, an extreme
form of absolute liability, presumption of guilt, and non-majority guilty
verdicts. The criticism is, in fact, directed at retributivism as a theory, a
theory that justifies or is compatible with extreme standards of guilt, proof,
and liability. The issue is not whether retributivism does use such stan-
dards, or would not under certain conditions, but whether retributivism as a
theory justifies (via DDE) the use of such standards and whether retributiv-
ism can explain why the use of such standards is wrong. (Recall that re-
tributivists have criticized consequential theories not so much for actually
punishing innocents but for their inability to explain the wrong of punishing
the innocent.391) Even if retributivism's factfinder was God or was omnis-
cient (and thus had no need for standards in order to determine guilt and in-
nocence), because of DDE, retributivism would be unable to explain why
the adoption of, and punishment under, such standards is wrong.
Let us, however, assume arguendo that the objection is persuasive.
Could consequentialism equally avail itself of the same argument? That is,
under conditions of perfect knowledge of who committed each crime and
which defendants are guilty and which are innocent, would a consequential-
ist theory nonetheless justify punishment of the innocent? No. Consequen-
tialist theories hold that punishment of an innocent lowers societal welfare
to a greater extent than punishment of a guilty person. This is because the
innocent would suffer more than the guilty392 and because punishment of
the innocent would probably be counterproductive. 393  For Bentham, be-
cause punishment by itself is an evil, punishment should only be imposed
where unavoidable. 394 In situations where the identity of the guilty offender
is known, punishment of an innocent would be avoidable.395 As Bentham
states, "To inflict punishment when ...the infliction of punishment is
avoidable, is in the case of the innocent, contrary to the principle of util-
390 As Schedler explains:
We know all too well that a system of legal punishment will on occasion convict and punish by
mistake individuals who are innocent .... To admit this is merely to admit that well-intentioned
human beings are fallible and imperfect and that, as a consequence, their legal systems will reflect
these characteristics.
Id. at 187.
391 See supra notes 158-159 and accompanying text.
392 See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
393 See supra notes 153-155 and accompanying text.
394 See supra notes 161-162 and accompanying text.
395 See supra notes 160-161 and accompanying text.
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ity.' ' 39 6 Thus, under conditions of perfect knowledge consequentialism
would also no longer be subject to the criticism of punishing the innocent.
Moreover, if retributivism's employment of constructs of idealized
worlds (for example, where the factf'mder is omniscient) persuasively
eludes retributivism's difficulties, then consequentialist theories could
equally avoid criticism by constructing its own idealized worlds. Rather
than a world of perfect knowledge, suppose a world with perfect deterrence.
In such an idealized world of perfect deterrence, no crimes would be com-
mitted because all crime would be deterred. Thus, a consequentialist theory
would have no need to justify intentional punishment of the innocent. It is
only the messy real world where people actually commit crimes that causes
difficulty for consequentialism.
If it is not retributivism as a theory that is problematic as to punishment
of the innocent, but only retributivism's application to the real world, then
equally it is not consequentialism as a theory that is problematic but conse-
quentialism's application to the real world. If instead the real world is rele-
vant in assessing a theory of punishment, then retributivism is compatible
with justifying punishment under standards and practices in which every, or
virtually every, innocent defendant would be convicted and punished. Ei-
ther way, as to punishment of the innocent, retributivism fares no better
than consequentialist theories of punishment.
E. Conclusion
Retributivists have found consequentialist theories to be hopelessly de-
fective for justifying the intentional punishment of the innocent. In re-
sponse, consequentialists argue that by intentionally creating and
maintaining necessarily fallible punishment institutions in which it is
known that some innocents will inevitably be punished, retributivism is un-
just by its own criteria. While conceding that some innocents will inevita-
bly be punished by mistake, retributivists deny that it is unjust because no
particular, identifiable innocent will be knowingly or intentionally punished
under retributivism. Invocation of some variant on the doctrine of double
effect, or DDE, then, purports to whitewash over the problem of punishing
the innocent for retributivism. So long as no particular, identifiable inno-
cent is intentionally punished, retributivists claim that punishment of the in-
nocent does not render their theory unjust or inconsistent with its own
criteria.
Even if DDE is valid and if its conditions can be satisfied, however, it
causes as many difficulties as it solves. Via DDE, retributivism justifies the
punishment of defendants without due regard to fault or culpability (a criti-
cism which retributivists have directed at consequentialist theories). By its
reliance on DDE, retributivism justifies the adoption of, and punishment
396 Bentham, supra note 63, at 476.
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under, standards of (i) strict liability, even for serious offenses, (ii) an ex-
treme form of absolute liability, (iii) a presumption of guilt standard of
proof, and (iv) non-majority jury verdicts. Retributivism is compatible with
justifying punishment under such extreme standards because even though it
would be foreseen that virtually every innocent defendant would be con-
victed and punished, no particular, identifiable innocent would be intention-
ally punished. While the good effect of punishing the guilty is intended, the
bad side effect of punishing the innocent is unintended. Moreover, just as
retributivists have claimed that consequentialist theories cannot explain
why intentional punishment of the innocent is wrong, so too retributivism
(because of DDE) cannot explain why justifying punishment under extreme
standards of liability and procedure in which all or virtually all innocent de-
fendants would be convicted and punished is wrong. By avoiding inten-
tional punishment of particular, identifiable innocents, retributivism is
subject to its own criticism of justifying punishment without due regard to
fault or culpability.
Retributivism could avoid the above difficulties, of course, by not in-
yoking DDE. But without it, retributivism is unjust by its own criteria by
intentionally creating and implementing necessarily fallible institutions that
are known to inevitably punish innocents. Either way, as to punishment of
the innocent, retributivism fares no better than consequentialist theories.
V. RETRIBUTMSM USES PERSONS NOT AS ENDS BUT AS MERE MEANS
Perhaps the "primary 397 or most "fundamental" 398 criticism retributiv-
ists level against consequentialist theories of punishment is that they use
those who are punished as mere means to attain the good consequences
sought to be promoted, rather than as ends in themselves. 3 9 Retributivism,
in contrast, allegedly treats offenders as ends in themselves by giving of-
397 MoRIs, supra note 6, at 46 ("The primary reason for preferring the system of [retributive] pun-
ishment as against the [consequentialist] system of therapy might have been expressed in terms of the
one system treating one as a person and the other not.").
398 DUFF, supra note 1, at 149 ("Mhe fundamental moral objection to any consequentialist account
... will be that it fails to accord to the citizen, and to the criminal, the respect which is their due.');
Greenawalt, supra note 11, at 1341 ("The most fundamental objection [to consequentialist accounts] is
to treating the criminal as a means to satisfy social purposes rather than as an end in himself.").
399 For example, a deterrence theory of punishment uses those who are punished as mere means in
order to attain the end of the deterrence of crime. The offender is used as a mere means in order to
benefit society. Though an offender might be used as a means to benefit others (general deterrence), the
goals of special deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation are arguably to the benefit of the offender
being punished. How then are consequentialist theories of punishment using offenders as mere means
when the offender himself is benefitted? Retributivists argue that the prohibition against using offenders
as mere means extends even to instances where the offenders are benefitted. Special deterrence and re-
habilitative theories of punishment give offenders what they need. General deterrence theories give so-
ciety what it needs (the reduction of crime). But according to retributivism, only by giving offenders
what they deserve, and not what they need, are wrongdoers respected as fully autonomous agents and as
ends in themselves.
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fenders only what they deserve.40 But retributivism, it will be demon-
strated, also uses persons as mere means.
After explaining the means/ends distinction, we will briefly consider
the state of the debate as to the distinction's relevance in the theory of pun-
ishment. The principal focus of this Part, however, will be to make the
novel argument that retributivism, in violation of Kant's maxim,40 1 per-
versely uses crime victims as mere means in order to treat their victimizers
(criminal offenders) as ends in themselves. Retributivism exploits crime
victims as, in Karl Marx's inimitable phrase, "slave[s] ofjustice."
40 2
A. Means and Ends
Though the nexus for the distinction between using persons as mere
means and treating persons as ends in themselves is generally traced to
Kant,40 3 a utilitarian, Cesare Beccaria, anticipated by some twenty years
Kant's maxim against disrespecting persons' humanity and autonomy by
using them as mere means.404 In arguing against impermissible forms of
punishment, Beccaria declares: "There is no liberty whenever the law in
some cases permits a man to cease to become a person and to become a
thing."405  Perhaps influenced by Beccaria,4 6 Kant announces that one
must, "Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or that
of another, always as an end and never as a means only."407 Applying this
to punishment, Kant contends:
Punishment by a court... can never be inflicted merely as a means to promote
400 Duff, supra note 6, at 10.
401 See infra notes 407-408 and accompanying text.
402 Karl Marx, Capital Punishment, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., Feb. 18, 1853 (praising retributivism, as
embodied in the views of Kant and Hegel, for not "looking upon the criminal as the mere object, the
slave of justice," but rather, raising the criminal "to the position of a free and self-determined being").
Impliedly, Marx is criticizing consequentialist theories for using criminals as mere objects and slaves of
justice for consequentialist purposes. But Marx goes on to question whether any approach to punish-
ment, including retributivism (which he terms "specious"), under existing social conditions, is morally
adequate. As Marx puts it "Is there not a necessity for deeply reflecting upon an alteration of a system
that breeds these crimes, instead of glorifying the hangman who executes a lot of criminals to make
room only for the supply of new ones?" Id.
403 See, e.g., Dolinko, supra note 2, at 1631 (footnote omitted) ("Kant, whose writings are the prin-
cipal source of the idea that using people, or treating them as 'means' (solely as means, as Kant was
careful to put it), is uniquely immoral....').
404 Beccaria's On Crimes and Punishments was published in 1764, see supra note 102, over 20
years prior to Kant's first expression of the maxim in 1785, see infra note 407.
405 BECCARLA, supra note 102, at 38 (Ch. XX) (translator's footnote omitted); cf. KANT, supra note
22, at 140-41 (a person "can never be treated merely as a means to the purposes of another or be put
among the objects of rights to things').
46 David Young, the translator, suggests that Kant might have been influenced by this passage of
Beccaria in developing his theory ofpunishment. BECCARIA, supra note 102, at 93 n.2 (Ch. XX).
407 IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 46 (Lewis White Beck
trans., 2d ed. 1990) (1785).
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some other good for the criminal himself or for civil society.... For a man
can never be treated merely as a means to the purposes of another or be put
among the objects of rights to things: His innate personality protects him from
this .... 408
1. The Retributivist Charge: Consequentialism Uses Offenders as
Mere Means.-Retributivists insist that their theory respects and honors of-
fenders as ends, but that consequentialist theories disrespect offenders by
using them as mere means409 or animals.410 As Hegel explains, by retribu-
tivism conceiving punishment as "embodying the criminal's own right, the
criminal is honoured as a rational being."411 In turn, the failure to so honor
criminals leads Hegel to reject consequentialist theories of punishment.
The criminal is denied being treated as a rational being "if he is regarded
simply as a harmful animal which must be rendered harmless, or punished
with a view to deterring or reforming him. '412 Speaking of deterrent theo-
ries based on threats, Hegel declares that "[tjo justify punishment in this
way is like raising one's stick at a dog; it means treating a human being like
a dog instead of respecting his honour and freedom. '413 As a contemporary
philosopher makes the argument:
[T]he retributivist seeks, not primarily for the socially useful punishment, but
for the just punishment, the punishment that the criminal (given his wrongdo-
ing) deserves or merits, the punishment that the society has a right to inflict
and the criminal a right to demand. Only a theory built on these values, so a
common argument goes, will respect persons as individuals of special worth-
a worth that is compromised if we feel free simply to use them (as utilitarian
deterrence theory appears willing to use them) for the social good.
414
408 KANT, supra note 22, at 140-141. This famous passage has also been translated as follows: "Ju-
ridical punishment can never be administered merely as a means for promoting another Good either with
regard to the Criminal himself or to Civil Society.... For one man ought never to be dealt with merely
as a means subservient to the purpose of another... IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
195 (W. Hastie trans., 1887).
409 There is some debate as to the matter whether Kant meant that persons must always be treated
exclusively as ends or whether they may be treated as means as long as they are not exclusively treated
as means. For agreement with the latter interpretation, see HART, supra note 11, at 244 ("Kant never
made the mistake of saying that we must never treat men as means. He insisted that we should never
treat them only as means 'but in every case as ends also.").
410 See infra notes 412-413, 435 and accompanying text.
411 HEGEL, supra note 22, at 126 (§ 100). As one commentator construes Hegel's view, punishment
is both an honor as well as a disgrace. J.E. MeTaggart, Hegel's Theory of Punishment, 6 INT'L. J.
ETHICS 482 (1896), reprinted in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT, supra note 34, at 40,
41.
412 HEGEL, supra note 22, at 126 (§ 100).
413 Id. at 125-26 (§ 99). One commentator argues that for Hegel the deterrent effect of punishment
is not undesirable but "it is beside the point. Mere deterrence fails to 'erase' the crime that has already
been committed and thus fails to negate the negation." Steinberger, supra note 89, at 861.
414 Jeffrie Murphy, Retributivism and the State's Interest in Punishment, in NOMOS XXVII:
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 156, 158-59 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds., 1985).
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Because, under retributivism, punishment is intrinsically good and the con-
sequences of punishment are irrelevant so long as deserving wrongdoers re-
ceive their just deserts,415 retributivism is perceived as not using offenders
as mere means or instruments to attain some other goal.416 In contrast, un-
der a consequentialist theory justifying punishment by deterrence, for ex-
ample, punishment is not intrinsically good but only instrumentally good in
attaining some other goal (deterrence).417 The claim is that deterrence-
based theories use the punished offenders as mere instrumental means in
order to obtain the intrinsic goods of reducing the incidence of crime and
the victimization of crime victims.
418
2. Accounts of Using Persons as Mere Means.--Before taming to
consequentialist responses to this criticism, let us briefly consider some
general conceptions of using another person as a mere means to an end. Al-
though its importance as a moral criticism is recognized to be substantial,
419
there is less consensus as to what it means to use another as a mere
means.420 In general, using another as a mere means is thought to belong in
the same family as the concepts of "manipulation, dehumanization, exploi-
tation, and disrespect."421 The notion of using another as a mere means may
also be understood in the negative-as failing to respect another's inviola-
bility, rationality, or moral status.
422
But let us consider some various accounts of using another as a mere
means. Kantian scholar Onora O'Neill explains that to use something as a
mere means is to treat it as a thing,423 instrument, or tool.424 Robert Nozick
415 See supra note 107 and accompanying text; infra notes 609-610 and accompanying text.
416 See supra note 400 and accompanying text.
47 See supra notes 108-109 and accompanying text; infra note 612 and accompanying text.
418 See supra notes 397-399 and accompanying text.
419 Nancy Davis, Using Persons and Common Sense, 94 ETHICS 387,387 (1984).
The belief that it is wrong to use persons is one that is well entrenched in our moral thinking. In
one form or another, it underlies a wide range of criticisms and analyses.
The conviction that there is something fundamentally wrong with using persons has formed the
background and, in some cases, the framework of much recent work in moral philosophy.
Id. (footnote omitted). Davis also notes the central importance of the wrongness of using persons is evi-
dent in "jurisprudence as well." Id. at 387 n.2.
420 Onora O'Neill, Between Consenting Adults, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 252, 252 (1985) ("Few moral
criticisms strike deeper than the allegation that somebody has used another.... But this consensus is
often shallow, since there is little agreement about what it takes to use others in morally problematic
ways."); Dolinko, supra note 2, at 1631 (footnote omitted) ("And although the immorality of using peo-
ple is today widely accepted in ordinary discourse, even this commonsense usage is both complex and
elusive.').
421 Davis, supra note 419, at 387 (footnote omitted).
422 Id. at 403.
423 As O'Neill puts it:
To treat something as a mere means is to treat it in ways that are appropriate to things. Things,
unlike persons, are neither free nor rational; they lack the capacities required for agency. They can
only be props or implements, never sharers or collaborators, in any projects. Things cannot act...
so cannot consent to or dissent from the ways in which they are used.
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finds the metaphor of a tool to be the paradigmatic example of using an-
other as a mere means because there are no moral constraints on how we
may treat a tool.425 A means or tool ceases to be that and becomes an end
when there are moral constraints on its use that cannot be overridden.
426
In addition to using another as a tool or commodity,427 using another
without their consent is another common conception of using someone as a
mere means. Declaring that "[i]ndividuals are inviolable," Nozick inter-
prets Kant's maxim as requiring that individuals "may not be sacrificed or
used for the achieving of other ends [than their own] without their con-
sent.428 Affirming the importance of treating persons as ends in themselves
and never as mere means, 429 John Rawls declares that consent is central to
not only explicating the meaning of Kant's maxim but also its realization.
430
O'Neill also sees consent as crucial to an adequate understanding of the dis-
tinction between treating a person as an end and using the person as a
... [I]f we treat other agents as mere means, we do prevent, damage or restrict their agency.
We use them as props or implements in our own projects, in ways that preempt their willing and
deny them the possibility of collaboration or consent-or dissent.
ONORA O'NEILL, CONSTRUCTIONS OF REASON: EXPLORATIONS OF KANT'S PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY
138 (1989) (emphasis omitted).
424 O'Neill, supra note 420, at 252 ("Making another into a tool or instrument in my project is one
way of failing to treat that other as a person .
425 As Nozick explains:
There is no side constraint on how we may use a tool, other than the moral constraints on how we
may use it upon others. There are procedures to be followed to preserve it for future use ("don't
leave it out in the rain"), and there are more and less efficient ways of using it. But there is no
limit on what we may do to it to best achieve our goals.
NOZICK, supra note 36, at 31.
426 Id. ("If we add constraints on its use that may not be overridden, then the object may not be used
as a tool in those ways. In those respects, it is not a tool at all.").
427 Davis, supra note 419, at 392 ("When we object to one person's using another, what we are say-
ing (at least some of the time) is that something that is not a mere good or commodity is being treated as
one.").
428 NOZICK, supra note 36, at 30-31.
429 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 179 (1971) ("[T]he principles ofjustice manifest in the ba-
sic structure of society men's desire to treat one another not as means only but as ends in themselves.").
More generally, Rawls expresses the importance of respecting persons as ends in this famous passage
starting on the first page of his classic work:
Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a
whole cannot override. For this reason justice denies that the loss of freedom for some is made
right by a greater good shared by others. It does not allow that the sacrifices imposed on a few are
outweighed by the larger sum of advances enjoyed by many.
Id. at 3-4.
430 As Rawls puts it:
[T]reating men as ends in themselves implies at the very least treating them in accordance with the
principles to which they would consent in an original position of equality.
... By contrast, to regard persons as means is to be prepared to impose upon them [without
their consent] lower prospects of life for the sake of the higher expectations of others.
Id. at 180.
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means, but in a way different than Rawls.431 Rather than the possible or ra-
tional consent of Rawls's original position, O'Neill argues for the relevance
of actual consent.
432
Perhaps the most elegant conception of the distinction is Herbert Mor-
ris's account of treating someone as a person 433 That is, to treat someone
as an end is nothing more than treating him as a person;434 and, using some-
one as a mere means fails to treat someone as a person.
435
Now that we have some sense of what is involved in treating someone
as an end rather than as a mere means, the next step is to determine to
whom we owe this duty. For Kant, this duty is owed to all of humanity:
"Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or that of an-
other, always as an end and never as a means only. '436 O'Neill, however,
offers a narrower scope of the duty. Rather than all of humanity, those who
are mere spectators to, or "wholly unaffected by," a course of action, are not
treated as mere means even if they do not actually consent to the action.
437
But consent must be at least possible (even if there is no actual consent), in
431 O'Neill, supra note 420, at 253 ("[Ain adequate understanding of what it is to treat others as
persons must view them not abstractly as possibly consenting adults, but as particular men and women
with limited and determinate capacities to understand or to consent to proposals for action.").
432 As O'Neill explains:
[Ut is morally objectionable to treat others in ways to which they do not consent. To do so treats
another as a thing or a tool, which cannot, so does not, consent to the ways in which it is used;
such so fails to treat others as persons, who can choose, so may withhold consent from actions
which affect them.
Id. at 254.
433 Morris suggests that "the primary reason" reason to prefer a retributivist to a consequentialist
system of punishment might be that the former does, and the latter does not, treat others as persons.
MORIUS, supra note 6, at 46.
434 Though Morris does not specifically track the means/ends distinction, his account of treating an-
other as a person may eloquently capture what is involved in treating another as an end rather than as a
mere means. Id. at 46-50. For Morris, two conditions must be satisfied in order to treat someone as a
person: "We treat a human being as a person provided, first, we permit the person to make the choices
that will determine what happens to him and, second, when our responses to the person are responses
respecting the person's choices." Id. at 48-49.
435 Morris explains what constitutes not treating another as a person:
When we talk of not treating a human being as a person or "showing no respect for one as a per-
son" what we imply by our words is a contrast between the manner in which one acceptably re-
sponds to human beings and the manner in which one acceptably responds to animals and
inanimate objects. When we treat a human being merely as an animal or some inanimate object
our responses to the human being are determined, not by his choices, but ours in disregard of or
with indifference to his. And when we "look upon" a person as less than a person or not a person,
we consider the person as incapable of rational choice. In cases ofnot treating a human being as a
person we interfere with a person in such a way that what is done, even if the person is involved in
the doing, is done not by the person but by the user of the person.
Id. at 46.
436 KANT, supra note 407, at 46 (emphasis added).
437 O'NEILL, supra note 423, at 139 n.12. O'Neill further explains that "[tjhere is not much diffi-
culty in ensuring that those who will in any case be no more than spectators have a genuine possibility
of dissent" Id. at 110.
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order to treat others as ends and avoid using others as mere means, for
"those closely involved in or affected by" a course of action.438 We will re-
turn to O'Neill's narrower test as to who may, and who may not, be treated
as a mere means in making the argument that retributivism uses persons as
mere means.
3. Consequentialist Responses.-Against the criticism by retributiv-
ists that consequentialist theories use those punished as mere means, conse-
quentialists have pitched a number of counterarguments. First, they argue,
the concept of using someone as a mere means is "unclear,"439 "notoriously
obscure," 440 "vague,"441 "elusive," 442 and enjoys "little agreement" among
commentators. 443 As such, the criticism is too imprecise to warrant, or to
form, a response. But since the criticism has come to play such a crucial
and central role in the punishment debate, 444 it cannot be brushed away this
easily. 445 Second, a consequentialist might concede that consequentialist
theories of punishment use offenders as mere means but might nonetheless
deny that it is problematic.446 Responding to Kant's imperative not to use
438 O'Neill, supra note 420, at 259.
439 Dolinko, supra note 2, at 1631.
440 DuFF, supra note 1, at 178.
441 HONDERICH, supra note 89, at 49. For three different possible interpretations of the means/ends
distinction, see id. at 49-50.
442 Davis, supra note 419, at 389. Davis expresses skepticism that the criterion of using persons as
mere means can, consistently with our common sense, bear the weight which is placed on it:
I am inclined to doubt that our commonsense views about using persons can play an important role
in philosophical argument, either in the construction or in the criticism of moral theories. Two
considerations underlie this skepticism: first, the things that philosophers have said about using
persons do not happily characterize our commonsense notions, and second, a closer look at these
notions reveals them to be elusive in important ways, ones that make their philosophical applica-
tion problematic.
Id. at 388-89.
443 O'Neill, supra note 420, at 252.
44 DuFF, supra note 1, at 178 (explaining that though the concept of using persons as mere means
is "notoriously obscure.., it generates a crucial objection" to consequentialist theories ofpunishment).
On the importance of this criticism of consequentialist theories, see also supra notes 382-383.
445 That a number of notable contemporary philosophers have regarded the inability of consequen-
tialism to adequately explain our intuition that using persons as mere means is wrong as sufficient rea-
son to reject consequentialism should give us pause in too hastily rejecting the using persons as mere
means criterion. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); CHARLES
FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG (1978); NozICK, supra note 36; RAWLS, supra note 429; Nagel, supra note
184.
"6 C.L. Ten, supra note 29:
[I]f we punish those who voluntarily breached the law in order to prevent them from repeating
their offences, or to deter potential offenders, we are not using them unfairly. The failure to pun-
ish in these cases would result in there being additional innocent victims of crime. These victims
could not reasonably have avoided being harmed by criminal acts in the way that those who volun-
tarily broke the law could have refrained from criminal acts and therefore avoided the resultant
punishment.
Id. at 3 69-70.
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people as mere means, Oliver Wendell Holmes proclaimed, "[i]f a man
lives in society, he is liable to find himself so treated."447 Furthermore,
Holmes added, "No society has ever admitted that it could not sacrifice in-
dividual welfare to its own existence."448 In other words, the treating of
people as mere means is normal, necessary, inevitable, and thus permissi-
ble, and we should not pretend otherwise.
Third, it might be conceded that consequentialist theories use offenders
as means but not as mere means.449 Consequentialist punishment of the
guilty might use them as means to attain the good consequences of punish-
ment but also treats the guilty as ends by giving them what they deserve.450
Furthermore, that one goal of deterrence-based theories is special deterrence
means that offenders who are punished are not being used solely as a means
to deter others.45 1  In sentencing an offender, one judge had occasion to
comment on Kant's maxim finding both that using others as mere means is
not problematic and that punishment for deterrence reasons fails to use of-
fenders as mere means. Faced with defense counsel's invocation of Kant's
maxim in arguing against the need for the defendant to be punished for rea-
sons of deterrence, Judge Frankel in United States v. Bergman4 2 concluded:
[Kant's] humane principle is not offended here. Each of us is served by the
enforcement of the law-not least a person like the defendant in this case,
whose wealth and privileges, so long enjoyed, are so much founded upon law.
More broadly, we are driven regularly in our ultimate interests as members of
the community to use ourselves and each other, in war and peace, for social
ends.453
A retributivist might reply that a person must not be used merely as a means
even if it was to benefit that person. As Kant argued, a person must not
even use himself as a mere means.4 54 However, the distinction between us-
ing a person as a mere means to his own benefit and treating a person as an
447 HOLMES, supra note 88, at 44.
448 Id. at 43. Holmes continues by giving examples of the ways in which society uses its members
as mere means:
If conscripts are necessary for its army, it seizes them, and marches them, with bayonets in their
rear, to death. It runs highways and railroads through old family places in spite of the owner's
protest, paying in this instance market value, to be sure, because no civilized government sacri-
fices the citizen more than it can help, but still sacrificing his will and his welfare to that of the
rest.
Id. Holmes concludes that using offenders as mere means is "perfectly proper." Id. at 47.
449 For general discussion as to the unpersuasiveness of this claim see DUFF, supra note 1, at 188-
92.
450 Duff, supra note 6, at 10.
451 Dolinko, supra note 2, at 1631-32. For a possible objection to this claim see id. at 1632.
452 416 F. Supp. 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
451 Id. at 499.
454 KANT, supra note 22, at 255 (emphasis added) ("[A) man cannot be used merely as a means by
any man (either by others or even by himsel/) but must always be used at the same time as an end.").
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end may be elusive.
Consequentialists also claim that consequentialism does not use of-
fenders as mere means because it treats offenders as ends by taking into ac-
count their interests. Bentham understood punishment as an evil because of
the pain it caused those punished.455 In determining whether punishment is
justified, the pain caused to the person punished is taken into account; if the
good consequences of punishment do not outweigh the pain caused to the
person punished, the punishment is not justified.456 The offender is thereby
treated as an end.
4 7
Fourth, consequentialists might argue that consequentialism not only
treats offenders as ends, but does so to a greater extent than retributivism.
David Dolinko suggests that it is consequentialism, not retributivism, which
truly respects the dignity of the offender. Rather than maintain, as retribu-
tivists do, that an offender has a right to be punished (a right that the of-
fender will gladly waive4 58) and that punishment is a "noble and uplifting
enterprise that attests to the richness and depth of our moral character," 45 9 a
deterrence-based approach respects the offender by presenting a more
straightforward view of punishment as a "dirty business" and a "sad neces-
sity. '460 "[I]t is the deterrence theorists... who truly 'respect' the criminal
by acknowledging that inflicting pain on him is, in itself, bad, and not to be
done unless it can be outweighed by its good consequences.
461
Fifth, it might be conceded that consequentialism uses offenders solely
as mere means, but the criticism might be defused by arguing that retribu-
tivism also uses offenders solely as mere means. Dolinko argues that by
punishing offenders, retributivism uses them as mere means in differing
ways. Retributivism uses offenders as mere means by implementing pun-
ishment institutions that invariably, mistakenly punish innocents. The in-
nocents mistakenly punished are used as mere means or sacrificed in order
that we may maintain our fallible punishment institutions and punish those
who are actually guilty.462 Retributivists could, of course, invoke some
variant on the doctrine of double effect 463 and reply that no particular, iden-
tifiable innocent is being used as a mere means intentionally. The validity
of this reply has been extensively addressed in Part IV. In addition, retribu-
45S See supra note 68.
456 See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
457 S.I. Benn, An Approach to the Problems of Punishment, 33 PHILOSOPHY 325, 329 (1958) ("To
look to the consequences does not entail treating the criminal merely as a means to a social end, as crit-
ics have asserted; for in weighing advantages and disadvantages, the criminal, too, must 'count for
one.").
458 See supra text accompanying note 115.
459 Dolinko, supra note 2, at 1656 (attributing this view to retributivists).
460 Id.
461 Id.
462 Id. at 1632-33. For a similar claim, see Schedler, supra note 296, at 189.
463 See supra notes 305-308 and accompanying text.
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tivism uses offenders as mere means by justifying the imposition of pun-
ishment despite being unable to know whether the actual amount of pun-
ishment imposed is what the offender actually deserves.464  Since
retributivism's treatment of offenders as ends depends on giving offenders
what they deserve,465 the inevitable failure of our punishment institutions to
determine the correct amount of deserved punishment leads to most offend-
ers not being treated as ends.466 Again, the retributivist response might be
to invoke some variant of the doctrine of double effect: that the amount of
punishment imposed is with the intention that it reflects an offender's just
deserts.
Sixth, not only is it permissible to use offenders as mere means, but the
principles of retributivism might affirmatively require it. Intriguingly, a
leading retributivist, Robert Nozick, seems to suggest that retributivism
properly should justify the intentional use of offenders as mere means.
Nozick maintains that "to be used as a means may be part of his [an of-
fender's] retributive matching desert, since that is what he has done to an-
other."467  By "matching desert," Nozick is referring to retributive
punishment's attempt to tun back the crime on to the criminal or "bringing
home to the offender the nature of what he has done.' 4 68 In other words,
under the lex talionis, retributivism seeks to match what the offender did to
his victim by doing the same to the offender.469 Since the offender has used
his victim as a mere means by which the offender gained the fruits of his
crime, the offender's matching desert also entails being used as a mere
means. Thus, intentionally using an offender as a mere means in punishing
him might not only be unobjectionable under retributivism, but affirma-
tively required. Since under this view intentionally using an offender as a
mere means is justified and required by retributivism, retributivists can
hardly object that consequentialist theories also justify using offenders as
mere means.
B. Retributivism Uses Crime Victims as Mere Means
The previous subpart considered the retributivist charge that conse-
quentialist theories immorally use as mere means the offenders they punish.
This subpart will make the novel and seemingly radical argument that re-
tributivism intentionally uses crime victims as mere means in order to treat
their victimizers (that is, the criminals) as ends in themselves. Although
this claim might seem preposterous at the outset, other commentators have
made related claims. Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell note that it is
464 Dolinko, supra note 2, at 1635.
465 See supra notes 400, 411 and accompanying text.
466 See supra notes 264-269 and accompanying text.
467 NozicK, supra note 104, at 372.
468 Id.
469 See supra note 79.
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criminals who use society as a mere means.470 And Jeffrie Murphy hints
that victims might be used by the state for its own ends.471
Before attempting to defend this radical claim, let us briefly set out the
steps of the argument: 1) Victim-relative norm violation is necessary for
the imposition of retributive punishment and for retributivism to treat cul-
pable wrongdoers as ends; 2) The interests of crime victims as ends are ir-
relevant in retributivism; 472 3) Therefore, the necessary use of victims'
being victimized constitutes using the victims merely as means in order to
treat culpable wrongdoers as ends and to attain appropriate retributive pun-
ishment. Steps 1 and 2 should be fairly uncontroversial. What is critical is
step 3. That is, whether retributivism's failure to treat crime victims as
ends, despite the necessary use of victims' being victimized, constitutes us-
ing victims merely as means.
1. The Necessary Use of Victims as Means.-As to step 1, I do not
mean to imply that victim-relative norm violation is only necessary for re-
tributive punishment but not for other, including consequentialist, theories
of punishment. Regardless of whether it is true with respect to other theo-
470 Kaplow & Shavell briefly suggest that, under a retributivist system, criminals use society, which
must bear the various costs of crime and maintenance of the administration of criminal justice, as mere
means:
[T]he main effect of the retributive view is to preserve the profitability of crime to some potential
criminals at a greater expense to their victims and to all who must finance the costs of punishment.
It is not clear how this treatment respects the dictum not to use people merely as a means to others'
ends, for it could be said that everyone else in society is thus used by criminals when fair [retribu-
tive] punishment is insisted on.
Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 28, at 1265-66 (footnote omitted). That is, criminals use society as a
mere means to a greater extent under retributivism than consequentialism because the former's lack of
emphasis on deterrence leads to a greater incidence of crime.
In the corresponding footnote to the above quotation, Kaplow & Shavell note that because criminals
voluntarily choose to commit crime, they may waive their rights (against being used as mere means). Id.
at 1266 n.742. While criminals choose to commit crime, crime victims do not choose to be victimized,
and thus do not waive any tights (against being used as mere means). As a result, "there seems to be a
stronger sense in which, from this Kantian perspective, the victims are being used as mere means, inde-
pendently of the course they would will for themselves." Id.
This Part will argue that it is not criminals that use society as a mere means, as Kaplow and Shavell
suggest, but rather that retributivism uses crime victims as mere means.
471 Murphy ventures that victims' interests might be respected less than that of their victimizers and
less than that of the state:
[Vqictims often feel that their particular injuries are ignored while the [criminal justice] system ad-
dresses itself to some abstract injury to the state or to the rule of law itself- a focus that appears to
result in wrongdoers being treated with much greater solicitation and respect than their victims re-
ceive. If the actual victims are noticed at all (other than to alert the state to a violation of its inter-
ests) ....
Jeffrie G. Murphy, Getting Even: The Role of the Victim, 7 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y., Spring 1990, at 209,
209.
472 The view that step 2, by itself, is sufficient to establish that retributivism uses crime victims as
mere means, and not even partially as ends in themselves, will be considered infra section V.C.4, par-
ticularly infra text accompanying notes 546-553.
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ries, I merely mean in step 1 that it is true for retributive theories of pun-
ishment. Though not all criminal offenses involve identifiable victims,
surely the vast majority defines the prohibited conduct with respect to a vic-
tim. Imagine the difficulty of drafting an offense of murder,473 robbery,
474
or assault 475 without reference to a human victim. Let us now consider
some specific ways in which victims are used in our penal system.
We often hear the claim that such and such an offense is a "victimless
crime." And so it is claimed that the offense deserves either no punishment
or less punishment. By implication, a crime that did harm a victim deserves
either some or more punishment. Either way, crime victims are necessarily
used as a means in order to gauge the proper level of deserved punishment.
For Hegel, "punishment should affect the offender as much as his offense
has affected the victim. ' 476 Thus, the degree to which the victim is affected
by the crime is used as a means to gauge the degree of desert of the offender
and the amount of punishment to be imposed under retributivism.
A victim's consent is used not only to delineate legal from illegal con-
duct, but also to differentiate among various forms of illegal conduct.
Whether a victim consents to the offender's conduct in many cases will be
dispositive as to whether conduct is criminal or not. Examples include
rape, larceny, and battery.477 The difference between blackmail and a rou-
tine business transaction may depend on whether the victim or the offender
initiated the transaction.478  The difference between the crimes of embez-
zlement and larceny depends on whether the victim initially consented to
entrust the property to the offender.479
Bias crimes depend on features of their victims. An offense committed
against victims with certain religious, ethnic, racial, or sexual features, with
the offender's motive to commit the offense based on one of these features,
transforms the underlying offense into an elevated offense carrying a
greater level of deserved punishment.
40
473 MPC, supra note 247, at § 210.1(1) (Criminal Homicide) ("A person is guilty of criminal homi-
cide if he purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently causes the death of another human being."
(emphasis added)).
474 Id. at § 222.1 ("(1) Robbery Defined. A person is guilty of robbery if, in the course of commit-
ring a theft, he: (a) inflicts serious bodily injury upon another;, or (b) threatens another with or purposely
puts him in fear of immediate serious bodily injury... (emphasis added)).
47' Id. at § 211.1(1) ("Simple Assault: A person is guilty of assault if he: attempts to cause or pur-
posely, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another;, or negligently causes bodily injury to
another with a deadly weapon; or attempts by physical menace to put another in fear of imminent seri-
ous bodily injury." (emphasis added)).
476 PRIMORATZ, supra note 1, at 80-81 (construing Hegel's view that punishment must be compa-
rable in value and character to the crime).
477MPC, supra note 247, at 2.11 (Consent).
478 MURRAY N. RoTHBARD, THE EmTcs OF LiBERTY 125 (1982); Sidney DeLong, Blackmailers,
Bribe Takers, and the SecondParadox, 141 U. PA. L. REV.1663, 1664 (1993).
479 DRESSLER, supra note 222, at 524; FLRCHR, supra note 1, at 7.
480 See generally Anthony M. Dillot Punishing Bias: An Examination of the Theoretical Founda-
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In virtually all jurisdictions, an offender who completes or consurn-
mates the attempted harm against a victim will deserve greater punishment
than one who fails to complete the attempted harm. 48' The amount of de-
served punishment is a function of the amount of harm sustained by the vic-
tim.
In response to these examples of retributivism using crime victims as
means in order to give offenders their just deserts, a retributivist might ar-
gue that criminal offenses are conceptualized as crimes against the state and
not against a human victim. It is tort law, not criminal law, where individ-
ual human victims seek redress under the law. The victims of criminal of-
fenses are, and crimes are committed against, the state or community or
society.482 Nonetheless, such crimes against the state are defined with ref-
erence to a human victim. Again, imagine the difficulty of drafting an of-
fense of rape, murder, or battery without reference to a human victim.
Though such crimes may theoretically be committed against the state, they
necessarily may only be committed on a human victim. For the vast major-
ity of criminal offenses, it is necessary to use individual victims in order to
formulate the offense.
Despite the necessity of using individual victims as means to define
most criminal offenses, retributivists might still maintain it is the state that
is formally considered the victim against which crime is committed. But if
so, by considering the interests of the state, it is the state (and not the indi-
vidual victim) that is treated as an end. Moreover, the very conception of
the state as the official victim of a crime only serves to underscore that in-
dividual human crime victims are used as means so the state and the of-
fenders may be treated as ends.
The only point here, from all these examples, is that human victims are
essential for, and integral to, the imposition of retributive punishment. As
one prominent retributivist, Michael Moore, recognized, "[v]ictims have a
lot to do with the justification of punishment for a retributivist.' '483 Moore
tions of Bias Crime Statutes, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 1015 (1997). For the Supreme Court's upholding of
this elevated form of liability dependent on specific features of victims, see Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508
U.s. 476 (1993).
481 DRESSLER, supra note 222, at 349; FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 474; ROBINSON, supra note 223,
at 616. Contra MPC, supra note 247, at § 5.05.
482 DRESSLER, supra note 222, at 1.
[U]nlike torts and contracts , the criminal law involves public law. That is, although the direct and
immediate victim of a crime may be a private party (e.g., a person who is robbed, assaulted or kid-
napped), and other individuals may be indirectly injured (e.g., a spouse of the direct victim), a
crime involves more: a crime is a "social harm," in that the injury suffered involves "a breach and
violation of the public rights and duties, due to the whole community, considered as a community,
in its social aggregate capacity." Because of this latter feature, crimes are prosecuted by public at-
tomeys representing the community at large, and not by privately retained counsel.
Id. (footnotes omitted); ROBINSON, supra note 223, at 5 ("Crimes are prosecuted by the state rather than
by the victim, while civil cases have a private "plaintiff' who brings the action.").
483 Moore, supra note 26, at 69.
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explains that human victims are central to retributivism because the desert
of an offender is based on culpable wrongdoing; wrongdoing is not merely
an act with bad consequences but also must be a violation of a norm.
484
"Any kind of retributivist needs a norm violation to justify punishment. It
is at this point that victims come in substantively. Victims come in as part
of the content of those norms."485 Referring to the most important norms
prohibiting murder, torture, rape, and the like, Moore declares that
"[v]ictims are important substantively because each of these serious moral
norms prohibits actions causing harms to certain victims. 486 Because of
the importance of these "victim-relative' norms,"487 victims "are at the cen-
ter of the norms whose violation is at the core of the criminal law."488 Vic-
tims have a "large place 489 in retributive punishment and "are central to the
norms whose violation justifies punishment for a retributivist. 490 There-
fore, retributivism necessarily uses crime victims as the means to attain re-
tributive punishment and the treatment of offenders as ends in themselves.
2. The Irrelevance of the Interests of Victims as Ends.-Like the first
step of the argument that retributivism uses victims as mere means, the sec-
ond step-that the interests of crime victims as ends in themselves are ir-
relevant to retributivism--should also be fairly uncontroversial. Because
retributivism is said to focus exclusively on what offenders deserve (that is,
offenders' just deserts), consideration of the interests of victims is irrele-
vant. Moore proclaims the interests of crime victims to be extraneous in the
enterprise of retributive punishment:
Retributivism is not the view that punishment of offenders satisfies the desires
for vengeance of their victims. In this view the harm that is punishment is jus-
tified by the good it does psychologically to the victims of crime, whose suf-
fering is thought to have a special claim on the structuring of the criminal
justice system. This is not retributivism. A retributivist can justify punish-
ment as deserved even if the criminal's victims are indifferent (or even op-
posed) to punishing the one who hurt them. Indeed, a retributivist should urge
punishment on all offenders who deserve it, even if no victims wanted it.
491
Although retributivism uses victims to define the core prohibitions of
the criminal law (victim-relative norm violations) and to gauge the degree
of offenders' desert, the interests of victims are irrelevant. As Moore
plainly states, "I think victims should and must be ignored if you are claim-
484 Id.
485 Id.
486 Id. at 69-70.
487 Id. at 71.
488 Id. at 72.
489 Id.
490 Id. at 73.
491 MOORE, supra note 73, at 89 (footnote omitted).
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ing to be doing retributive theory. '492 The victim's interest in if, or how
much, an offender should be punished is simply irrelevant to, and inconsis-
tent with, retributive punishment. As Moore explains:
[V]ictims have no say when we leave the general punishment grading scheme
set up by the democratic legislature for a court's application of that scheme to
a particular offender. What the victim wants by way of amount or kind of pun-
ishment, whether a certain process makes the victim happy or sad, is simply ir-
relevant to how a court should proceed in a criminal case.4 93
Regardless of whether accommodating the interests of victims involves
victims seeking increased punishment or leniency for the offender, accom-
modating such interests is irrelevant and inconsistent with retributive pun-
ishment. Taking into account the interests of victims who want to see their
victimizers suffer is not retributive justice. According to Moore, that is
"corrective justice and not retributive justice. '494  Implementing such a
scheme of victim vengeance, "doesn't look retributive; it looks compensa-
tory to the victim. Punishment in such a scheme turns on the victims decid-
ing what they want, not on what justice demands. '495 Similarly for Moore,
accommodating victims' interest in leniency is incompatible with retributiv-
ism. As Moore proclaims, "The propensity of a victim to forgive her trans-
gressor is irrelevant to retributive desert. '496 Moore further adds that
"retributive justice demands that culpable wrongdoers suffer, irrespective of
whether or not those they wrong wish it."'497 As Richard Murphy notes,
"With retributivism, any considerations of the victim or of society, at least
after the crime has been committed, are irrelevant. '498 According to Moore,
"doing justice is the essence of retributive punishment and... victims have
neither any moral right nor expertise to say how our legal institutions
should achieve such justice. '499 Moore "conclude[s] that such victim-say
over punishment is inconsistent with retributivism. 5 00
Even theorists advocating that the interests of victims should be taken
into account in formulating a theory of punishment have recognized that the
resulting theory of punishment cannot be retributive. 50 1 Though previously
492 Moore, supra note 26, at 67.
493 Id. at 75.
494 Id. at 75-76.
495 Id. at 76.
496 Id. at 77.
497 Id. at 78.
498 Richard S. Murphy, The Significance of Victim Harm: Booth v. Maryland and the Philosophy of
Punishment in the Supreme Court, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1303, 1308 (1988).
499 Moore, supra note 26, at 89.
500 Id.
501 Moore cites this as further support for his position that taking into account the interests of vic-
tims is incompatible with retributivism. Id. at 66-67, 75-76, 76 n.23. But see George Fletcher, The
Place of Victims in the Theory of Retribution, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 51, 63 (1999) (advocating that ac-
ceding to victims' interests as to the punishment of the offender and giving the victim a special role at
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a retributivist, Jeffrie Murphy acknowledges that in advocating for the in-
clusion of victim preference as to whether and to what extent an offender
should be punished, he is no longer a retributivist.502 Randy Barnett has
proposed an alternative theory of punishment based on restitution to the vic-
tim °5 0 3 Barnett acknowledges that such a scheme would not be compatible
with retributivism but would instead replace it.
50
4
In short, there is purportedly no conceptual place within retributive
punishment to accommodate the interests of victims, to treat victims as ends
in themselves.
3. The Use of Victims as Mere Means.-Demonstrating the conclu-
sion in step 3, the critical step in the argument that retributivism uses vic-
tims as mere means, will be comparatively more difficult. Steps 1 and 2 are
presumably proven to satisfaction because retributivists themselves ex-
pressly make the arguments comprising those steps. Though I will argue
that step 3-retributivism treats victims as mere means-follows from steps
1 and 2, I will be unable to use retributivists' express arguments to establish
it. Naturally, given retributivism's reliance on Kant's maxim as a principal
criticism of consequentialist theories of punishment, retributivists would be
loath to expressly admit to my conclusion in step 3. I will argue that re-
tributivism's express agreement with steps 1 and 2 entails retributivism's
(however reluctant) acceptance of the conclusion of step 3. If successful,
the argument will demonstrate that one of retributivism's principal argu-
ments against consequential theories of punishment applies to itself.5 05
To summarize the argument thus far, victims are used as the necessary
means to determine the desert and punishment of an offender (step 1), but
their interests as ends in themselves are ignored, are irrelevant, and are in-
consistent with determining the desert and punishment of an offender (step
2). Combining steps 1 and 2, retributive punishment uses victims as means
in determining whether and to what extent an offender should be punished
without treating the victims as ends in themselves. If retributivism uses vic-
tims as means and fails to treat them as ends, then retributivism uses vic-
tims as mere means in order to determine if and to what extent offenders
should be punished. As a result, retributivism uses victims as mere means,
in violation of Kant's maxim, in order to treat their victimizers as ends in
trial is entirely compatible with retributivism).
502 Murphy, supra note 471, at 221-24.
503 Randy E. Barnett, Restitution: A New Paradgm of Criminal Justice, 87 ETHICS 279 (1977).
504 Randy Barnett, The Justice ofRestitution, 25 AM. J. JuRis. 117,120-121,127 (1980).
505 The argument that retributivism uses crime victims as mere means could conceivably apply to
some consequentialist theories as well. But there is significantly greater conceptual room within conse-
quentialism to take into account, as one of the many good consequences to be promoted by punishment,
the satisfaction of victims' interests. My main point, however, is not so much to defend consequential-
ism as it is to demonstrate that the retributivist criticism-that consequentialism uses persons as mere
means-applies equally to retributivism.
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themselves.
Kant's categorical maxim to always treat persons as ends in themselves
rather than mere means"°6 is not only one of retributivism's principal justifi-
cations507 but also a principal criticism of consequential theories of punish-
ment.50 8 That retributivism may violate Kant's maxim therefore undercuts
retributivism's justification as well as demonstrates that retributivism fares
no better than consequential theories. Since treating persons as ends in
themselves is a purported feature of retributivist, but not of consequential-
ist, theories, the criticism's application to retributivism is even more
damaging.
If the above argument is true, then retributivism treats victimizers as
ends but victims as mere means whereas the converse may hold with re-
spect to consequentialist theories: they treat victimizers as mere means and
victims as ends.50 9 Perhaps from the perspective of Kantian morality it is
just as wrong to treat victimizers as mere means as it is to treat victims as
mere means. Nonetheless, our intuitions may inform us that treating vic-
tims as mere means, as retributivism does, is worse than treating victimizers
as mere means (as consequentialism arguably does). Arguably, if faced
with a choice between using one or the other as mere means it would be
preferable to treat culpable wrongdoers rather than innocent victims as mere
means. It seems morally worse to sacrifice the interests of innocent victims
in order to respect culpable wrongdoers as ends than to sacrifice the inter-
ests of culpable wrongdoers in order to respect innocent victims. Other-
wise, victims of crime are being victimized twice--once by the culpable
wrongdoers and then again by retributivism.
4. Can Retributivism Avoid the Claim That It Uses Victims as Mere
Means?.--How would retributivism avoid the conclusion, in step 3, that it
uses victims as mere means? There are two obvious ways, but both are
problematic. If either the premise in step 1 or the premise in step 2 did not
apply to retributivism, then, of course, the conclusion in step 3 would not
follow. Let us first consider the elimination of victim-relative norms from
retributivism (step 1). As Moore argued above, the core criminal prohibi-
tions involve the violations of victim-relative norms. Victims are "central,"
"are at the center," and "have a large place" in the formulation of such
norms.510 As Moore states, "[v]ictims... are important to retributive jus-
tice because the desert (that triggers a just punishment) is a function of the
violations of the rights of victims by offenders. 511 Just imagine formulat-
506 See supra text accompanying notes 407-408.
507 See supra notes 18, 414 and accompanying text.
508 See supra notes 397-398 and accompanying text.
509 A deterrence-based consequentialist theory might be said to treat victims as ends by punishing
offenders in order to reduce the incidence of their, and others', future crime victimization.
510 See supra text accompanying notes 488-490.
511 Moore, supra note 26, at 89.
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ing a moral norm or drafting a criminal statute prohibiting murder or rape
without making reference to a human victim.
Moore gives a specific example in which victims are used to determine
the proper amount of retributive punishment.5 12 Suppose a culpable wrong-
doer detonates one bomb that kills five people. Is the culpable wrongdoer
to be punished for one homicide or five? Even though the culpable wrong-
doer only committed one act, he will be punished for five homicides.
Moore argues that this result only makes sense by reference to the centrality
of victims in our victim-relative norms.5 13 In other words, victims are used
as a device or means to determine the desert of an offender who with one
act causes multiple homicides. Without using victims, how would we be
able to make sense of the determination that the offender's desert includes
five homicides rather than one? Moreover, without using victims it would
be difficult to punish for homicides at all.
In light of the centrality of victim-relative norms to retributive punish-
ment, the elimination of step 1 does not seem to be a promising avenue for
retributivism to avoid the criticism that it uses crime victims as mere means.
Though it would no longer be using victims as mere means (by foregoing
victim-relative norms), retributivism would be unable to properly determine
the appropriate desert for violations of victim-relative norms. Moreover,
the very formulation of norms that comprise the core of criminal law, vic-
tim-relative norms, would be jeopardized if not impossible.
Let us consider the elimination of step 2. According to the arguments
of Moore and Murphy above, accommodating the interests of victims as to
if, and how much, an offender should be punished is inconsistent with re-
tributivism. Therefore, by accommodating the interests of victims, one
would no longer be doing retributive punishment. As a result, it seems that
retributivism can avoid the criticism that it uses crime victims as mere
means but at the cost of no longer having a retributive theory of punish-
ment. For a retributivist then, the cure would be worse than the malady.
Therefore, elimination of step 2 is likewise an unpromising avenue for re-
tributivism to avoid the conclusion in step 3.
It would seem that retributivists must look elsewhere to avoid the claim
that retributivism uses crime victims as mere means. Let us now consider
some arguments that retributivists might make to resist the conclusion in
step 3.
C. Objections
Since the claim that retributivism treats crime victims as mere means is
quite radical, let us try to anticipate some possible objections. Four possi-
ble objections to the argument that retributivism violates the Kantian
512 Id. at 71.
513 Id. at 71-72.
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maxim will be presented and countered. First, Kant's injunction against us-
ing persons as mere means does not, and should not, apply to crime victims.
Second, though retributivism may use crime victims as mere means, it does
not do so intentionally. Third, though retributivism may use crime victims
as means, it does not use them as mere means. Fourth, retributivism does
not use crime victims in any way at all.
1. Kant's Maxim Does Not, and Should Not, Apply to Retibutivism 's
Use of Crime Victims.-One could object that although retributivism might
use crime victims as mere means, Kant's injunction does not (and should
not) apply to a punishment authority's use of crime victims in punishing of-
fenders. In other words, while Kant's maxim applies to a punishment sys-
tem's treatment of offenders, who are directly involved, the victims of
crime are too remote to the process and only peripherally involved.
The objection, however, is unpersuasive. Kant does not limit the ap-
plication of his maxim to certain persons. Those not to be used as mere
means include all of humanity. As Kant, in perhaps the most famous for-
mulation of the maxim, declares: "Act so that you treat humanity, whether
in your own person or that of another, always as an end and never as a
means only."' 14 Therefore, by Kant's plain language, crime victims, as part
of humanity, would seem to be included among those who must not be used
as mere means. But perhaps a retributivist might argue that Kant's plain
language should not be dispositive.
As discussed above, the scope of Kant's maxim might be interpreted
more narrowly.515 O'Neill allows that Kant's maxim might not apply quite
so strictly with respect to "those who will in any case be no more than spec-
tators. 516 But according to O'Neill, Kant's maxim does apply to those who
are "closely involved in or affected by" a course of action. Under this view,
the objection might gain some traction if crime victims might be conceived
of as "spectators" to the punishment of their victimizers rather than "closely
involved in or affected by" the punishment. While the degree to which
crime victims are affected by the punishment of their victimizers (or lack
thereof) will surely vary, clearly there are many crime victims who are
greatly affected 17 by the quantity and quality of the punishment that the
victimizer receives. 518 These victims,519 even under this narrower interpre-
514 KANT, supra note 407, at 46 (emphasis added).
515 See supra text accompanying notes 437-438.
516 O'NEILL, supra note 423, at 110.
517 See, e.g., Jim Yardley, In Oklahoma Ciy, Delay Brings Even More Anguish, N.Y. TIMES, May
12, 2001, at A12 (describing the "anguish," "frustration," and "anger" felt by survivors and victims of
the Oklahoma City federal building bombing over the delay in Timothy McVeigh's execution).
518 See generally GEORGE FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: VICIMS' RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL
TRIALS (1995) (discussing the variety of ways that victims are affected by the trials and punishments of
their victimizers). See particularly id. at 194, discussing how particular victims would be greatly af-
fected by a more active role at trial.
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tation of the scope of Kant's maxim, would clearly be included among the
group of persons that a system of punishment should not use as mere
means.
2. Retributivism Does Not Intentionally Use Crime Victims as Mere
Means.-Retributivism's use of victims as mere means might be insulated
from criticism by invocation of some variant on the doctrine of double ef-
fect.5 20 Perhaps, retributivists might argue, even though it is foreseen that
some unknown victims will be used as mere means, that they are so used is
not intentional. Unlike the claim that retributivism only unintentionally
uses offenders as mere means, 521 retributivists cannot plausibly claim that
the theory's use of crime victims as mere means in order to treat offenders
as ends is unintentional. Retributivists expressly claim that, after the com-
mission of a crime, the interests, preferences, and concerns of the crime's
victim are to be ignored and are irrelevant.522 Moreover, to give any say to
victims as to the punishment of the offender is inconsistent, and incompati-
ble, with retributivism. 523 Given these explicit rejections of a conceptual
space within retributivism for victims as ends in themselves, retributivists
could hardly claim it to be unintentional.
519 To provide an admittedly atypical example of how a victim may be affected by the punishment
of her victimizer consider the following hypothetical based on a Law & Order television episode: Sup-
pose that a borderline mentally retarded 18-year old girl is in a state-sponsored program to "mainstream"
her into the general population of a high school. The rationale behind mainstreaming her is that if she is
placed into an environment where she is expected to be "normal" it will foster and encourage her to be-
come more "normal." As part of the mainstreaming process, other students are not informed of her con-
dition. In the high school, she has sexual relations with a nonretarded 18-year old boy from the school.
School administrators find out, report it to the police and the boy is put on trial for rape. The girl testi-
fies that she liked the boy, that she did want to have sexual relations with him, that she enjoyed it, and
that she would like to have sexual relations with him again. The prosecuting attorney nonetheless
claims that the girl's mental retardation precluded her ability to consent as a matter of law. The boy
eventually admits that he realized that she was not entirely "normal" and thus was at least reckless as to
whether she could properly consent. In a statement to the jury, the girl pleads with the jury not to con-
vict the defendant, not out of concern for him, but for herself. She says that she understands that she is
considered to be partially mentally retarded, but that in her own mind's eye she considers herself to be
"normal." If the boy is convicted and punished she understands that in the view of the community she
would be considered abnormal and a freak. It would be a violation of her image of herself to be judged
lacking the capacity to consent. Nonetheless, the boy is convicted and punished. See Law & Order:
Damaged (NBC television broadcast, May 6, 1998).
Though, with respect to the boy, justice may well have been done, are we so sure that justice was
done with respect to the girl? Is the girl, the putative victim of the crime, treated with respect and dig-
nity? Are her interests vindicated? Is she treated as an end-in-herself? Or is she used as a mere means
in order for the defendant to be given his just deserts?
520 See supra notes 305-308 and accompanying text.
521 See supra text accompanying notes 462-466 for a possible retributivist response to Dolinko's
claim that retributivism uses offenders as mere means by maintaining necessarily fallible punishment
institutions.
522 See supra text accompanying notes 491-493.
523 See supra text accompanying note 500.
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3. Retributivism Uses Crime Victims as Means But Not as Mere
Means.-Though retributivism uses victims as means because of the neces-
sity of victim-relative norms, and does not treat victims as ends because it
ignores their interests, nonetheless it might be argued that retributivism
does not use victims as mere means. That is, retributivism treats victims, in
part, as ends. Retributivism might be said to treat victims as ends in view
of some of the metaphoric justifications of retributivism. Retributivism is
said to express solidarity with victims, 524 restore a relation of equality be-
tween the victim and offender,525 counteract a dominance-submission rela-
tionship between offender and victim, 526 and free a victim's blood or life
spirit from the control of the offender.527 All of this rhetoric, it might be ar-
gued, suggests that retributivism is very much treating victims as ends.
Nevertheless, the objection that retributivism treats victims, at least in
part, as ends is unpersuasive. First, as Moore notes, this metaphoric rheto-
ric embodies a slide from retributivism into consequentialism. 528 For re-
tributivism to be justified by counteracting dominance or restoring equality
or vindicating the victim in some way suggests that it is attempting to pro-
mote some future state of affairs or good consequences. Punishment of de-
serving wrongdoers is thereby not intrinsically good but rather an
instrumental good by which the victim may be vindicated. It might be re-
plied that the good consequences to be promoted (vindication of the victim)
are not factually or contingently consequential but only conceptually conse-
quential.529 As such, vindicating the victim is a conceptual consequence of
retributive punishment but does not constitute a slide into the factual or
contingent consequentialism of deterrence theories of punishment. Whether
or not the promotion of merely conceptual consequences fails to slide into
consequentialism will be discussed in Part VI.
But even if we accept that justifying punishment by its promotion of
conceptual consequences does not slide into consequentialism, the very fact
that the vindication of victims is only conceptual or abstract underscores
that victims are not treated as ends in themselves. Some abstract concept is
promoted, rather than the actual interests of flesh and blood victims. 530 The
conceptual consequence, and not the actual victim, is treated as an end. As
a result, retributivism fails to treat the victim as an end.
Second, if the claim is that retributivism treats victims as ends, despite
524 FLETCHER, supra note 518, at 201-05.
525 HEGEL, supra note 22, at 124 (§ 99).
526 George Fletcher, Blackmail: The Paradigmatic Crime, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1617, 1634-35
(1993).
527 DAVID DAUBE, STUDIES IN BILICAL LAW 122-23 (1947) (explaining the biblical basis for
Kant's notion of"bloodguilt"); see Fletcher, supra note 501, at 60-61.
528 Moore, supra note 26, at 82-83.
529 See infra text accompanying notes 577-578.
530 See supra note 471.
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ignoring their interests, then retributivism is subject to the same criticism
retributivists have leveled against rehabilitative theories of punishment.
Retributivists have criticized rehabilitative approaches as paternalistic, de-
meaning, and disrespectful of offenders by giving offenders not what they
deserve but rather the therapeutic treatment that they need.531 By imple-
menting treatment on the offender's behalf but against the offender's pref-
erences, rehabilitative punishment makes the offender not a rational subject
or moral person, but rather an object.53 2 Rehabilitative punishment theories,
retributivists maintain, treat offenders as less than rational, choosing beings.
Herbert Morris, in an influential article, explains what is entailed by the re-
habilitative theory treating offenders as things or animals:
When we treat a human being merely as an animal or some inanimate object
our responses to the human being are determined, not by his choices, but ours
in disregard of or with indifference to his. And when we "look upon" a person
as less than a person or not a person, we consider the person as incapable of ra-
tional choice.5
33
In contrast, Morris describes how retributivism treats offenders as persons
or ends: "We treat a human being as a person provided, first, we permit the
person to make the choices that will determine what happens to him and,
second, when our responses to the person are responses respecting the per-
son's choices.
'534
If retributivism may be said to treat victims as ends (despite ignoring,
and finding irrelevant, their interests) by punishing offenders on their be-
half, retributivism is treating victims in the same way-paternalistically and
as less than persons-that retributivists criticize rehabilitative theories for
treating offenders. Suppose a victim does not want her victimizer punished
at all or wants leniency or is opposed to the type of punishment the offender
will receive, for example, capital punishment or chemical castration.1
3
1
Suppose further that a system of retributive punishment nonetheless deter-
mines that the offender shall be punished against the victim's wishes. If it
is still maintained that the punishment is on behalf of the victim or to vindi-
cate the victim's interests, then is this not paternalism? Is this not a claim
531 See, e.g., MURPHY, supra note 113, at 134-35; C.S. Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of Pun-
ishment, in CONTEMPORARY PUNISHMENT: VIEWS, EXPLANATIONS, AND JUSTIFICATIONS 194-99 (Ru-
dolph J. Gerber & Patrick D. McAnany eds., 1972).
532 See MURPHY, supra note 113, at 134-35.
533 MORRIS, supra note 6, at 46.
534 Id. at 48-49.
535 See, e.g., Sara Rimer, Victims Not of One Voice on Execution of McVeigh, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25,
2001, at Al (noting that some victims and survivors of Timothy McVeigh's 1995 bombing of the federal
building in Oklahoma City oppose McVeigh receiving the death penalty); Candidate Who Murdered
Opponent Gets Life, No Parole, USA TODAY, Aug. 24, 2000, at A3 (reporting that family members of
Tennessee State Senator Tommy Burks, who was murdered by his opponent in the 1998 senate election,
asked prosecutors not to seek the death penalty).
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that the victim is an object to be vindicated, but not a rational human being
whose choices are to be respected? Is not the victim being treated with, as
Morris puts it, "disregard of or with indifference to"536 her choices?
Consider also Kant's suggestion that only young children and the in-
sane may be treated as ends or persons when we act in violation of their ex-
pressed interests: "I cannot do good to anyone in accordance with my
concepts of happiness (except to young children and the insane), thinking to
benefit him by forcing a gift upon him; rather, I can benefit him only in ac-
cordance with his concepts of happiness. 5 s3 7 The Kantian principles of be-
neficence and respect for others as persons require that we recognize and
share the ends of others as their ends and not paternalistically take them
over as our ends, as we see fit.538 In other words, retributivism cannot per-
suasively claim to be treating victims as ends in themselves by claiming to
promote aims or ends that the victims themselves do not share.
The claim that retributivism treats victims as ends by punishing of-
fenders to vindicate the victims in some way, despite ignoring and finding
irrelevant the victims' interests, subjects retributivism to the same criticism
retributivists have made against rehabilitative theories of punishment. Re-
tributivists have found the criticism to be a sufficient basis to reject the re-
habilitative theory of punishment. Unless retributivists wished the same
criticism to be applied to retributivism, presumably they would not wish to
make the claim that retributivism treats victims as ends (while ignoring
their interests). As a result, retributivism may be forced to concede that it
fails to treat victims as ends.
To summarize, retributivists might argue that the various metaphorical
justifications of retributivism, amounting to a vindication of the victim in
some way or another, constitute treating crime victims, at least in part, as
ends in themselves. Two responses demonstrate the failings of this argu-
ment. First, justifying punishment by some form of conceptual or abstract
vindication of the victim only serves to underscore that the actual flesh-and-
blood victims are not being treated as ends-abstract ends are being pro-
moted, rather than the interests of actual victims. Second, retributivism's
vindicating a victim against the victim's interests subjects retributivism to
the charge of paternalistically treating crime victims as objects rather than
rational subjects-the same criticism retributivists have directed at rehabili-
tative theories of punishment. Therefore, the claim of conceptual vindica-
tion of the victim fails to alter the conclusion that retributivism uses crime
536 MORRIs, supra note 6, at 46.
537 KANT, supra note 22, at 248.
538 O'NEILL, supra note 423, at 115-16. As to the duty of respect, "[p]olicies ofrespect must rec-
ognize that other's maxims and projects are their maxims and projects. They must avoid merely tadng
over or achieving the aims of these maxims and projects, and must allow others the 'space' in which to
pursue them for themselves." Id. at 115. As to the duty of beneficence, "it is from the start antipatemal-
istic. The duty to seek others' happiness is always a duty to promote and share others' ends without tak-
ing them over .. " Id. at 116.
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victims as mere means.
4. Retributivism Does Not Use Crime Victims at Al.-Retributivists
might claim that retributivism, in its use of victim-relative norms, does not
use victims themselves in any way at all, but instead uses facts about vic-
tims. 539 If so, it might be argued, then retributivism is not using victims as
mere means in violation of Kant's maxim. For example, the use of a vic-
tim's consent to define what is and what is not a crime is not using the vic-
tim but using a fact about the victim-that she did or did not consent. The
definition of bias crimes based on features of a victim is not using the vic-
tim but using a fact about the victim-his religious, ethnic, racial, gender,
or sexual orientation features. Using the amount of harm sustained by a
victim to determine the amount of an offender's deserved punishment is not
using the victim but using a fact about the victim-the amount of harm sus-
tained by the victim. In all of these instances, it might be argued, retributiv-
ism is not using victims as mere means but merely using facts about victims
to treat offenders as ends in themselves.
The objection is problematic for a number of reasons. First, while the
means/ends distinction is notoriously elusive and ambiguous, 540 distinguish-
ing between the use of a person as a means and the use of a fact about that
person as a means may be even less clear. What criteria are we to apply to
determine whether what is being used as a mere means is a person or a fact
about that person? Without this being sufficiently elucidated, it may be
merely a matter of intuition as to whether a particular instance of "using as
a mere means" falls into the category of person or fact about a person.
Since it is retributivism that touts it does not use persons as mere means,
and severely criticizes consequentialist theories of punishment for doing so,
the burden would seem to be on retributivists to sufficiently define the dis-
tinction upon which the claimed superiority of their theory, and the claimed
inferiority of consequentialist theories, depends. After all, since it is re-
tributivists who have wielded the argument as a sword against consequen-
tialist theories of punishment, retributivists cannot use the dullness of the
sword as a shield now that its point is facing retributivism.
Second, the objection is belied by the express language of a leading re-
tributivist, Michael Moore. Moore and others claim that retributivism de-
pends on victims themselves, not on facts about victims. For example, it is
victims, not facts about victims, who "are central to the norms whose viola-
tion justifies punishment for a retributivist;" 541 it is victims who have a
"large place" in retributive punishment;542 and it is victims "who are at the
center of the norms whose violation is at the core of criminal law."543
539 I am indebted to Kent Greenawalt for suggesting this point.
540 See supra text accompanying notes 439-443.
541 Moore, supra note 26, at 73.
542 Id. at 72.
543 Id.
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Though there are a number of other examples, 544 consider finally the fol-
lowing statement by Moore: "Any kind of retributivist needs a norm viola-
tion to justify punishment. It is at this point that victims come in
substantively. Victims come in as part of the content of those norms."5 45 In
all of these examples, it is the use of victims, not facts about victims, that is
necessary for retributivism.
It might still be claimed that one retributivist's framing of the issue in
terms of victims does not preclude other retributivists from claiming that
what is being used is'facts about victims. While this is true, the cited lan-
guage at least demonstrates the plausibility of the claim that it is victims,
and not facts about victims, which are being used by retributivism.
Third, let us assume arguendo that retributivism does not use victims at
all, either because retributivism instead uses facts about victims or for some
other reason. Even if retributivism does not use crime victims, it nonethe-
less fails to treat crime victims as ends in themselves. To satisfy Kant's
maxim it is not enough to avoid using persons as means; persons must also
be affirmatively treated as ends. As Kant tells us, "a man cannot be used
merely as a means by any man (either by others or even by himself) but
must always be used at the same time as an end. '546 The duty is, therefore,
not only negative but positive as well. The negative component is satisfied
by not using someone merely as a means; the positive component is satis-
fied by always treating someone, at least in part, as an end in herself.547 As
Kantian scholar O'Neill, in interpreting Kant's maxim, explains, "[m]erely
not to be used is not enough for being treated as a person.
548
Because after the commission of the crime, victims' interests, prefer-
ences, wants, needs, and concerns are "ignored" 549 and treated as "irrele-
vant, 550 retributivism fails to treat crime victims as ends in themselves.
551
If victims' interests are ignored and irrelevant, then retributivism is entirely
indifferent to the interests of victims. But treating others with indifference
is, according to one conventional view of Kant's maxim, failing to treat
them as persons or ends in themselves.552  Or as Kant himself explains,
treating others with mere indifference is not enough to avoid using others as
mere means: "it is not enough that he is not authorized to use either himself
544 See generally supra section V.B.1.
545 Moore, supra note 26, at 69 (emphasis added).
546 KANT, supra note 22, at 255 (emphasis added).
547 O'NEILL, supra note 423, at 113 ("[here are two separate aspects to treating others as persons:
The maxim must not use them (negatively) as mere means, but must also (positively) treat them as ends-
in-themselves." (citation omitted)).
548 Id. at 105.
549 Moore, supra note 26, at 67.
550 Id. at 75; Murphy, supra note 498, at 1308; see SADURSKI, supra note 270, at 241.
551 See generally supra section V.B.3.
552 O'NEILL, supra note 423, at 106 (viewing this criterion as a relevant but not fundamental con-
ception of failing to treat persons as ends in themselves).
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or others merely as means (since he could then still be indifferent to them);
it is in itself his duty to make man in general his end.
553
In other words, the validity of step 2 in our argument-that retributiv-
ism finds the interests of crime victims as ends to be irrelevant-is, by it-
self, sufficient to establish that retributivism runs afoul of Kant's maxim
even if retributivism does not use crime victims in any way..
Fourth, let us assume arguendo that the distinction between using per-
sons and using facts about persons as mere means is tenable and that re-
tributivism only uses facts about victims, but not victims themselves, as
mere means. If so, then consequentialists can use the same distinction to
avoid the criticism by retributivists that deterrence-based theories of pun-
ishment use offenders as mere means to promote the reduction of crime.
Retributivists have criticized deterrence-based theories for not justify-
ing actual punishment but merely the perception or appearance of punish-
ment.554 This is because if an offender is punished but the public is
unaware, the good of general deterrence is lost.555 In addition, the benefit
of deterrence may be obtained by merely pretending to punish rather than
by actually punishing an offender.556 Therefore, what does the real work of
deterrence is not actual punishment but the publicity of punishing.5 57 Thus,
a deterrence-based theory does not justify actual punishment but merely the
perception of punishment.5 8 (Of course, to make the perception of pun-
ishment credible, offenders might, at least occasionally, have to be actually
punished.)
559
Let us assume arguendo that the above retributivist critique of the de-
terrence-based theory is valid. Could not consequentialists claim that it is
not offenders themselves who are being used as mere means to attain deter-
rence but instead a fact about offenders, or rather, a perceived fact? Essen-
tially, the fact, or perceived fact, that the offenders are being punished, and
not the offenders themselves, is what deterrence-based theories use to attain
the end of crime reduction. Thus, not only do deterrence-based consequen-
tialist theories not use offenders as mere means, but they do not use them as
means at all. In this way, consequentialism could avoid the retributivist's
criticism that it uses offenders as mere means.
So, where does this leave us? Against the charge that retributivism
uses crime victims as mere means to attain the end of retributive punish-
ment, I have suggested that retributivism might employ a distinction be-
tween using persons as mere means and using facts about persons as mere
553 KANT, supra note 22, at 198.
554 See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
555 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
556 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
557 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
558 Id.
559 See supra note 66.
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means. Retributivists might claim that retributivism only uses facts about
crime victims as mere means to attain the end of retributive punishment of
deserving wrongdoers. Thus, it does not use crime victims themselves as
mere means. But if so, the deterrence-based theory of punishment may em-
ploy the same distinction to escape criticism that it uses offenders as mere
means to attain the end of deterrence. If the utilization of the distinction is
valid, deterrence-based theories equally do not use offenders as mere means
but only facts, or perceived facts, about offenders.
In order to escape the same'criticism that retributivists have leveled
against consequentialism-using persons as mere means-retributivism
must introduce a distinction that not only absolves itself, but also conse-
quentialism, from the criticism. The resulting situation is that either both
retributivism and consequentialism use persons as mere means or neither
theory uses persons as mere means. Either way, with respect to the criteria
of using persons as mere means, retributivism fares no better than conse-
quentialist theories of punishment.
In fact, retributivism might fare worse. After all, it is retributivism that
has touted treating persons as ends as a virtue of its theory and pointed to
consequentialism's failure to do so as a defect of that approach. If using
persons as mere means is a valid criticism of deterrence theories, it is still
only an external criticism. But if retributivism uses persons as mere means,
it is an internal criticism that contradicts one of the tenets of its theory.
Moreover, if any class of persons should be treated as mere means, it should
be victimizers and not victims. But retributivism gets it backward. It uses
victims as mere means in order to treat victimizers as ends in themselves.
Though consequentialism may use persons as mere means, at least it uses
victimizers as mere means in order to treat (future) innocent crime victims
as ends in themselves.
The ensuing "trilemma" for retributivism is that either a) it foregoes
punishment of violations of the core of criminal law, that is, victim-relative
norms, or b) it accommodates the interests of victims but ceases to be re-
tributive, or c) it runs afoul of the Kantian maxim by treating crime victims
as mere means, thereby violating one of retributivism's central tenets.
D. A Brief Digression: The Tension Within
Retributivism over Victims' Rights
The existence of the trilemma perhaps explains why "card-carrying"
Kantian deontologists like Jeffrie Murphy and George Fletcher feel the pull
of victims' rights and have taken, in Moore's term, "the victim's turn.
560
While Murphy has conceded that taking victims' interests into account ren-
ders his account of punishment no longer retributive, Fletcher maintains
that there is not only logical space within retributivism for victims' interests
560 Moore, supra note 26, at 67.
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but that a richer account of retributivism would include integrating the in-
terests of victims and doing justice to the suffering of victims. 561 Further-
more, Fletcher argues that victims should have a say in the plea-bargaining
and trial stages.
562
The debate between the retributivists Moore and F letcher5 63 reflects the
tension within retributivism itself. On the one hand, incorporating the in-
terests of the victim into a determination of the deserved punishment of the
victimizer seems incompatible with retributivism. On the other hand, using
one set of persons (crime victims)56 as mere means in order to treat another
set of persons (offenders) as ends in themselves, if not incompatible with
retributivism, renders retributivism subject to one of its principal criticisms
of consequentialism.
Moore suggests a possible way out of the trilemma. Accommodating
the interests of victims by taking into account their preferences as to if and
how much an offender should be punished is not violative of retributivism if
"victim preference is constitutive ofjustice .... -565 That is, rather than re-
tributivism requiring the punishment of deserving wrongdoers according to
their just deserts, a "rights-based retributivism" would give the victim the
right to decide if and to what extent566 punishment should be imposed. Re-
tributive justice would be satisfied, therefore, not when the offender is pun-
ished according to his desert but when the offender is punished (or not)
according to the victim's preferences.
Moore suggests three criticisms of this alternative form of retributiv-
ism. First, "rights-based retributivism" is no longer retributivism.5 67 It is
corrective justice providing compensation to the victim. 568 Second, it vio-
lates the principle of equality.569  Suppose culpable wrongdoers A and B
commit the same wrongdoing with the same culpability against victims C
and D, respectively. Victim C is forgiving and decides not to seek punish-
ment of A, but victim D seeks the maximum possible punishment of of-
561 Fletcher, supra note 501, at 55-63.
562 FLETCHER, supra note 518, at 188-201.
563 Moore's article, see supra note 26, is a response to Fletcher's article, see supra note 501, as to
whether consideration of victims' rights is compatible with retributivism.
56 It might also be argued that retributivism sacrificesfuture crime victims in order to do justice to
criminal offenders. Suppose that consequentialism does a better job of preventing crime than retributiv-
ism. Thus, while retributivism arguably does justice to the criminal, consequentialism does justice to
future innocent crime victims (by decreasing their numbers). As C.L. Ten has asked of punishment un-
der retributivism: "For whose benefit is punishment to be instituted? Surely not for the benefit of law-
abiding citizens who run an increased risk of being victims of crime. Why should innocent people suffer
for the sake of dispensing retributive justice?" C.L. Ten, supra note 29, at 369.
565 Moore, supra note 26, at 76.
56 Presumably, the victim's right to decide the extent of punishment would be constrained by the
limit of how much punishment "ordinary" retributivism would allow.
567 Moore, supra note 26, at 75-77.
568 Id. at 75-76.
569 Id. at 77.
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fender B. Though A and B seem equally deserving of punishment, A is not
punished at all and B is punished severely. If retributivism necessarily in-
volves desert-based punishment, and A and B have the same desert, then
"rights-based retributivism" allowing differential punishment of A and B
cannot be retributivism. Third, "rights-based retributivism" is simply
wrong: "retributive justice demands that culpable wrongdoers suffer, irre-
spective of whether or not those they wrong wish it."1
5 70
If Moore is correct in these criticisms of "rights-based retributivism,"
then there does not appear to be a satisfactory way out of the trilemma for
retributivism.
E. Conclusion
Perhaps the most fundamental criticism retributivists have leveled
against consequential theories of punishment is that they violate Kant's in-
junction against using persons (offenders) as mere means. Retributivists
claim that unlike consequentialism, their own theory gives offenders what
they deserve and thereby treats offenders as ends. But even if retributivism
does treat offenders as ends, it only does so by using crime victims as mere
means in violation of Kant's maxim. Because victim-relative norm viola-
tions are necessary for the imposition of retributive punishment, and treat-
ing crime victims as ends in themselves is irrelevant to, and incompatible
with, retributivism, that theory treats crime victims not as ends but as mere
means. Thus, the retributivist critique of consequentialist theories of pun-
ishment applies to retributivism itself.
A number of possible retributivist objections were considered and re-
jected. First, it might be argued that Kant's maxim does not (and should
not) apply to retributivism's use of crime victims as mere means. But
Kant's express language states that all humanity must be treated as an end
and not a mere means. As part of humanity, crime victims clearly fall
within the protection of Kant's injunction.
Second, it might be argued that retributivism only unintentionally uses
crime victims as mere means. But because of retributivists' express claims
of the necessary use of victim-relative norms, and their express claims as to
the irrelevance of victims' interests, retributivism intentionally uses crime
victims as mere means.
Third, it might be conceded that retributivism uses victims as means
but not as mere means. Retributivists might point to the various good ab-
stract or conceptual consequences promoted by retributivism-amounting
to a vindication of victims-reflecting retributivism's treatment of victims
as ends. That the end of punishment is some conceptual consequence,
however, only serves to underscore that some abstract concept is being
promoted rather than the actual interests of flesh and blood victims. In ad-
570 Id. at 78.
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dition, by claiming to vindicate victims, despite ignoring their interests, re-
tributivism is treating victims as objects rather than rational subjects-the
same criticism by which retributivists have found rehabilitative theories of
punishment untenable.
The fourth objection is that retributivism does not use victims at all;
rather, it uses facts about victims as mere means. Even if true, retributivism
still violates Kant's maxim by failing to satisfy the positive duty to treat
victims as ends in themselves. In addition, if retributivism only uses facts
about victims (but not victims themselves), then consequentialism could
equally avail itself of this claim. As a result, a deterrence-based theory does
not use the punishment of offenders as mere means, but only uses the fact,
or perceived fact that offenders are being punished, in order to promote the
good consequence of deterrence. Either way, as to Kant's injunction of
never treating persons as mere means but always as ends in themselves, re-
tributivism fares no better than consequential theories of punishment. To
the extent that retributivism can escape from the very same criticism it has
leveled against consequentialist theories, consequentialist theories equally
escape.
VI. CONCEPTUALLY CONSEQUENTIAL RETRIBUTIVISM'S PUNISHMENT OF
THE INNOCENT AND USE OF OFFENDERS AS MERE MEANS
For the most fundamental form of retributivism, which we have termed
simple or pure retributivism, the desert of those punished constitutes the
justification of punishment, and punishment is thereby an end in itself.5 71 In
contrast, conceptually consequential retributivism 7 2 justifies punishment
based on the abstract or conceptual consequences punishment generates.
These abstract or conceptual consequences are claimed to be meaningfully
distinct from the factual or contingent consequences that are promoted by
consequentialist theories of punishment. This Part will demonstrate that a
large class of retributivist theories--conceptually consequential retributiv-
ism-succumbs to the same criticisms that retributivists make about conse-
quentialism precisely because of its reliance on consequences to justify
punishment.
After explaining why retributivists are driven to resort to conse-
quences-albeit a special type of consequences-to justify punishment, we
will consider whether conceptually consequential retributivism collapses
into consequentialism. Even if it does not, the distinction between contin-
gent and conceptual consequences will be shown to be so slender as to al-
low a deterrence-based theory, justifying punishment by the conceptual
consequences of deterrence, to fall under the rubric of retributivism. And
even if it does not, the utilization of consequences makes conceptually con-
571 See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
57 For a brief explanation of this class of retributivism, see supra text accompanying notes 124-
126.
96:843 (2002)
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
sequential retributivism succumb to the same criticisms retributivists have
leveled against (contingently) consequentialist theories of punishment. Re-
gardless of the nature of the consequences used to justify punishment, the
employment of consequences in retributivism will be shown to justify the
intentional punishment of particular, identifiable innocents as well as the
use of offenders as mere means. In other words, while the conceptual na-
ture of the consequences used to justify punishment in retributive theories
may or may not prevent a slide into consequentialism, retributivism's use of
consequences (regardless of their nature) leads to the same problems as in-
curred by (contingently) consequentialist theories of punishment.
A. Conceptually Consequential Retributivism
This subpart will explain conceptually consequential retributivism. Af-
ter considering why retributivism might resort to consequences to justify
punishment, it will examine the distinction between actual and conceptual
consequences and will provide examples of conceptually consequential re-
tributivism. Next, it will contrast conceptually consequential retributivism
with both simple, or pure, retributivism as well as (contingent) consequen-
tialism. Finally, it will consider whether conceptually consequential re-
tributivism collapses into consequentialism.
1. Why Use Consequences? The Retributivism Dilemma: Circular-
ity or Slide into Consequentialism.-The existence of both the pure and the
conceptually consequential forms of retributivism may stem from the di-
lemma retributivism faces between circularity and collapse into consequen-
tialism. In attempting to justify simple or pure retributivism as the
preferable theory of punishment, one is limited in the types of arguments
that can be elicited without sliding into consequentialism. 573 But without
eliciting some additional argument apart from "it's right to punish criminals
because doing so is right," retributivism is widely regarded as circular or
empty. 574 Hugo Bedau succinctly states the problem for a retributivist:
573 HART, supra note 11, at 9 (contending that retributivist accounts "all either avoid the question of
justification altogether or are in spite of their protestations disguised forms of Utilitarianism"); Fletcher,
supra note 501, at 53 ("When intuitive retributivists are challenged they often retreat into a vague con-
sequentialism .... 
574 See, e.g., Benn, supra note 45, at 30 (noting that Kantian justification for retributivism serves
"not to justify punishment but, rather, to deny that it needs any justification"); Dolinko, supra note 12, at
517; Fletcher, supra note 501, at 53 ("Mhe intuitive [retributivist] argument that we must sanction evil
deeds with punishment hardly seems like an argument at all."); Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 28, at
1232 ("It seems that some defenders of the retributive view take it to be self-evidently correct Most
proponents of retributive theory do little more than assert [the validity of retributivism] .... "); id at
1233 (noting that retributivist justifications of punishment "seem virtually indistinguishable from re-
statements of the definition of the notion of retribution" (footnote omitted)); J.L. Mackie, Retributivism:
A Test Case for Ethical Objectivity, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 55, at 677, 679 ("'Desert' is not
a further explanation [of how punishment is justified under retributivism], but is just the general, as yet
unexplained, notion of positive retributivism itself."); Quinton, supra note 41, at 6 (retributivism consid-
954
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Either he [the retributivist] appeals to something else-some good end-that is
accomplished by the practice of punishment, in which case he is open to the
criticism that he has a nonretributivist, consequentialist justification for the
practice of punishment. Or his justification does not appeal to something else,
in which case it is open to the criticism that it is circular and futile.
575
Retributivists have two options in countering the problem of circularity
or emptiness. First, they might deny that the circularity is problematic.
Moore argues that retributivism is "no worse off than any other non-
utilitarian theories in ethics, each of which seek to justify an institution or
practice not by the good consequences it may engender but rather by the in-
herent rightness of the practice." 576 This might be a persuasive argument to
a fellow nonconsequentialist, but to a consequentialist it only demonstrates
the problem with nonconsequentialist theories and supports the adoption of
consequentialist views.
The second solution to the problem of circularity or emptiness in sim-
ple or pure retributivism is to avoid it altogether by justifying punishment in
terms of the good consequences that punishment generates. Though this
avoids one horn of the dilemma-circularity or emptiness-it triggers the
other. If retributivism is to avoid the charge of circularity or emptiness by
justifying punishment by the good consequences generated, then it is sub-
ject to the claim of collapsing into consequentialism.
Retributivists reply by invoking a distinction between actual and con-
ceptual consequences. 577  Consequentialist theories, such as deterrence or
rehabilitation, justify punishment by actual or contingent consequences.
These types of consequences are, in theory, subject to empirical verifica-
tion; they either occur or do not occur in the real world. A given instance of
punishment, or punishment in general, either promotes deterrence or it does
ers punishment to be "self-justifying").
Jeremy Bentham found the concept ofreiributivism to be little more than an intuition or feeling. It is
a "principle in name rather than in reality: it is not a positive principle of itself, so much as a term em-
ployed to signify the negation of all principle." BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES, supra note 57, at 16. Re-
tributivism aggrandizes one's feelings or intuitions "as a ground or standard for itself." Id. The
principle amounts to: "whatever you find in yourself a propensity to condemn, is wrong for that very
reason." Id. The principal is a contrived rationale "for avoiding the obligation of appealing to any ex-
ternal standard, and for prevailing upon the reader to accept of the author's sentiment or opinion as a
reason for itself." Id. at 17.
Interestingly, Bentham himself concedes that the principle of utility is also not susceptible to proof
and, moreover, denies the need for proof. Bentham asks, of the principle of utility, "Is it susceptible of
any direct proof?" Id at 4. Bentham answers as follows: "Wt should seem not: for that which is used to
prove every thing else, cannot itself be proved: a chain of proofs must have their commencement some-
where. To give such proof is as impossible as it is needless." Id.
575 Bedau, supra note 83, at 616. For a similar view, see Bern, supra note 457, at 327: "[W]hat
pass for retributivist justifications of punishment in general, can be shown to be either denials of the
need tojustify it, or mere reiterations of the principle to be justified, or disguised utilitarianism."
576 Michael Moore, Closet Retributivism, USC CITES 9, 15 (1982).
577 See DUFF, supra note 1, at 7; Fletcher, supra note 14, at 516.
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not. The justification of punishment, then, is contingent on the good conse-
quence being promoted. In contrast, conceptual consequences are claimed
to logically and necessarily follow punishment and therefore are not contin-
gent. The justification of punishment by conceptual consequences is not
contingent on being subject to empirical verification and whether or not
they actually occur in the real world. By resorting to merely conceptual,
rather than actual or contingent, consequences, conceptually consequential
retributivism is claimed not to collapse into consequentialism. 578
Conceptually consequential retributivism, then, may be seen as retribu-
tivism's answer to both horns of the above dilemma. Because punishment
is justified by something external to itself (punishment's consequences), the
charge of circularity or emptiness is avoided. And because the conse-
quences are conceptual, rather than actual or contingent, conceptually con-
sequential retributivism purportedly avoids collapsing into
consequentialism. This latter claim is subject to some dispute and will be
considered further below.
2. Examples.-Let us consider some examples of the class of retribu-
tivist theories that I have designated conceptually consequential retributiv-
ism. A wide variety of conceptual consequences are utilized to justify
punishment, including: expressing solidarity with victims, 57 9 restoring a re-
lation of equality between the will of the victim and of the offender,580 an-
nulling or negating the crime,581 avoiding the diminishment of society's
values,582 demonstrating the seriousness of the criminal conduct as some-
thing that should not have been done,583 voicing society's emphatic denun-
ciation of crime, 584 removing the advantage gained by the offender in freely
indulging his will,585 and negating the offender's advantage gained by his
renunciation of self-restraint. 586 Conceptually-consequential retributivists
also justify punishment on grounds such as: educating the offender,587 "re-
578 See DuFF, supra note 1, at 7; Fletcher, supra note 14, at 516.
579 FLETCHER, supra note 518, at 201-05. For a critique of expressive theories of punishment, see
Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363, 1414-
27 (2000).
580 HEGEL, supra note 22, at 124 (§ 99).
581 Id. at 123 (§ 97).
582 Oldenquist, supra note 17, at 750. Contra Benn, supra note 46, at 30 (arguing that retributivism
justifying punishment by its promotion of "respect for the law" "is surely to justify punishment by its
utility").
583 Herbert Morris, A Paternalistic Theory of Punishment, 18 AM. PHIL. Q. 263, 266 (1981).
584 REPORT OF THE ROYAL CoMMIssION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, Cmd. 8932 (1953), as cited in
HART, supra note 11, at 2, 7, 170 (Lord Denning's justification of punishment). For the view that de-
nunciatory theories are not retributive but utilitarian, see MOORE, supra note 73, at 90.
585 John Finnis, The Restoration of Retribution, 32 ANALYSIS 131, 134 (1971-72).
586 Murphy, supra note 6, at 14.
587 W.A. Parent, The Whole Life View of Criminal Desert, 86 ETHICS 350, 351-53 (1976).
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stor[ing] the equilibrium of benefits and burdens," 588 effecting "a connec-
tion with correct values for those who have flouted them,"589 counteracting
a dominance-submission relationship between offender and victim, 590 "re-
establish[ing] the acknowledgment of the victim's worth damaged by the
wrongdoing and... repair[ing] the damage done to the victim's ability to
realize her value,"591 "bring[ing] the criminal to understand the nature and
implications of her crime,"592 and freeing a victim's blood or life spirit from
the control of the offender.
5 93
It is not always clear, however, whether a purportedly retributive the-
ory utilizing consequences to justify punishment is employing actual or
conceptual consequences. Let us take for example Kant's theory of pun-
ishment. After posing a hypothetical of an island nation about to dissolve
and whose inhabitants would disperse throughout the world, Kant asks
whether the executions of the murderers still on death row should be carried
out even though there will be no deterrent effect (because the society is
about to disband).5 94 Kant answers that every murderer must be executed so
that "blood guilt does not cling to the people for not having insisted upon
this punishment; for otherwise the people can be regarded as collaborators
in this public violation of justice."5 95 How should Kant's justification for
executing the murderers on death row be classified? Simple or pure retribu-
tivism is purported to be retrospective and immune to the push or pull of the
future consequences of punishment.596 But Kant is clearly attempting to
justify retributive punishment by invoking a prospective perspective. Kant
is seeking to justify punishment by recourse to the bad future consequences
that would befall others if murderers were not executed. Punishment is jus-
tified because it eliminates the bad consequences of blood guilt clinging to
members of society and the people being complicit in a public miscarriage
of justice. So, if it is not simple or pure retributivism-because conse-
quences are employed to justify the punishment-are the consequences ac-
tual or conceptual?
A retributivist might reply that we should not take Kant's metaphysical
588 MoRmus, supra note 6, at 34. The full quote is as follows: "Justice--that is punishing-such in-
dividuals--restores the equilibrium of benefits and burdens by taking from the individual what he owes,
that is, exacting the debt." Id.
589 NozicK, supra note 104, at 384. For the view that Nozick's theory collapses into consequential-
ism, see C.L. TEN, supra note 35, at 45-46.
590 Fletcher, supra note 526, at 1634-35.
591 Hampton, supra note 5, at 1686.
592 DUFF, supra note 1, at 259.
593 See DAuBE, supra note 527, at 122-23 (explaining the Biblical basis for Kant's notion of blood
guilt); see also Fletcher, supra note 501, at 60.
594 KANT, supra note 22, at 142.
595 Id.
596 See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
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musings on blood guilt too seriously.597 All that is meant is that punishment
precludes other members of society from being complicit in the crime.
598
The good to other members of society that comes from avoiding blood guilt
and complicity in the crime is only an abstract, conceptual good or conse-
quence.599 But it is not clear that what Kant is referring to is only abstract
and conceptual.600 Kant's theory has been said to carry clearly consequen-
tialist strains,601  appeal to "unmistakenly consequentialist" considera-
tions, 60 2 invoke "utilitarian considerations... irreconcilable with his main
doctrine," 603 and be consequentialist as to the threat6°4 of punishment.
605
Perhaps beneath the fancy language of blood guilt and complicity in crime
597 See FLETCHER, supra note 46, at 37-38.
598 Id. at 38.
599 See Fletcher, supra note 14, at 516.
600 For the view that the consequences by which Kant's theory justifies the punishment of the mur-
ders on death row are symbolic or conceptual, see Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punish-
ment, 49 MONIST 3 (1965), reprinted in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT, supra note 34,
at 25, 33.
601 See Murphy, supra note 249, at 509 ("It is no longer clear to me to what extent it is proper to
continue to think of Kant as a paradigm retributivist in the theory of punishment."). Murphy, a Kantian
scholar and former retributivist, goes on to list 14 passages from throughout Kant's writings that reveal a
lack of commitment to retributivism and explicit leanings toward consequentialism. Id. at 5 13-16. In
one such passage, Kant seems to declare himself a consequentialist: Punishments "'imposed by govern-
ments are always deterrent. They are meant to deter the sinner himself or to deter others by making an
example of him."' Id. at 513 (quoting Immanuel Kant, Universal Practical Philosophy, in LECTURES
ON ETHICS 55 (Louis Infield trans., 1978)). Murphy summarizes the 14 passages as follows:
To summarize, justified punishment is a deterrence system finctioning to maintain a system of or-
dered liberty of action. To set any more morally ambitious goal for punishment would be to adopt
an unacceptable theory of the role of the state and would represent an attempt to play God ....
Punishment is a necessary evil, but we should inflict and support it with regret and without any
sense of having embarked on a moral crusade.
Murphy, supra note 249, at 517-18.
602 Cottingham, supra note 116, at 243-44 (arguing that Kant is justifying punishment by "unmis-
takenly consequentialist" considerations, namely the avoidance of the bad consequences that would oc-
cur if crime is not punished).
603 EWING, supra note 57, at 16 n.1. Ewing refers to a passage in which Kant suggests that conse-
quentialist concerns justify deviations from the lex talionis. Kant carves out an exception to his view
that murder always requires capital punishment. If capital punishment would sufficiently depopulate the
state or desensitize the subjects to violence, a different punishment could be imposed. As Kant explains:
If, however, the number of accomplices (correi) to such a deed is so great that the state, in order to
have no such criminals in it, could soon find itself without subjects; and if the state still does not
want to dissolve, that is, to pass over into the state of nature, which is far worse because there is no
external justice at all in it (and if it especially does not want to dull the people's feeling by the
spectacle of a slaughterhouse), then the sovereign must also have it in his power ... [to] pro-
nounce a judgment that decrees for the criminals a sentence other than capital punishment, such as
deportation, which still preserves the population.
KANT, supra note 22, at 143 (footnote omitted).
6W See generally Sharon Byrd, Kant's Theory of Punishment: Deterrence in Its Threat, Retribution
in Its Execution, 8 LAW & PHIL. 151 (1989).
605 For other evidence from Kant's writings of some leanings toward consequentialism, see supra
note 76 and accompanying text.
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is the very ordinary, concrete, and nonconceptual emotion of guilt. That is,
punishment is imposed in order to avoid feeling guilty about not punish-
ing.
606
3. Does Conceptually Consequential Retributivism Collapse into
Consequentialism?-Rather than attempt to ascertain whether Kant's the-
ory of punishment, or any particular retributive theory,607 collapses into
06 Retributivists have placed great stock in our emotions regarding crime and punishment. Anger,
hatred, and outrage are not merely defended and legitimized, but celebrated and glorified as appropriate
retributive responses to crime. JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 94-
95 (1988); Moore, supra note 119, at 210; Samuel H. Pillsbury, Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Pas-
sions of Criminal Punishment, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 655, 671-72 (1989); Roger Wertheimer, Under-
standing Retribution, 2 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Summer-Fall 1983, at 19, 23. The intensity and
appropriateness of such emotions are even used to justify the institution of retributive punishment. See
Murphy, supra note 471, at 215.
Given this centrality of emotions, particularly guilt, in retributive thinking, it is not a stretch to con-
clude that avoiding the abstract ends of blood guilt and complicity entail avoiding the very concrete guilt
feelings generated by a failure to mete out retributive justice. Thus there is some basis to argue that de-
serving wrongdoers, by being punished, are treated as means to prevent others from feeling guilt under a
retributive theory of punishment.
607 In addition to Kant's theory being accused of collapsing into consequentialism, the other theory
exerting a powerful influence on retributivism-Hegel's-is also charged with collapsing into conse-
quentialism. Hegel's view is that punishment negates or annuls the crime or wrongdoing. But it is
claimed to collapse into utilitarianism or consequentialism:
The doctrine of "annulment," however carefully wrapped up in obscure phraseology, is clearly
utilitarian in principle. For it holds that the function of punishment is to bring about a state of af-
fairs in which it is as if the wrongful act had never happened. This is to justify punishment by its
effects, by the desirable future consequences which it brings about.
Quinton, supra note 41, at 7-8. Hegel's theory also appears to be consequentialist in determining the
degree of desert and punishment. The degree of an offender's punishment is, at least in part, a function
of the danger it poses to society at a particular time. For Hegel, crime's
danger to civil society is a determination of its magnitude .... This quality or magnitude varies,
however, according to the condition of civil society, and this is the justification both for attaching
the death penalty to a theft of a few pence or of a turnip, and for imposing a lenient punishment for
a theft of a hundred and more times these amounts.
HEGEL, supra note 22, at 251 (§ 218). Hegel sets the degree of punishment for a particular crime based
upon the incidence of crime in, or the stability of, a particular society:
If society is still inwardly unstable, punishments must be made to set an example, for punishment
itself is a counter-example to the example of crime. But in a society which is internally stable, the
positedness of crime is so weak that the cancellation (Aufhebung] of this positedness must itself
assume similar proportions. Thus, harsh punishments are not unjust in and for themselves, but are
proportionate to the conditions of their time ....
Id. at 251 (§ 218) (Addition).
That the degree of'punishment for a particular offense should vary according to the particular current
conditions of the state or society is similar to utilitarian theories of punishment such as Beccaria's and
Bentham's. For example, Beccaria argued that the severity or mildness of the punishment for a particu-
lar offense should vary based on the current conditions ofa society or state:
I conclude with the reflection that the magnitude of punishment ought to be relative to the condi-
tion of the nation itself. Stronger and more obvious impressions are required for the hardened
spirits of a people who have scarcely emerged from a savage state. ... But, to the extent that hu-
man spirits are made gentle by the social state, sensibility increases; as it increases, the severity of
punishment must diminish if one wishes to maintain a constant relationship between object and
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consequentialism, let us consider whether the entire class of conceptually
consequential retributivist theories collapses into consequentialism. Let us
assume that a plausible account may be given of the difference between ab-
stract or conceptual consequences and contingent or factual conse-
quences. 618  The question, however, is whether the use of only the former
type of consequence, but not the latter, is sufficient to preclude retributivist
theories from collapsing into consequentialism. That is, is a purportedly re-
tributivist theory of punishment which justifies punishment only by the
good conceptual, but not factual or contingent, consequences still a retribu-
tivist theory? For one retributivist, Moore, the answer appears to be no--
justifying punishment by its conceptual consequences makes punishment
merely an instrumental good, rather than an intrinsic good.60 9 For Moore,
feeling.
BECCARIA, supra note 102, at 81 (Ch. XLVII) (translator's footnote omitted). As to determining the
degree of desert and justifying the amount of punishment, then, Hegel seems to be squarely in the con-
sequentialist camp. For the view that Hegel is retributivist in determining ifsomeone should be pun-
ished but consequentialist in determining how much someone should be punished, see EwING, supra
note 57, at 24; Dubber, supra note 89, at 1582.
Even retributivists criticize other retributivist theories for collapsing into consequentialism. Moore
criticizes George Fletcher's theory, see supra note 501, justifying punishment by the good conceptual
consequences of vindicating the victim as collapsing into consequentialism:
[Y]ou cannot hold Fletcher's theory and still be a retributivist. Fletcher's actual language is here
instructive; he argues that the function of the criminal law is to end dominance, to terminate domi-
nance, to counteract dominance, or to correct dominance. The point of punishment for Fletcher,
in other words, is to cause a certain state of affairs to come into being by punishing; namely, the
state of affairs whereby this dominating relationship between offender and victim no longer exists.
Yet to say this is not to be a retributivist any more. Fletcher recognizes that you can't have causal
relations between the good that justifies punishment, and the act of punishing, and yet be a retribu-
tivist; rather, you are an instrumentalist, someone for whom punishing those who deserve punish-
ment is not intrinsically good but only instrumentally good.
Moore, supra note 26, at 82-83 (footnote omitted). For other conceptually consequential retributivist
theories which have been criticized as collapsing into consequentialism see supra notes 582 & 589.
608 For discussion of the distinction, see DUFF, supra note 1, at 7, 10.
609 An intrinsic good, or something which has intrinsic value, is good or has value in and of itself
regardless of whether it can generate or lead to other goods or other things of value. On the other hand,
an instrumental good, or something which has instrumental value, is not necessarily a good, or does not
have value, in and of itself, but only is a good or has value because it is an instrument towards, or leads
to, other goods or other things of value. On the intrinsic good/instrumental good distinction, see
WILLIAM K. FRANKENA, ETHIcs 64-67 (1963); GERALD F. GAUs, VALUE AND JUSTIFICATION: THE
FOUNDATIONS OF LIBERAL THEORY 126-130 (1990); G.E. MOORE, PRINCIpIA ETHICA 23-30 (Cam-
bridge Univ. Press 1956) (1903); MOORE, supra note 73, at 157; NOzICK, supra note 104, at 413-15;
Duff, supra note 6, at 5-7; Noah M. Lemos, Value, in THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY,
supra note 56, at 948, 948-49.
For one retributivist, Moore, the intrinsic/instrumental distinction is precisely what marks the
distinction between retributivist and consequentialist theories of punishment. MOORE, supra note 73, at
157 ("[W]hat is distinctively retributivist is the view that the guilty receiving their just deserts is an in-
trinsic good.").
For the view that retributive punishment is understood as an intrinsic good, see for example, EWING,
supra note 57, at 13, 14 & nn.1-2; MOORE, supra note 73, at 157; NOZICK, supra note 104, at 374;
Bean, supra note 45, at 30; Lawrence Davis, They Deserve to Suffer, 32 ANALYSIS 136, 136 (1972);
Dolinko, supra note 12, at 515-28; Duff, supra note 6, at 6-7. But see Mundle, supra note 236, at 74.
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retributivism requires that punishment be only an intrinsic good or end in
itself, the good or end in itself of punishing those who deserve it.610 A con-
sequentialist or instrumentalist theory of punishment justifies punishment
based on the good consequences that follow from punishment.611 Punish-
ment is therefore not intrinsically good, but only instrumentally good in or-
der to attain some other good.612 If we punish in order to attain the goods of
preventing blood guilt from clinging to society, preventing society's com-
plicity with the crime, expressing solidarity with the victim, restoring a rela-
tionship of equality between victim and victimizer, or for similar reasons,
then punishment of those who deserve it is not an intrinsic good but rather
an instrumental good. Punishment, then, is instrumentally good in attaining
these other goods or good consequences.
If the intrinsic/instrumental distinction separates retributive from con-
sequential theories of punishment, then theories justifying punishment by
the good conceptual consequences that are attained slide into consequential-
ism. In other words, the claim that the consequences are merely conceptual
is not enough to prevent a slide into consequentialism, because the good of
punishing those who deserve it is not exclusively an intrinsic good but is
also an instrumental good in achieving the various good conceptual conse-
quences. Justifying punishment by the promotion of the consequences
stemming from punishment necessarily renders punishment itself only an
instrumental good in service to those other consequences. That the conse-
quences stemming from punishment are conceptual or symbolic or intangi-
ble does not alter the classification of the good of punishment itself as
instrumental.
Rather than try to reach an ultimate resolution of what may be only a
terminological or definitional debate, let us cash out what it will mean for
retributivism if the conceptual consequences promoted by punishment may
be used to justify punishment. That is, let us consider some of the conse-
quences of retributivism's use of conceptual consequences.
B. Is Conceptual Deterrence a Form ofRetributivism?
Let us assume arguendo that even if the consequences used to justify
punishment are only conceptual, that still suffices to prevent the slide into
consequentialism. Even so, the resulting distinction between retributive and
consequential theories of punishment is tenuous. If the conceptual/factual
consequences distinction is to serve as the litmus test for distinguishing
theories of punishment, then retributive and consequential theories will still
come quite close to collapsing into each other. That is, even if conceptually
consequential retributivism does not collapse into consequentialism, conse-
quentialist theories might slide into retributivism.
610 Moore, supra note 26, at 82-83.
611 See supra note 109.
612 Moore, supra note 26, at 82-83.
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Could not a consequentialist theory of punishment, justifying punish-
ment by the deterrence of crime, claim that the deterrence attained is not
factual or contingent deterrence but merely conceptual or rational deter-
rence? By conceptual deterrence I mean that no one need actually be de-
terred from the commission of a crime by the punishment of another. The
justification of punishment by conceptual deterrence would not be contin-
gent on some empirically verified, or verifiable, deterrent effect. The claim
would merely be that part of the nature, or conceptual meaning, of punish-
ment is that it would be rational for people to avoid its imposition. Concep-
tual deterrence, it might be asserted, necessarily or logically follows from
the imposition of punishment. Thus, such deterrence is not factual or con-
tingent but only abstract or conceptual. Let us term this the conceptual de-
terrence theory of punishment.
Is this conceptual deterrence theory of punishment consequential or re-
tributive? To answer this question let us consider some features of the the-
ory. The theory justifies the imposition of punishment neither because
punishing those who deserve it is intrinsically good, nor because it is an end
in itself, but, rather, in order to attain the good theoretical consequence of
rational or conceptual deterrence. Thus, punishment itself is only an in-
strmental good. Would the punishment of innocents be justified under this
theory? Yes, if it would serve to promote the good of conceptual deter-
rence. That is, if by punishment of innocents it would be less rational for
other members of society to commit crime, then intentional punishment of
innocents would be justified.613 Would this conceptual deterrence theory
use offenders as mere means to attain the good consequence of conceptual
deterrence? Yes. Because the end of punishing is to promote conceptual
deterrence, the punishment of the offenders is the mere means. Our concep-
tual deterrence theory certainly does not share many of the features tradi-
tionally associated with retributivism. But according to retributivists, the
conceptual nature of the consequences apparently suffices to prevent our
conceptual deterrence theory from being consequential. As a result, the
conceptual deterrence theory seems to be a retributive theory of punishment
after all.
The point of this perhaps minor reductio ad absurdum is that classify-
ing retributive and consequential theories based on the conceptual/factual
consequences distinction threatens the collapse of the wall between the
theories of punishment. Even if we accept some retributivists' insistence
that justifying punishment based on the good conceptual consequences to
be attained does not constitute a slide into consequentialism, that does not
613 If intentionally punishing the innocent, perhaps by falsely claiming that they were guilty, would
make it rational for others not to commit crime, then conceptual deterrence would be promoted. Be-
cause if what justifies punishment under this theory-conceptual deterrence-is promoted by the inten-
tional punishment of the innocent, the conceptual deterrence theory justifies the intentional punishment
of the innocent.
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preclude consequentialist theories from sliding into retributivism. More-
over, since the conceptual deterrence theory is a form of retributivism
(based on the conceptual/factual consequences distinction), then retributiv-
ism justifies the intentional punishment of the innocent and the use of of-
fenders as mere means.
As we will see in the next subpart, the most significant effect of re-
tributivist theories justifying punishment by the consequences (even if only
conceptual) punishment promotes is that conceptually consequential
retributivism incurs the same problems for which retributivists have found
consequentialist theories untenable. Though the nature of the consequences
may be different, the problems stemming from the use of consequences are
the same. Conceptually consequential retributivist theories will be shown
to justify the intentional punishment of particular, identifiable innocents and
the use of offenders as mere means.
C. Punishment of the Innocent and Use of Offenders as Mere Means
The class of retributive theories we have designated conceptually con-
sequential retributivism justifies the intentional punishment of the innocent
and the use of offenders as mere means because of its use of consequences
(even if only conceptual) to justify punishment. To see this, it might be
helpful first to understand why consequential theories are, and simple or
pure retributivism is not, generally thought to be vulnerable to these criti-
cisms. Let us take, for an example, a general deterrence-based consequen-
tial theory of punishment, which justifies punishment by the good factual or
contingent consequences that punishment produces. 14 If the good conse-
quence of deterrence may be obtained by punishing the innocent as well as
the guilty, then the attainment of that consequence justifies the punishment
regardless of the offender's guilt or innocence. 615 Guilty or innocent, the
person punished is the mere means by which that good consequence, in this
case deterrence, is obtained. Rather than treating the person punished as an
end in himself, the person punished is merely the means by which the end
or goal of punishment (in this case deterrence) is attained. At least, this is
how retributivists would explain it. Simple or pure retributivism, because it
does not justify punishment by resort to its consequences, is generally
thought not to be susceptible to these criticisms. As one commentator ex-
plains, simple or pure retributivism justifies punishment:
[A]s an appropriate response to past wrong-doing which has, and needs, no
further purpose beyond itself: for if punishment has no further aim it cannot be
accused of manipulating those on whom it is imposed or against whom it is
threatened-of using them as means towards a further end.
616
614 See supra notes 61, 62, 124 and accompanying text.
615 See supra note 141-143, 160-161, 167 and accompanying text.
616 DUFF, supra note 1, at 186.
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Is the susceptibility of the (contingently) consequentialist deterrence
theory of punishment to the twin criticisms of intentional punishment of the
innocent and use of offenders as mere means dependent on, or a function of,
the nature of the consequences sought to be promoted? That is, does it mat-
ter whether the consequences sought to be promoted are contingent or con-
ceptual? It is generally assumed that it is not the use of consequences
themselves but rather the contingent nature of the consequences that renders
consequentialist theories vulnerable to criticisms of punishing the innocent
and using offenders as mere means.6 17 As one commentator expresses the
assumption:
The contingency of the relation between punishment and its consequentialist
aims generates the most familiar objection to any purely consequentialist the-
ory of punishment: that it would justify clearly unjust kinds of punishment (the
deliberate punishment of an innocent scapegoat, the excessively harsh punish-
ment of the guilty), if they would serve the system's aims.
618
According to this argument, then, it is the contingent nature of the conse-
quences, rather than the use of consequences themselves, that causes the
problems of consequentialist theories of punishment.
This idea apparently underpins the rationale of conceptually conse-
quential retributivism. Because the consequences necessarily or logically
follow from punishment of those who deserve it, every instance of punish-
ing those who deserve it will generate the specified conceptual conse-
quence. Therefore, promotion of the good conceptual consequences will
not justify punishment of all those (including the innocent) whose punish-
ment would be justified by actual or contingent consequences. That is, the
attainment of good contingent consequences will, but the attainment of
good conceptual consequences will not, justify punishment of the innocent
or the use of offenders as mere means.
But the logic of this argument is seriously flawed. That punishment of
those who deserve it will invariably generate the specified good conceptual
consequence does not mean that punishment of those who deserve it is the
only way to attain the good conceptual consequences. Punishment of those
who deserve it may be a sufficient condition for the attainment of the good
conceptual consequences. But it is not a necessary condition. Therefore,
the good conceptual consequences may be generated without punishing
those who deserve it. This opens the door for the possibility of attaining
good conceptual consequences by punishing those who do not deserve it.
As a result, attainment of the good conceptual consequence could justify
punishment of the innocent and the use of offenders as mere means.
617 See id. at 2 (explaining that the "contingent relation between punishment and its justifying aims
generates [the] familiar objections" to consequentialist theories, including punishment of innocent
scapegoats and, in general, imposing unjust punishment).
618 Duff, supra note 6, at 6.
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We have already seen this in our discussion of the conceptual deter-
rence theory, which justified punishment not on any actual deterrent effect
realized in the world but on the promotion of rational or conceptual deter-
rence. We noted that the theory would be subject to the criticisms that it
justifies intentional punishment of the innocent and the use of offenders as
mere means. Thus, the susceptibility of a deterrence-based theory (justify-
ing punishment either by conceptual or contingent deterrence) to these criti-
cisms does not seem to depend on, or be a function of, the nature of the
consequences---contingent or conceptual--sought to be promoted.
That deterrence-based theories are subject to these twin criticisms re-
gardless of whether the consequence to be attained is conceptual or factual
suggests that the abstract nature of the consequences in conceptually conse-
quential retributivism will not preclude such retributivist theories from be-
ing subject to the same criticisms. If so, then it would seem to be not the
nature of the consequences, but merely the use of consequences per se, that
renders a theory of punishment subject to these criticisms.
1. Intentional Punishment of Particular, Identifiable Innocents.-To
see if this conjecture is true, let us consider some particular theories from
the class of conceptually consequential retributivism. The various concep-
tual consequences used to justify punishment in the class of conceptually
consequential retributive theories include: expression of solidarity with vic-
tims,619 restoration of a relation of equality between the will of the victim
and of the wrongdoer,620 dissolution of a dominance-submission relation-
ship between wrongdoer and victim,621 freedom from blood guilt,622 and
restoration of the balance of benefits and burdens.623 Let us apply any one
of these conceptually consequential retributive theories to the following hy-
pothetical.
Suppose that a culpable wrongdoer has culpably committed serious
wrongdoing against a victim but has evaded liability for any of a number of
reasons (such as a nonexculpatory or extrinsic defense) or that, in addition
to the serious wrongdoing, the wrongdoer has committed a minor offense
against the same victim for which he has been found guilty, but has not yet
been punished. In either case, even though the culpable wrongdoer has not
been adjudicated to be legally guilty of the serious criminal offense, all of
the above conceptual consequences would be promoted by punishing the
wrongdoer for the serious wrongdoing. Serious wrongdoing has been
committed which has produced a need to express solidarity with the victim,
a relation of equality to restore, a dominance-submission relationship to
619 FLETCHER, supra note 518, at 201-05.
620 HEGEL, supra note 22, at 124 (§ 99).
621 Fletcher, supra note 526, at 1634-35.
622 KANT, supra note 22, at 142.
623 See generally MORRIS, supra note 6; MURPHY, supra note 113.
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sever, blood guilt to be released, and a balance of benefits and burdens to be
allocated. Just as the good consequence of deterrence might be promoted
regardless of the guilt or innocence of the person punished, so too the vari-
ous good conceptual consequences of the various conceptually consequen-
tial retributive theories could be promoted by intentionally punishing a
particular, identifiable legal innocent.
A retributivist might argue that even if a retributive theory would jus-
tify punishment of the wrongdoer for the serious wrongdoing of which he is
legally innocent, the person would never be punished for the very reason
that he is legally innocent of the serious crime. While this may be true, re-
tributivism per se would nonetheless justify the punishment. In other
words, that a retributive system of punishment would not, as a matter of
practice, punish the legally innocent person does not eliminate the problem
that retributivism per se does justify such punishment.
Conceptually consequential retributivism also justifies the intentional
punishment of particular, identifiable moral innocents. Suppose a defen-
dant is convicted of an offense without committing a morally culpable
wrong. For example, the defendant is convicted of an offense unjustly de-
fined to be a crime or is convicted under a strict liability standard. Though
the defendant has not engaged in morally culpable wrongdoing, she has
nonetheless committed a legally defined criminal offense and has violated
the legal rights (even if not moral rights) of another. Despite not commit-
ting a morally culpable wrong, all of the above conceptual consequences
would be promoted by punishing her. A criminal offense has been commit-
ted, involving the violation of the legal rights of another, for which solidar-
ity with the victim needs to be expressed, a relation of equality must be
restored, a dominance-submission relationship has to be severed, a blood
guilt needs to be released, and a balance of benefits and burdens must be
allocated. Just as the good consequence of (contingent) deterrence might be
promoted regardless of the guilt or innocence of the person punished, so too
the various good conceptual consequences of the various conceptually con-
sequential retributive theories could be promoted by intentionally punishing
a particular, identifiable moral innocent.
And perhaps more importantly, even if a conceptually consequential
retributive system of punishment would not punish innocents, conceptually
consequential retributivism cannot explain to us why it would be wrong to
do so. Recall that consequentialists have also argued, against the criticism
by retributivists that deterrence-based theories justify the intentional pun-
ishment of the innocent, that a deterrence-based system of punishment
would not, in fact, intentionally punish the innocent.6 4 Retributivists have
replied that even if a consequentialist system of punishment would not in-
tentionally punish innocents, consequentialism cannot explain why inten-
624 See supra notes 144-147, 153-155 and accompanying text.
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tional punishment of the innocent is wrong.6 25 This is because that which
justifies punisment-deterrence--fails to possess the intellectual resources
to explain why punishment of the innocent is wrong.
The retributivist argument against consequential deterrence theories
may be applied just as powerfully to conceptually consequential retributiv-
ism. That which justifies punishment for such theories-the promotion of
the various conceptual consequences-fails to include any reason why in-
nocents should not be punished. As a result, just as theories justifying pun-
ishment by factual or contingent consequences are subject to the criticism
that they justify intentional punishment of particular, identifiable innocents,
so also retributive theories justifying punishment by conceptual conse-
quences are subject to the same criticism. More importantly, conceptually
consequential retributivism cannot explain why punishment of the innocent
is wrong.
2. Use of Offenders as Mere Means.-Part V concluded that retribu-
tivism, in general, uses the victims of crime as mere means in violation of
Kant's maxim. This section will show that a specific class of retributive
theories-conceptually consequential retributivism-uses offenders them-
selves as mere means and thus falls victim to the precise criticism that re-
tributivists have directed at consequentialist theories.626  The good
(contingent) consequences of, for example, deterrence or rehabilitation, jus-
tify punishment. These consequences are the purpose or end of what is of
intrinsic value for consequentialist theories; 627 the punishment of offenders
is the mere instrument or means by which the good consequences are ob-
tained.6 28  In contrast, retributivism is claimed to never treat offenders
merely as means but always, at least partially, as ends in themselves.6 29 Be-
cause punishment of deserving offenders has intrinsic value and is an end in
itself for simple or pure retributivism, the punishment of deserving offend-
ers is claimed not to constitute the use of offenders as mere means.6 10 Re-
tributivism in general is conventionally assumed to treat offenders as ends
in themselves by giving them only what they deserve.6 1 But giving offend-
ers only what they deserve may not be enough for conceptually consequen-
tial retributivism to avoid using offenders as mere means.
By resorting to consequences to justify punishment, conceptually con-
sequential retributivism uses the punishment of wrongdoers as a mere
means to attain the various good conceptual consequences. The purpose or
end of punishing is to promote good conceptual consequences, such as: an-
625 See supra notes 158-159 and accompanying text.
626 See supra notes 397-399, 409-418 and accompanying text.
627 See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
628 See supra notes 617-618 and accompanying text
629 See supra note 400 and accompanying text.
630 See supra text accompanying note 616.
631 See supra note 400 and accompanying text.
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nulling or negating the crime,63 2 avoiding the diminishment of society's
values,633 expressing the seriousness of the criminal conduct as something
that should not have been done,63 4 expressing society's emphatic denuncia-
tion of crime,635 removing the advantage gained by the offender in freely
indulging his will,636 negating the offender's advantage gained by his re-
nunciation of self-restraint, 637 and educating the offender.638 The persons
being punished are merely the means by which those good conceptual con-
sequences are to be obtained. It is the attainment of the good conceptual
consequence that is of intrinsic value; the punishment of the offender is
only of instrumental value. Thus, just as retributivists claim of consequen-
tialist theories, conceptually consequential retributivism uses offenders as
mere means.
A conceptually consequential retributivist might concede that offenders
are used as means but still object that they are not used as mere means.
While the punishment of offenders might be used as means to attain the
good conceptual consequences, they are also treated as ends by punishing
them in accordance with what they deserve. Therefore, conceptually con-
sequential retributivism does not use offenders as mere means. But the re-
tributivist critique of consequentialism suggests this objection fails.
Retributivists have argued that consequentialist theories use offenders
as mere means, in violation of Kant's maxim, even in those instances in
which only the guilty are punished.639 Jeffrie Murphy points out that the
consequentialist theory faces Kantian objections not only to punishment of
the innocent, but also to punishment of the guilty.640 This is because it
[M]ust involve justifying punishment in terms of its social results--e.g., deter-
rence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. And thus even a guilty man is, on this
theory, being punished because of the instrumental value the action of the pun-
ishment will have in the future. He is being used as a means to some future
good-e.g., the deterrence of others. Thus those of a Kantian persuasion, who
see the importance of worrying about the treatment of persons as mere means,
must, it would seem, object just as strenuously to the punishment of the guilty
on utilitarian grounds as to the punishment of the innocent.6 t'
According to Murphy, then, where punishment is justified by its conse-
quences, even the guilty-those who receive the punishment they de-
632 HEGEL, supra note 22, at 123 (§ 97).
633 Oldenquist, supra note 17, at 750.
634 Morris, supra note 583, at 266.
635 See supra note 584.
636 Finnis, supra note 585, at 134.
637 Murphy, supra note 6, at 14.
638 Parent, supra note 587, at 351-53.
639 Murphy, supra note 6, at 5; Wasserstron, supra note 34, at 340-41.
640 Murphy, supra note 6, at 5.
641 Id.
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serve-are used as mere means in violation of Kant's maxim.642
Murphy's critique of utilitarian or consequentialist theories applies
equally to conceptually consequential retributivism. 643 Because conceptu-
ally consequential retributivism justifies punishment based on the good
conceptual consequences generated, punishment of an offender will be of
instrumental value. The offender, even one who is guilty and is punished
only as he deserves, is being used as a means to attain the good conceptual
consequences--e.g., annulling or negating the crime. "Thus those of a
Kantian persuasion, who see the importance of worrying about the treat-
ment of persons as mere means, must, it would seem, object just as strenu-
ously to the punishment of ... [those who deserve it on the grounds of
conceptual consequences] as to the punishment of the innocent."64 In other
words, conceptually consequential retributivism, even if it only punishes
culpable offenders as they deserve, would still be objectionable on Kantian
grounds of using offenders as mere means.
Of course, the obvious difference between Murphy's critique of conse-
quentialist theories and the critique's attempted application to conceptually
consequential retributivism is that the former theories utilize contingent
consequences and the latter employ conceptual consequences. But is this
difference, as it relates to using offenders as mere means, significant? It
does not seem so. Regardless of the nature of the consequences, the pun-
ishment of the offender stands in the same relation to the consequences
used to justify the punishment. Punishment of the offender is the mere
642 Richard Wasserstrom offers a similar argument that punishment of the guilty may trigger the
same moral objections as punishment of the innocent. Wasserstrom, supra note 34, at 340. As Wasser-
strom explains it, "[i]n both cases the objection is identical: a person is used as a means to benefit oth-
ers-whether through deterrence in punishing the guilty; or some other real or presumed benefit to
others, in punishing the innocent." Id.
643 Wasserstrom's argument, similar to Murphy's, see supra text accompanying notes 640-641,
could also be applied to conceptually consequential retributivism. The persons punished under concep-
tually consequential retributivism, whether guilty or innocent, are punished in order to attain conceptual
consequences that purportedly benefit others. Thus, the persons punished (even the guilty) are used as
mere means in order to benefit others. The conceptual consequences (used to justify punishment under
various versions of conceptually consequential retributivism) that explicitly seek to benefit others in-
clude expressing solidarity with victims, restoring a relation of equality between the victim and offender,
counteracting a dominance-submission relationship between offender and victim, and re-establishing the
victim's worth. All of these various conceptual consequences strive to benefit those other than the per-
sons being punished. The attainment of these conceptual consequences purports to benefit the victims of
crime. Thus, to the extent that conceptual consequences benefit others, Wasserstrom's argument against
the deterrence theory applies equally to conceptually consequential retributivism. As a result, conceptu-
ally consequential retributivism uses those who are punished (even if guilty) as mere means in a morally
objectionable manner. Those who are punished are used as mere means in order to benefit others-for
example, their victims.
644 Id. Though I am quoting from Murphy, the language inserted in the brackets constitutes a sub-
stantive alteration of Murphy's analysis. I deleted Murphy's language of "the guilty on utilitarian
grounds" and substituted the language in brackets. This has been done to show that Murphy's argu-
ment-that consequentialism not only uses innocents, but the guilty as well, as mere means-aso would
demonstrate that the promotion of conceptual consequences uses offenders as mere means.
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means or instrument by which the good consequences are obtained. At-
tainment of the good consequences is of intrinsic value; the punishment of
the offender is of instrumental value. Therefore, if punishment of those
who deserve it, as justified by its contingent consequences, constitutes us-
ing offenders as mere means, then punishment of those who deserve it as
justified by its conceptual consequences also constitutes using offenders as
mere means. In other words, if (contingently) consequential theories use
offenders as mere means, then conceptually consequential retributivism also
uses offenders as mere means.
A retributivist still might argue that as long as an offender is punished
in the manner that she deserves, she might be used as a means but not as a
mere means. But if this is true for conceptually consequential retributivism,
then it is equally true for (contingently) consequentialist theories. Regard-
less of whether consequentialist and conceptually consequentialist retribu-
tivism theories do or do not use offenders as mere means in violation of
Kant's maxim, neither theory fares better than the other.
D. Objections
This subpart considers two objections to the above arguments against
conceptually consequential retributivism. First, conceptually consequential
retributivism justifies punishment not only by the good conceptual conse-
quences to be obtained, but also because the offender deserves it. Second,
the conceptual consequences elicited in support of retributivism are merely
descriptive and play no part in the justification of punishment.
1. Justifies Punishment by Both Conceptual Consequences and De-
sert.-Adherents to conceptually consequential retributivism might point
out that their theory justifies punishment not merely to promote good con-
ceptual consequences but also to mete out the desert of the offender. So,
conceptually consequential retributivism, properly understood, does not
have a different justification than pure or simple retributivism but an addi-
tional one. Would such an understanding of the theory avoid the above
criticisms?
Construing conceptually consequential retributivism in that way would
provide a basis to distinguish the conceptual or rational deterrence theory645
from retributivism. Though the conceptual deterrence theory utilizes con-
ceptual consequences to justify punishment (the conceptual consequence of
rational deterrence), it does not also use the desert of the offender as a justi-
fication. Thus, the collapse of the conceptual deterrence theory into retribu-
tivism would be precluded.
The revised interpretation of conceptually consequential retributivism,
however, would not avoid justifying the intentional punishment of particu-
lar, identifiable innocents. Suppose, as discussed above, one or more of the
645 See supra subpart VI.B.
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good conceptual consequences could be promoted by punishing an inno-
cent. The conceptual consequences component would justify such punish-
ment. But the desert component would not. The two components of what
justifies punishment would give contradictory answers. This incompatibil-
ity or instability of the two components, however, could easily be remedied
in two ways.
First, the two components might operate disjunctively. That is, pun-
ishment would be justified if either good conceptual consequences might be
promoted by punishing or if the person punished deserved it. Let us sup-
pose again that the punishment of an innocent would serve to promote one
or some of the good conceptual consequences. Promotion of the good con-
ceptual consequences would then serve to justify the intentional punishment
of a particular, identifiable innocent. Though the disjunctive operation of
the two components yields a non-contradictory determination of whether a
given instance of punishment is justified, the problem of punishing the in-
nocent remains.
Second, the two components might operate conjunctively. That is,
punishment would not be justified unless both (i) the offender deserves it,
and (ii) the good conceptual consequence would be obtained. This seems
more promising. With punishment justified only if both components are
satisfied, the conjunctive operation of the components provides a non-
contradictory determination of whether a given instance of punishment is
justified. In addition, it would seem that even if the punishment of an inno-
cent would promote a good conceptual consequence, such punishment
would not be justified because the person punished does not deserve it. The
conjunctive operation of the components would seem to avoid punishment
of the innocent.
646
And under the conjunctive approach, conceptually consequential re-
tributivism would avoid using offenders as mere means. Though punish-
ment of an offender would be used as a means to attain the good conceptual
consequence, the offender would also be punished because he deserves it.
Therefore, though the offender would be used as a means, he would not be
used as a mere means. That one of the components justifies punishment
because the offender deserves it means that the offender would, at least in
part, be treated as an end.
646 But a more subtle version of the problem ofjustifying the intentional punishment of particular,
identifiable innocents still remains. Under conceptually consequential retributivism, even the conjunc-
tive version, there will be various approaches to what constitutes the status of deserving punishment.
Under the moralistic conception, morally culpable wrongdoing renders one deserving of punishment
But as discussed above, see supra subpart II.B, this approach justifies the intentional punishment ofpar-
ticular, identifiable legal innocents. And the legalistic conception justifies the intentional punishment of
particular, identifiable moral innocents. See supra subpart II.C. The combined moralistic and legalistic
conception of deserving punishment avoids the problem, in part, of intentionally punishing the innocent.
But as discussed above, see supra subpart II.C, the combined conception does this at the cost of giving,
in some instances, contradictory determinations of the degree of an offender's desert and punishment.
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Though the conjunctive operation of the components might, in part,
preclude conceptually consequential retributivism from intentionally pun-
ishing the innocent and using offenders as mere means, it creates another
difficulty. Suppose that an offender deserves punishment but that for some
reason the good conceptual consequence could not be attained by punishing
that offender. Conceptually consequential retributivism, construed conjunc-
tively, would not be able to justify the offender's punishment, thereby vio-
lating the retributive duty to punish the guilty.
Retributivists would, of course, reply that conceptual consequences
necessarily or logically follow the punishment of a deserving offender.
Whether they do or do not, however, is merely a matter of intuition. Re-
tributivists offer no argument that punishment, in fact, does avoid society's
complicity with a crime, 647 express solidarity with the victim,648 or annul or
negate the crime.649 But it may not matter so much whether conceptual
consequences invariably follow deserved punishment or not.
Perhaps the more important point is that conceptually consequential re-
tributivism could not explain why it would be wrong to forego punishing a
deserving, guilty offender iWthe good conceptual consequences could not be
attained by punishment. That is because if the good conceptual conse-
quences could not be attained, then punishment of the guilty, culpable
wrongdoer would be unjustified, and therefore, foregoing punishment
would not be wrong under conceptually consequential retributivism. So, of
course, conceptually consequential retributivists could not explain the
wrong of not punishing deserving offenders. But presumably, not punish-
ing the guilty, culpable wrongdoer is wrong, and consequentially concep-
tual retributivism should be able to explain why. After all, simple or pure
retributivism could offer an explanation because foregoing punishment of
the guilty would be wrong under it. As Kant declares, "[t]he principle of
punishment is a categorical imperative, and woe to him who crawls through
the windings of eudaemonism [the principle of utility] in order to discover
something that releases the criminal from punishment .... -650 That is, pun-
ishing a deserving wrongdoer is a duty of justice, and good consequences,
or the lack thereof, are never a reason to forego punishing a wrongdoer de-
serving punishment.
Despite their inability to explain why it is wrong to forego punishing a
culpable wrongdoer if the good conceptual consequence could not be at-
tained by punishing, a conceptually consequential retributivist might insist
on denying the "if' in our argument. That is, because of the conceptual na-
ture of the consequences, the good conceptual consequences would always
be promoted by punishing a deserving wrongdoer. As a result, a conceptu-
647 KANT, supra note 22, at 142.
648 FLETCHER, supra note 518, at 201-05.
649 HEGEL, supra note 22, at 123 (§ 97).
650 KANT, supra note 22, at 141.
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ally consequential retributivist would never need to explain the wrong of
foregoing punishment of a deserving wrongdoer where the good conceptual
consequences would not be promoted.
Even so, conceptually consequential retributivism still cannot supply a
morally relevant explanation of why foregoing punishment of the guilty is
wrong. Since both components are required for punishment to be justified,
the wrong of not punishing must also be explained by resort to both compo-
nents. Thus, the wrong of not punishing a deserving wrongdoer whose pun-
ishment would promote the good conceptual consequence must consist of
both (i) the injustice of violating the duty to punish and (ii) the unattainabil-
ity of the good conceptual consequence of punishment. Thus, the explana-
tion must consist, at least in part, of the inability to attain the good
conceptual consequences. But for retributivism, "[t]he state of affairs
where a wrongdoer suffers punishment is morally better than the state of af-
fairs where he does not; and it is better irrespective of any of the conse-
quences of punishing him."65' That is, the wrong of not punishing those
who deserve punishment should outweigh any inability to attain beneficial
conceptual consequences from the punishment. Therefore, to the extent that
it relies on consequences, conceptually consequential retributivism cannot
provide a satisfactory account of why it is wrong to forego punishment of
the guilty.
This would seem to be a fair criticism because it is retributivists who
have argued that the problem with consequentialism is not so much that it
would punish the innocent but that it could not adequately explain why do-
ing so would be wrong.652 That a consequentialist's explanation might re-
sort to violations of utility, counterproductivity, or that it would undermine
deterrence has been criticized by retributivists as failing to capture the mor-
ally relevant reason why punishment of the innocent is wrong. 653 In other
words, that punishment of the innocent would generate bad consequences
fails to account for our moral abhorrence to it. Equally, conceptually con-
sequential retributivism's reliance on abstract consequences to explain why
foregoing punishment of the guilty is wrong also fails to capture our moral
intuition that it is unjust.
The resulting dilemma for conceptually consequential retributivism is
that (i) without the conjunctive interpretation, it justifies the intentional
punishment of particular, identifiable innocents and uses offenders as mere
means, but (ii) with the conjunctive interpretation, it cannot supply a mor-
ally relevant account of why foregoing punishment of guilty, deserving
wrongdoers is wrong.
2. Conceptual Consequences Do Not Justify Punishment.-The ob-
651 Rawls, supra note 1, at 5.
652 See supra notes 158-159 and accompanying text.
653 Id.
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jection might be that conceptually consequential retributivism does not util-
ize punishment's good conceptual consequences to justify punishment. It
perhaps merely refers to the good conceptual consequences generated by
punishment as a side-benefit. Or perhaps the conceptual consequences pro-
vide some answer to consequentialists who demand that punishment serve
some purpose or end beyond itself. In any event, and for whatever reason
retributivists might refer to punishment's conceptual consequences, the
conceptual consequences are in no way part of the justification of punish-
ment. Under such a construction of conceptually consequential retributiv-
ism, the actual and sole justification of punishment is the desert of the
offender. Does this construction of conceptually consequential retributiv-
ism avoid any of the above criticisms?
The elimination of the conceptual consequences from the justification
of punishment does eliminate the problem of using offenders as mere
means. This is because the punishment of offenders is no longer the in-
strument or means by which something of intrinsic value is attained-the
conceptual consequences. Since punishment of offenders is its own end, of-
fenders are no longer used as mere means. And intentional punishment of
the innocent would, in part,654 be avoided because the innocent would not
deserve it.
But problems would remain. If the conceptual consequences play no
part in the justification of punishment, then why restrict the side-benefit of
punishment to only conceptual consequences? Why not refer to the side-
benefit of actual consequences? If retributivism is to refer to some side-
benefit of punishment that plays no part in the justification of punishment,
then why would it not refer as well to the side-benefit of actual conse-
quences such as deterrence? Moreover, if the sole justification for punish-
ment is an offender's desert, then conceptually consequential retributivism
collapses into simple or pure retributivism.
E. Conclusion
To avoid the charge of circularity or emptiness stemming from simple
retributivism's formula of "it is right to punish criminals because doing so
is right," a large class of retributive theories resort to the consequences of
punishment to justify punishment. In turn, to avoid the criticism that the
use of consequences collapses this class of retributivism into consequential-
ism, retributivists invoke the distinction between factual or contingent con-
sequences and conceptual or logical consequences. By justifying
654 Even under this interpretation of conceptual consequential retributivism, the theory would still
be subject to the problems of punishing the innocent, including under strict liability, discussed in supra
Part IV. Such punishment of the innocent might be thought to constitute intentional punishment of the
innocent. See text accompanying supra note 335. Moreover, both the moralistic and legalistic concep-
tions of conceptually consequential retributivism would justify the intentional punishment of particular,
identifiable innocents. See supra subparts 11.B--C.
Deterring Retributivism
punishment merely by the latter type of consequences, they claim, concep-
tually consequential retributivism avoids sliding into consequentialism.
The distinction is revealed to be tenuous by showing that a deterrence-based
theory, justifying punishment by rational or conceptual deterrence, would
then be a form of retributivism. Thus, even if conceptually consequential
retributivism does not collapse into consequentialism, a conceptual deter-
rence theory slides into retributivism.
Even if the distinction is accepted and conceptually consequential re-
tributivism does not slide into consequentialism, the use of consequences to
justify punishment for retributivism is problematic. Regardless of the na-
ture of the consequences employed to justify punishment, the use of conse-
quences by retributivism incurs the same problems as consequentialist
theories. Because the purpose or end of punishment is the promotion of the
good conceptual consequences, the punishment of wrongdoers is merely the
means by which the good conceptual consequences may be attained. And
because many of the good conceptual consequences may be promoted even
if a defendant is innocent, the promotion of the good conceptual conse-
quences justifies intentional punishment of particular, identifiable inno-
cents.
Unless retributivism departs from the formula of desert as the sole jus-
tification for punishment, it is circular or empty. But once retributivism de-
parts from desert as the sole justification for punishment by resorting to
consequences, and since the consequences may be obtained by punishing an
offender without desert, retributivism is subject to the very same problems
of consequentialist theories-justifying intentional punishment of particu-
lar, identifiable innocents and the use of offenders as mere means.
CONCLUSION
Retributivism's claimed superiority and place on the moral high
ground in the debate on the justification of punishment is based, in large
part, on retributivists' claims that consequentialist, but not retributive, theo-
ries of punishment (i) justify the intentional punishment of particular, iden-
tifiable innocents, (ii) use persons as mere means in violation of Kant's
maxim to always treat persons as ends in themselves, (iii) fail to give a
principled account of the degree of an offender's desert and punishment,
and (iv) punish without due regard to an offender's fault, culpability and
guilt. This Article has held a mirror to these critiques and has demonstrated
that retributivism suffers equally from each of these failings. In some in-
stances, retributivists might be able to defend their theory from these criti-
cisms but only by advancing arguments that allow consequentialist theories
to avoid these problems as well. Either way, retributivism is no better than
consequentialist approaches to punishment. And, as a theory of punish-
ment, it might be worse. While undeniably flawed, consequentialism is true
to itself. In contrast, because retributivists' own criticisms of consequen-
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tialist theories may be turned back on retributivism, retributivism fails to
satisfy its own criteria of just punishment.
